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Abstract 
This project examines the choices that rebel groups make between different types of sub-
state political violence campaigns. I argue that rebels will choose a specific campaign type based 
on variations in the levels of state actions that cause grievances (referred to as coercion), and the 
capacity of both the state and the rebel group. This project develops a framework to explain the 
rebel decision-making process. The rebels seek to change the political behavior of the state by 
undertaking some form of violent campaign. Rebel campaigns are the ways in which rebels seek 
to obtain their ends; this project delineates between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns. 
However, rebels’ choice of campaign is affected by several factors: coercion, state administrative 
capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. I 
hypothesize that the different types of campaigns are affected differently by these factors. 
Additionally, I hypothesize that levels of coercion are more strongly related to the initial year of 
the campaign than subsequent years, regardless of campaign type. These hypotheses are analyzed 
via quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, this includes the development of novel 
latent variables for coercion and capacity prior to empirical testing of the hypotheses. 
Qualitatively, two case studies of rebel groups are examined; the Mau Mau in Kenya and the 
LTTE in Sri Lanka. The research finds limited support for the hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between coercion and capacity, and the rebels’ choice of campaign.  
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1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The historical record provides us with numerous examples of one type of political 
violence coexisting or transitioning into another type of violence. For example, the ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan has been described as terrorism, insurgency, and/or civil war—depending 
on the time, the location, and the perspective of the observer. What is true of Afghanistan is also 
true in research that looks at these phenomena; while terrorism, insurgency, and civil war all 
refer to forms of sub-state political violence, they are often studied in isolation from each other.  
This is an important omission; research that focuses only on one type of violence tends to 
explain the rebel group choice in terms of a choice between non-violence and the one type of 
violence under study.1 Such research does not address the fact that rebel groups may be making 
choices between different types of sub-state violence, rather than only facing a choice between 
non-violence and a given type of violence. While several scholars have pointed out the need for 
research that links types of sub-state violence together (Findley and Young 2012; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Carter 2016), little work has been done to develop a framework to tie together 
multiple types of sub-state violence, which, in turn, would permit better analysis of the factors 
that affect rebel choice of a specific type of political violence. This research seeks to offer a new 
framework which provides just that. 
                                                 
1 Significant fields of literature exist that examine the relationship between any one type of sub-state violence and 
explanatory factors. Listing all research done in each field is beyond the scope of this project, however, some 
examples are as follows. Researchers studying terrorism in isolation include Laqueur (1987), Pape (2005), Jongman 
(1988), Crenshaw (1981), Victoroff (2005), Abrahms (2008), and Hoffman (2006). Researchers studying insurgency 
in isolation include Galula (2006), Kilcullen (2010), Muller and Seligson (1987), Metz and Millen (2004), and 
Fowler (2005). Researchers studying civil war in isolation include Hironaka (2005), Sambanis (2004), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), Hegre (2001), Buhaug and Gates (2002), and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002).  
2 
The problem with examining each type of violence in isolation is that we may be missing 
the interplay between choices. For example, how much does state coercion affect a rebel choice 
to respond with terrorism? With an insurgent campaign? Is this choice of terrorism or insurgency 
predicated on rebel capacity? What about the state’s capacity to retaliate against violent rebel 
action? I argue that coercion, as well as state and rebel capacity, need to be examined together, in 
relationship to the different sub-state violence types that are available to rebels, in order to have a 
more complete picture of when rebel groups will choose a specific type of violence. Without 
considering the choice that rebel groups have among these three options, we will not have the 
complete story as to how groups will elect to choose a specific type of violence. This is a 
question that has not yet fully been addressed in the literature.  
There is a small field literature that includes the quantitative analysis of choices between 
different types of sub-state violence, however, this extant literature does not provide a 
comprehensive framework that encompasses terrorism, insurgency, and civil war.2 Findley and 
Young (2012) look at the incidence of terrorist events within civil war. Carter (2016) 
distinguishes between strategies of terrorist and insurgent attacks. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
discuss the differences between insurgency and civil war. Several other authors identify that 
there are multiple types of sub-state violence that rebels can choose between, but these 
frameworks remain more abstract, and do not rigorously identify and address how the issues of 
capacity and coercion can serve as explanatory factors.3 
Developing a theory that links specific configurations of structural factors with specific 
violence types would allow for greater precision in explaining sub-state violence choices, and 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of the choices rebels make between different types of sub-state violence.   
3 See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of these theoretical frameworks. 
3 
that is what this project does in the following pages. In doing so, this research advances the 
literature by providing a better understanding of rebel choices between types of violence, which 
has implications for the study of terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and sub-state violence more 
broadly.  
In order to address these issues, and to add to our understanding of why rebel groups may 
choose different types of violence, this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I argue that, 
instead of looking at discrete conflict events, political violence can better be understood as the 
ways by which rebel groups seek to change the political behavior of a state. This concept of ways 
draws on two fields of literature. The first, from military and strategic studies, describes ways in 
relationship to ends and means in terms of strategy development (Gray 2014; Yarger 2012). In 
this framework, the ways, or actions, are constrained by the means, or limiting conditions, 
available to the rebel groups. Utilizing the ends-ways-means framework means that acts of 
political violence can be placed in their larger context, understood as elements of a strategy of 
violence chosen by the rebel group. The first advantage of this ends-ways-means framework is 
that the types of rebel violence—terrorist, insurgent, and civil war—can then be understood as a 
set of options that rebel groups choose between, rather than as isolated phenomenon.  
This concept of a set of options, or ways, dovetails neatly with political science literature 
on the phenomenon of ‘policy substitution’. Introduced in Chapter 2, and discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 4, policy substitution research focuses on how different conditions facing an 
actor may change the behavior that actor chooses to employ in order—the choices it can 
substitute between—to achieve its goals (Most and Starr 1984). The policy substitution research 
field is focused on the choices that states make, vis-à-vis other states (Levy and Thompson 2010; 
Morrow 1993; Lake 1996; Clark and Reed 2005) or vis-à-vis non-state groups (Moore 2000; 
4 
Enterline and Gleditsch 2000). However, the substitution literature has only rarely examined how 
rebel groups may make substitutions; a search of the literature found only three similar usages of 
the substitution framework when looking at rebel groups. 4 In perhaps the application closest to 
this project, Bueno de Mesquita (2013) looks at rebel group choice between conventional or 
unconventional tactics. Cunningham et al. (2005) looks at the choice of duration in civil wars, 
and Frisch (2009) looks at the choice of target: attacking the state versus another rebel group. 
Therefore, a second advantage of this approach is the extension of the policy substitution 
literature further into studies of rebel group choices by expanding the menu of choices of sub-
state violence types that rebel groups have.  
Chapter 2 also introduces the concept of a campaign, which is a time-constrained series 
of actions focused on achieving a specific objective. A campaign can encompass multiple types 
of violent events, and the same type of event may be present in multiple campaign types. 
However, differentiating between campaign types is still possible, since this classification 
scheme is focused on the aggregate characteristics, or overarching ways, rather than individual 
events. By grouping events into campaigns, it becomes easier to answer the question raised in the 
opening paragraph of this chapter; an insurgent campaign may include an act of terrorism, but it 
will also include other criteria that differentiate it from a terrorist campaign. 
This differentiation between campaign types is the focus of Chapter 3, which delineates 
three ways of rebel campaigns: terrorist, insurgent, and civil war. In order to do so, this chapter 
first reviews the multiplicity of definitions and descriptions of each phenomenon, and then 
                                                 
4 There is also some literature on tactical substitution in rebel groups, such as the type of terrorist attack 
(kidnapping/bombing/etc.) to be used given a certain counterterrorism policy (Enders and Sandler 1993, Enders and 
Sandler 2006, Brandt and Sandler 2009, Faria 2007). 
5 
addresses the theoretical defensibility of understanding that phenomenon as a campaign. A 
review of previous research on civil wars reveals that this type of violence is already often 
implicitly understood in campaign-style terms (e.g. Sambanis 2004; Chenowith and Lewis 2013). 
Insurgency is sometimes—when it is viewed as a subset of civil war—also treated in this manner 
(e.g. Byman 2008; Connable and Libicki 2010). While references to terrorist campaigns exist in 
descriptive literature (e.g. Pape 2005; Crenshaw 2008), terrorism is typically measured in terms 
of the occurrence and frequency of discrete events. Chapter 3 argues, however, that terrorism 
should be understood as a campaign, and that doing so may permit for a better understanding of 
why terrorism occurs, relative to other types of sub-state violence.  
Chapter 4 delves into how the structural conditions of the state and the rebel group, as the 
means that influence rebel choice, are linked to the onset and occurrence of campaigns. The 
variations between these different structural conditions are therefore expected to correlate with 
different campaign types. Drawing from an organizational structure proposed by Bell et al. 
(2013), this chapter identifies three casual groups of factors for sub-state political violence: 
coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Utilizing an approach of coercion and capacity as the 
primary predictors of sub-state violence agrees with much of the extant research in this area.5   
However, the lacuna in this area is not so much what the major causal factors are, but 
instead how changes in those causal factors might co-vary with different types of sub-state 
violence. Previous research into the causes of generalized sub-state political violence has tended 
toward binary measures of conflict occurrence or at rough measures of magnitude of conflict, 
                                                 
5 There is a vast literature on the causes of sub-state violence (cf. Gurr 1970, Tilly 1978, Lichbach 1994, Gurr 2000, 
Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Regan and Norton 
2005, Weinstein 2007, Kalyvas 2006). 
6 
rather than the type of conflict, which is the focus of this project. Research in the specific fields 
of terrorism, insurgency, and civil war have also identified predictors for a specific type of 
violence, but these predictors typically do not take into account the incidence of other types of 
violence, which they may also predict. Chapter 4 combines the findings from these multiple 
research areas, developing hypotheses as to how the variations between coercion and capacity 
help explain the onset and incidence of different types of sub-state political violence.  
Once generated, these hypotheses undergo rigorous testing in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
Chapter 5 utilizes latent variable techniques to develop novel measures of coercion and capacity. 
Latent variable modeling, new to social science literature, captures a measure of the shared 
variance of multiple observed variables, which provides information on the unobservable, or 
inferred, variable of interest. This chapter extends previous efforts to use latent variables to 
capture aspects of state capacity, and also provides a first attempt at generating latent variables 
for aspects of rebel capacity, something that has not previously been attempted in the literature. 
Chapter 6 quantitatively analyzes rebel campaigns across multiple countries and years in order to 
empirically test the hypotheses on rebel campaign choice. In order to do so, this chapter develops 
a novel methodology for measuring terrorist campaigns (as opposed to terrorist events). In so 
doing, this project makes a contribution to research in sub-state violence by developing a 
standardized, replicable campaign classification scheme for terrorism, generating unit 
commensurability between terrorist campaigns and insurgent or civil war campaigns. Chapter 6 
incorporates this campaign data with the latent variables generated in Chapter 5, alongside other 
widely used and accepted preexisting data sources, to develop this project’s dataset. Multinomial 
probit analysis is performed on this dataset. Results from the empirical testing provide some 
support for the hypotheses. 
7 
Chapters 7 and 8 test the hypotheses by qualitatively examining two historical case 
studies of sub-state politicized violence in Kenya and Sri Lanka. Each case study provides an in-
depth look at the onset and occurrence of different types of rebel campaigns, with a particular 
focus on how campaign choices were affected by changes in coercion, state capacity, and rebel 
capacity. The results of these case studies generally support the hypothesis, but also provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the interplay between these factors in specific contexts. Chapter 
9 reviews the results of the quantitative and qualitative hypotheses testing, and discusses how 
framing sub-state violence as campaigns chosen by rebels offers a better way of understanding 
the onset and occurrence of specific types of sub-state violence. The chapter ends by describing 
the implications of this project on future research on this topic. 
 
  
8 
Chapter 2 - Ends, Ways, Means: A Framework 
One of the challenges of study of political violence is that events—battles, bombs, and 
massacres—are easier to observe and record than the larger strategies that drive these events. 
This is logical, but unfortunate. The observation of discrete phenomenon is easy to record, since 
it is part of the public record. However, the motivation behind these discrete events is of more 
import, since understanding the overarching goals of the rebel group offers a clearer picture of 
why certain violent activities are undertaken. As Friedman (2014, 27) notes, “Tactics are the 
currency used to buy strategic effect and they are far more tangible than the item that they are 
intending to purchase. Observers tend to focus on the tangible at the expense of the intangible.”  
I argue that, not only are the violent actions taken by rebels are driven by these 
underlying, less tangible goals, but if we can identify the broader courses of action rebel groups 
choose to take in pursuit of these goals, we should also then be able to better understand what 
structural factors explain those courses of action. The focus of this project, therefore, is to 
broaden the frame of analysis and look at relationships between multiple types of sub-state 
conflict, and to do so not by studying the happenstance of discrete events, but rather to categorize 
the broader actions of sub-state rebellion into specific types and then determine which type is 
most likely to occur, given observable structural conditions. In order to do so, I utilize an ends-
ways-means framework originally proposed by theorists of military strategy, but which also 
incorporates political science theories of policy substitution and rationality. 
The framework of ends, ways, and means is used to understand military actions within a 
larger context (Clausewitz 1976, 87). This ends-ways-means framework is still in wide use today 
as a method of understanding national security strategy, and the tradeoffs that occur between 
9 
what a state would like to achieve strategically, and what is possible, given current conditions.6 
This framework provides a basis for explaining how different types of rebel activities can be 
understood as options, substitutable for each other based, with the choice of violence type made 
by a rational actor.  I argue that the framework proposed here offers three benefits. First, this 
framework explicitly lays the substitutable nature of campaigns of sub-state violence. Though, as 
discussed in the next chapter, identifying campaigns is not new to the literature, however, the 
framework that delineates between comparable campaigns is. Second, using this framework 
permits individual events to be nested underneath those campaigns. In doing so, it organizes and 
makes clear the delineations between specific events and larger, more sustained choices, or 
courses of action, taken by a rebel group. Again, this explicit delimitation of the relationship 
between tactical actions and larger campaigns, which permits events of one type to be subsumed 
into larger categories that may be of the same or a different type, is an addition to the 
methodologies currently at use. Though there are examples of interpreting events within larger 
campaigns or wars (Findley and Young 2012), this project draws up on this previous research to 
formalize a more encompassing methodology that ranges across multiple event and campaign 
types. Finally, while drawing from policy substitution and rationality literature, this approach is 
unique in that it incorporates these political science fields with the ends-ways-means concept 
from the field of strategic and military studies. By combining these two fields, the findings from 
the political science fields are tied into a specific unit of analysis, the campaign, which is strictly 
delimited, whereas in the larger literature in these fields, the unit of analysis can vary widely.  
While the ends-ways-means framework comes from the fields of military and strategic 
studies, it relates to a similar concept that exists within the political science field, in the concept 
                                                 
6 For examples of modern usage, see Friedman (2014) or Hammes (2011). 
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of ‘policy substitution’. Policy substitution, in its original sense, focused on the different foreign 
policy choices that a state could make in response to a give situation (Most and Starr 1984). This 
substitution argument is extended in Chapter 4 to help explain how rebels might choose between 
different types of violent sub-state campaigns. In this way, the ends-ways-means framework 
provides an overarching approach to understanding the expression of rebel violence, and the 
substitution literature provides additional insights into the choices that rebels make in choosing 
between different ways, based on variations in the means.  
The primary assumption required to use the ends, ways, means framework is that of the 
rational actor. Actors—in this case, the state and the rebel group—are assumed to act rationality. 
In this sense, actors are considered to be utility maximizers who are capable of critically 
considering their options for action, and then undertaking the option which appears to be the 
most likely path to bring about success. This is not to imply that rebel campaigns will always be 
successful, but rather that, among a limited choice of options, the onset and occurrence of 
different types of rebel campaigns is the product of a rational calculation by the rebel group 
actor. Such an approach is related to, and consistent with, extant literature (cf. Crenshaw 1981; 
Sandler et al. 1983; Lichbach 1987). The rationality assumption is critical to utilizing an ends-
ways-means framework for understanding rebel violence. Without some form of rationality 
assumption on the part of the actors, there would be no logic to a causal relationship between the 
means and the ways of violence, as the actors would not seek to understand, or be constrained 
by, their—or their opponents’—capabilities (means) prior to choosing a course of action. Yarger 
(2012, 45) supports this argument when he notes that the “underlying assumption” of an ends-
ways-means approach is that “competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best 
of their abilities. …Strategy is fundamentally a choice.” Without the assumption of rationality, 
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actors cannot be assumed to make choices that are in their own best interests; as Gray (2014, 53) 
notes, “it is sensible to define rational behavior as that which seeks purposefully to match ends, 
ways, and means.” 
Additionally, this ends-ways-means framework provides an extension of political science 
research on conflict that acknowledges similar relationships. Such an outlook can be seen in 
research put forward by Findley and Young, who state that: 
Different varieties of violence may actually fit within a similar strategic approach. Thus, 
whereas the key actors in conflict are variably referred to as dissidents, rebels, insurgents, 
terrorists, and revolutionaries, among others, and are often treated separately, they may 
follow a similar strategic logic in their choices to use violence. (Findley and Young 2012, 
287) 
 
Findley and Young (2012) provide support to two key arguments in this project, when 
they note that actions should be separated from actors, and that different types of civil 
conflict actions should be studied in relationship to each other. Additional support for this 
argument comes from Chenowith and Lewis (2013), who also argue for the use of the 
campaign as the unit of analysis, and indeed contribute their own campaign-based dataset 
to the literature.  
However, there are some limitations to both Findley and Young (2012) and Chenowith 
and Lewis (2013). First, Findley and Young (2012) do not establish a broad theoretical 
framework to explain how different types of violence start or change in relationship to each 
other. This is because their research is focused solely on terrorism that occurs in pre-, ongoing-, 
and post-civil wars; they do not analyze terrorism when it occurs outside of intrastate wars. Also, 
while they note that a range of other sub-state violent actions should be included in research that 
looks at relationships between violence types, they themselves do not include these other types 
of violence in their research. Similarly, Chenowith and Lewis (2013) provide a single category of 
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‘violent’ campaign that is primarily built upon civil war data (it also includes a few instances of 
insurgency). Their focus is on the difference between violent and nonviolent campaigns; choices 
between different types of violent campaigns are identified as being beyond the scope of their 
research (Chenowith 2011, 6-7).   
The ends-ways-means framework can provide an overall context for understanding the 
strategic direction a rebel group chooses to take. Though this framework is not new, I propose a 
novel application of the framework in order to better analyze the actions of rebel actors, one that 
also incorporates research on policy substitution and rationality. Though there are some 
historical case studies of specific groups which do utilize an ends-ways-means framework for 
analysis, to the best of my knowledge no formalized broad theory, applicable to all states over an 
extended period of time, exists which takes into account the ends, ways, and means of rebel 
groups as the starting point for understanding which causal factors are linked most closely with a 
specific course of rebel action. By filling this research lacuna, this project provides a more 
comprehensive overview of what factors explain the campaign choices that rebel groups make 
than has previously been available. By understanding how shifting factors are related to the 
choice of violence, and the tradeoffs between different types of rebel violence become clearer. 
Thus, this project furthers research on how rebel groups make choices, and what factors may 
help shape those choices. The first step in applying the ends-ways-means framework to sub-state 
political violence is to clarify what exactly we mean by ends, ways, and means. The sections 
below cover each term in detail. Before further discussion of this framework, however, the term 
rebel, as used above, should be defined.  
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 Rebels 
For this project, a rebel is defined as a sub-state actor who is undertaking or 
contemplating undertaking violent politicized action against the state, its institutions, its security 
forces, or its population, with the goal of changing the political behavior of the state; in short, a 
rebel is someone who is a politically-driven insubordinate of the state.  This follows with the 
standard dictionary definition, as “a person who opposes or fights against a government.”7 Rebel 
is thus a value-neutral term; it makes no judgment on the legitimacy of the actor, their actions, or 
the state against which they are rebelling. A corresponding definition of rebellion is offered by 
O’Neill (2005, 15), as “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which 
the nonruling group consciously uses political resources… and violence to destroy, reformulate, 
or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”8  
There are two important caveats to this definition. First, while this definition of rebel 
stresses the political motivations of such actors, it can encompass actors who also partake of 
what are traditionally thought of as criminal activities. Such activities can be a necessary 
component of resourcing for rebel groups, and states have a vested interest in criminalizing, and 
thus delegitimizing, groups whose main goals may actually be political in nature (Williams 2009; 
Naim 2005). Second, this definition does not imply a specific course of action that is pursued by 
the rebel. Some theorists, use the term rebel interchangeably with the term insurgent—that 
implied course of action is excluded from this definition (Salehyan 2009; O’Neill 2005; Galula 
2006). It is in the context of ways that the delineation between activities and actors becomes 
                                                 
7 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, s.v. “rebel,” accessed January 30, 2014. 
8 O’Neill is actually defining insurgency, but his definition of insurgent is interchangeable with this project’s 
definition of rebel. This interchangeability is common in the literature; see the paragraphs that follow this quote in 
the text. 
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vital. Much social science literature succumbs to the fallacy of conflating activities with actors. 
For example: What is a terrorist? The easiest, though tautological, definition would be: one who 
commits acts of terrorism. But what if that terrorist is also engaged in developing alternate 
governance institutions? Is the shadow governor of a province a terrorist, or an insurgent? This 
lack of definitional clarity comes back to the basic conundrum that those who participate in sub-
state violence can (and do) participate in more than one course of violent action, which is why 
this research utilizes the non-activity-specific term rebel. Having thus defined the rebels, I now 
turn to the framework of ends-ways-means to explain the context in which rebel activities occur. 
 Ends  
As noted above, a rebel is defined as a sub-state actor who is undertaking or 
contemplating undertaking violent politicized action against the state, its institutions, its security 
forces, or its population, with the goal of changing the political behavior of the state. By virtue of 
this definition, all rebels therefore have a prespecified end: to affect the political behavior of the 
state in way that is favorable to the goals of the rebels. Salehyan (2009, 19) argues for this most 
basic aim of rebel groups when he notes that, “Rebellion is a strategy for winning concessions 
from the government. It is used when conventional politics fails. …Whatever the demand, 
disputes between rebels and the state are part of a bargaining process in which actors threaten 
one another with violence.” Clausewitz (1976, 75) puts the ultimate aim of armed conflict even 
more succinctly; he states that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”  
While endstates can vary based on what action the rebel group is trying to force the 
government to do, a discussion of the differentiation of these desired endstates is beyond the 
scope of this project. Disaggregating the ends of rebellion would ultimately come down to a 
discussion of the magnitude of success both aimed for, and achieved, by rebel actions. Since this 
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project is concerned with explaining the onset and occurrence of rebel activities, a focus on the 
achievement of ends is outside of the research foci. Such a disaggregation would be a potential 
path for future research, but will not be covered here in more detail—the assumption hereafter is 
that all rebels seek to affect state behavior via politicized violence, and that the specific way in 
which that behavior is to be shifted is not necessary to theory development. In essence, the ends 
are held constant, in order to measure changes in the ways and means.   
 Ways 
Delineating between different categories of activities incorporates the idea of policy 
substitution, which argues that agents chose from a menu of options in order to address a given 
situation (Most and Starr 1984). For example, a state has several options if it wants to respond to 
aggression by another state: diplomatic outreach, economic sanctions, or military actions. Within 
each of these broad categories, there are further options. Military action could encompass the 
stationing of troops at the border, unconventional skirmishing or guerilla-style warfare, or direct 
force-on-force large battles. The policy substitution literature argues that, instead of focusing 
specifically on one type of option, the menu of options should be studied in relation to each other 
(Most and Starr 1984). This policy substitution literature, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
helps to explain how the different means available to rebel groups will shape their choices, or 
substitutions, that they make between different types of violence. But what are these different 
types of violence that rebels engage in? 
 Four Ways 
For the purposes of this research, the ways that rebels can act are broken down into four 
choices. The first three choices are different types of sub-state violence: terrorist, insurgent, and 
civil war courses of action. A full discussion of these three courses of action, their definitions 
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and causal factors, comprise Chapter 3. This tripartite classification scheme is drawn from the 
writings of Colin Gray (2007), Renard and Taillat (2008), and Bard O’Neill (2005).  
Gray lays out an escalatory schematic for understanding how the ways of rebel violence 
may change:  
Terrorism is a mode of irregular combat, and it may or may not accompany guerilla 
warfare. It is simply a tactic, as is guerilla fighting. …If their cause prospers, terrorists 
will become insurgents. Should they continue to gain in strength they will mutate from 
insurgents into regular soldiers able to confront the forces of the state in open battle. 
Because of the political context of irregular warfare, one needs to be careful in the use of 
terms. (Gray 2007, 247) 
 
Renard and Tailliat (2008) and O’Neill (2005) provide similar explanations of these three ways 
of violence, though the words they use are slightly different. O’Neill, like Renard and Taillat, 
defines ‘insurgents’ similarly to this chapter’s definition of ‘rebels,’ and utilizes the term 
‘guerilla warfare,’ which is synonymous to this chapter’s definition of insurgency. Renard and 
Taillat propose a model:  
…based on three operational poles: the terror pole, the guerilla pole, and the conventional 
warfare pole. The three poles create a triangle of tactical possibilities, in which every 
insurgent action takes place. Concretely, this means that a group closer to the terror pole 
will mainly rely on acts of terrorism, while maintaining a more or less pronounced aspect 
of guerilla warfare, or even of conventional warfare, depending on its proximity to the 
other poles. This is to say – most groups do not rely on a single pole. …The dynamic 
oscillation between the poles can be caused either by internal or external pressures. 
(Renard and Taillat 2008) 
 
Bard O’Neill (2005, 33) identifies three ‘forms of warfare’ that insurgents practice: terrorism, 
guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare, and notes some distinguishing features of each; “A 
form of warfare may be viewed as one variety of organized violence emphasizing particular 
armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets.”  
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To be sure, this tripartite division of the ways of rebel violence is not the only way in 
which sub-state violence can be organized, but, as seen in the writings of Gray, Renard and 
Taillat, and O’Neill, some scholarly support does exist for this typology. Other scholars who 
separate out these three types of violence in their research include Sambanis (2008, 174), Bueno 
de Mesquita (2013), and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Sambanis (2008) argues that terrorism is 
distinct from other forms of sub-state violence, and follows a different causal logic. Bueno de 
Mesquita (2013) lays out the differences between conventional (civil war) and unconventional 
(an amalgam of insurgency and terrorism), though he notes the presence of all three as types of 
sub-state violence. Fearon and Laitin (2003) delineate between insurgency and civil war, and 
briefly note that terrorism, as a separate phenomenon, also occurs.  
Beyond these three choices of violence, however, there is also the choice to not undertake 
a violent action. Such a choice is not uncommon; one example is presented later in this paper in 
the case study of the LTTE. During the course of the LTTE conflict, which lasted from 1983 to 
2009, there was a caesura from most fighting from about 2001 to 2005. Though things were 
fairly calm on the surface, both sides actually used this time to build their capabilities to prepare 
for what they saw as inevitable future conflict. The LTTE could have staged attacks during this 
time period, but instead chose not to. Therefore, while this project is focused on tradeoffs 
between types of sub-state violence chosen by rebel groups, it also recognizes that those rebel 
groups may choose to refrain from violent action at certain points. 
In sum, the ways in which rebel groups conduct their activities can be understood as 
different options, substitutable with each other. This project delineates between four different 
ways: terrorist, insurgent, civil war, and the choice to not undertake violent action. The 
advantage of using this four-category typology is that it is both sufficiently detailed to 
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differentiate between the major categories of sub-state violence, while simultaneously retaining a 
parsimonious number of categories. These ways are distinct from the means; the ways are the 
methods of action chosen by rebels in order to achieve an end, a change in the political behavior 
of the state. As discussed below, the means are the constraints that may inform the choice that 
rebels make when deciding on what way they will pursue. 
 Means 
While the ways of sub-state violence are concerned with the courses of actions rebels 
choose to take, those choices are limited by the environment. Gray (2007, 246) supports this 
framing, when he argues that rebels choose specific ways of fighting, constrained by the context 
in which they operate; “Irregulars fight irregularly because they cannot succeed, or even survive, 
in any other way.” In other words, there is an interrelationship between desired ends, courses of 
action taken to achieve those ends, and the resources and capability of the actors to pursue those 
actions. Kem describes this interrelationship as follows:  
The ends (or end state) drive the purpose of the campaign. The means determine how that 
can be accomplished and have to be considered before you can realistically determine the 
ways. Put another way, to be able to accomplish certain ways of approaching the 
campaign requires you to have resources; the resources, or means, determine just how 
ambitious or constrained you will be in determining the ways to accomplish the mission. 
(Kem 2012, 27)   
 
Thus, the means are the capabilities and drivers of rebellion available in the context in 
which a specific rebel group operates. The means refer not only to rebel capability, but also to 
the capability of the state the rebels are fighting. Rebels typically have less total means to operate 
than do their opponent, the state. But these disadvantages may be dynamic—there may be 
geographic or technical capabilities that form physical or operational areas of relative rebel 
advantage. When a rebel group does take action in some way, that act of rebelling implies that 
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some means to act, whatever they are, are available. This is not a static measure; changes in the 
means available may lead to a change in the course of action a rebel undertakes. Of course, if 
rebels lose all means, they may cease to be a functioning group. Since this project is focused on 
the choices of rebel groups between different types of sub-state violence, the research is scoped 
with an emphasis on rebel groups that have some level of organization and, and some point, 
choose violence. Within this universe of rebel groups, the means available to a rebel group 
should affect both the initial choice of rebellious activity as well as choices to sustain or switch 
the type of rebel campaign. As Hammes (2011, 10) notes, “lack of resources to achieve goals via 
a specific way does not mean one automatically gives up all strategic goals. When the means are 
insufficient, the first step is to evaluate alternative ways.”   
Gray (2007, 247) argues that that, not only are alternative ways chosen based on a 
calculation of the means, but that, for a rebel group, “To choose to fight in irregular modes, with 
guerilla warfare and terrorism, is always a forced choice.” In accordance with this claim of 
Gray’s, the means can be seen as the primary limitation on both rebel and state actions, and 
consequently, that an understanding the means available within a specific strategic context will 
provide a window into the types of action available to rebels at that time. As noted above, the 
means available may be so limited that rebels choose not to undertake any violent action for a 
period. Therefore, the means should be key to understanding why rebels act the way they do. If 
the primary means affecting the strategic context can be observed and measured, rebel activity 
should then be able to be explained.  
Building on the theoretical configuration proposed by Bell et al. (2013), this research 
breaks down the means available into three basic concept areas: coercion, state capacity, and 
rebel capacity. The major advantage of this configuration is that these three concepts tie together 
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much of the social science research findings on the major causal factors of multiple types of sub-
state violence; the use of this configuration allows multiple variables already known to be 
significant to be arranged and indexed in a systematic way under the three concepts.  
While each of these three concepts is briefly described here, a full discussion of their 
definitions and component parts are the foci of Chapter 4. Coercion, which is directed at the 
rebels from the state, are those actions which the state takes in order to punish, smother, or 
repress rebel activities. Coercion can directly affect the means available to rebel groups, both 
directly, by the imprisonment or execution of rebel group members, or indirectly, if the effects of 
coercion serve to suppress or encourage popular support for the rebel group. Capacity refers to 
the ability of actors to carry out their chosen activities.9 In this project, capacity is split into two 
sub-areas, state capacity and rebel capacity, since the relative capabilities of both actors matter in 
determining most likely courses of action.   
In sum, the means are established via coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity, which 
are the primary constraints on rebel actions. Rebel endeavors are categorized into three ways: 
terrorist, insurgent, or civil war. Informed by the means, these ways are pursued in order for the 
rebel group to achieve its ends, which are directed at changing the political behavior of the state. 
Thus, the ends-ways-means framework provides the theoretical basis for understanding and 
explaining what type of action rebels are most likely to take given a specific context. However, 
in order to make sense of the observed event phenomena of sub-state conflict, we need one other 
concept—the campaign—which is nested in this larger framework (Kem 2012). 
                                                 
9 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, s.v. “capacity,” accessed March 7, 2015. 
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 Campaigns 
Clausewitz (1976) identified two levels to war: the strategic and the tactical. The tactical 
level is concerned with the events of conflict, while the strategic level is concerned with 
achieving the overall goals of the war. Later military theorists added to this model a third level, 
the operational level, where strategy is linked to tactics. The strategic level is concerned with the 
overarching, broad national goals, and its output is broad guidance on the employment of the 
military. This is the ‘big picture’ view. The tactical level is concerned with the execution of 
specific actions. At this level, the focus is on the particulars of the events of conflict: the 
emplacement of troops in a specific disposition, the planning of ambushes or explosives 
detonations. The operational level is where broad strategic goals are taken and translated into 
plan of action, a campaign, which is comprised of the deliberate arrangement of the conflict 
events at the tactical level in order to achieve a strategic goal (Dupuy 1992, 65; Naveh 1997, 9-
10). Figure 2.1 illustrates these three levels of war and their associated actions. 
Campaigns are intricately tied to the ends-ways-means framework, for without a proper 
understanding of what ends are sought and what means are available, practicable ways, or 
campaigns, could not be created. This concept of campaigns is not limited to military or strategic 
studies; it is also present in political science literature.10 In both fields of study, the concept is 
similar. This research uses Chenoweth’s definition of campaign:  
We define a campaign as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or 
events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the 
tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere 
from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also 
purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, 
such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime.  Campaigns 
                                                 
10 cf. Gurr 1970; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Cunningham et al. 2013; Abrahms 2014; Pape 2005; Horowitz and 
Reiter 2001; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994. 
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have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots 
or spontaneous mass acts. (Chenoweth 2011, 3) 
 
Figure 2.1 The Levels of War 
As noted in the 
definition, campaigns are 
time-delimited.  
Classifying campaigns as 
time-delimited allows a 
series of conflict events to 
be aggregated into a 
theoretically defensible 
temporal unit. Once 
conflict events are so 
organized, the events that happen in a particular campaign can be analyzed in order to determine 
what type of campaign the rebels were pursing in a specific year. This exercise of interpreting a 
campaign based on a time period is necessary, because the campaign plans of rebels are not 
otherwise necessarily clear. Indeed, campaign plans of rebel groups are often confidential; a 
public discussion of the means available and the ways to be pursued would open a rebel group to 
specifically targeted countermeasures (Fearon 2008; Hendrix 2010). However, once a rebel 
group has taken violent action, it is usually no long a secret to the state or to the general public. 
These specific conflict events are a matter of historical record, and, if a series of these events is 
assumed to form a campaign, the type of campaign chosen by the rebel group can be reasonably 
deduced ex post facto. As further discussed in Chapter 3, the categorization of conflict events 
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into campaigns is a methodological technique already commonly used in the study of civil war; I 
argue that such a methodology is also valid in the study of terrorism and insurgency.   
 Conclusion 
As described above, the ends-ways-means framework offers a way to conceptually 
organize the options available to rebel groups. The rebels themselves are assumed to be rational 
actors, with the assumption that the ends that rebels seek are some affect to the political behavior 
of the state. The ways in which rebels seek to change state behavior consist of a number of 
potentially substitutable options, encompassing everything from a choice not to act to a choice to 
undertake civil war. Rebel choice is constrained by the means available to the group, which may 
include both resources available the group, and state actions to suppress group activities. Finally, 
the concept of the campaign, as a specific temporal unit, is introduced. Campaigns provide a 
methodology to collate conflict events in order to identify comparable ways that a rebel group 
might choose. 
Chapter 3 develops definitions for each type of campaign, and identifies the key factors 
that signify a specific type of campaign. Chapter 4 discusses the concepts of coercion, state 
capacity, and rebel capacity, generating hypotheses on how they influence sub-state violence 
choices. Chapters 5 through 8 are dedicated to testing these hypotheses, and the final analysis 
and conclusion are presented in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 3 - The Ways of Rebellion 
As discussed in Chapter 2, one way of understanding why rebel violence occurs is to 
frame rebels as rational actors who make choices to carry out specific courses of action, based on 
certain limitations, in order to affect the political behavior of the state. These courses of actions, 
or campaigns, are divided into three types: terrorist, insurgent, and civil war. The focus of 
Chapter 3 is to understand and define those campaign types; the chapter assesses the extant 
literature that describes each of the three phenomena, and discusses how these phenomena can be 
understood as campaigns, with a focus on differentiation between the types of campaign.   
While it is possible to develop a methodology for differentiating between campaign 
types, one problem that arises is that multiple types of violent events may take place within a 
single campaign. As Findley and Young (2012) point out, terrorist events often occur within civil 
wars. Such overlap need not derail this chapter’s attempt at categorization, however. As Davis 
(2005, 184) notes, “Because typologies are nothing more than complex concepts—analytical 
constructs defined in terms of configurations of other scientific concepts—and because the 
borders of most scientific concepts are fuzzy, we should not expect that the borders of type-
concepts will be distinct.”  I argue that the overall pattern of events (within a given time) should 
point towards a specific campaign. This is not to say that the distinction is always perfectly clear-
cut, but a focus on the overall objective of the campaign (e.g. do the rebels engage mainly in 
large battles or civilian attacks?) should provide enough clarity that the rebel choice of action can 
be estimated.  
Prior to approaching the definitional debates that surround each of these terms, one 
semantic point must be raised and addressed. This is the difference between the way that sub-
state violence types are understood in this research project, and the way that they are more 
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commonly perceived in social science literature. While military theorists such as Gray (2007) 
and Renard and Taillat (2008) are in agreement with this project’s categorization of terrorist, 
insurgent, and civil war activities as campaigns, the majority of social science literature on the 
subject does not discuss or analyze these phenomena as campaigns. Despite the use of different 
lenses of analysis, this preexistent literature does provide a number of definitions for each type of 
phenomena, and is a good starting point to attack the problem of definitional clarity. Therefore, 
in the paragraphs below, the noun forms—terrorism, insurgency, and civil war—are often used, 
instead of the adjective forms—terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaign—because this is how 
the majority of social science literature is written. However, the focus when drawing from the 
extant literature in these fields is on what the key distinctions are between the overall goals or 
objectives of the violence. These distinctions are then used to help understand and delineate 
between campaigns, rather than events. 
 Terrorism  
The historical roots of the word terrorism go back to the French Revolution (1793-1794), 
where “it was more or less a synonym for ‘reign of terror.’ Subsequently it acquired a wider 
meaning in the dictionaries as a system of terror. A terrorist was anyone who attempted to further 
his views by a system of coercive intimidation (Laqueur 2011, 6).” This is not to say that 
terrorism as a phenomenon per se did not exist prior to the French Revolution, but rather that the 
Reign of Terror marks the origination of the etymology. The idea of terrorism as an act by rebels, 
rather than governments, evolved over time. In the latter half of the 1800s, radical Carlo Pisacane 
developed the theory of ‘propaganda by deed,’ which argued that violence “was necessary not 
only to draw attention to, or generate publicity, a cause, but also to inform, educate, and 
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ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution” (Hoffman 2006, 5). It was from this idea, 
rather than its French namesake, that the modern conceptualization of terrorism originates.11   
Contemporary discussions of terrorism offer a profusion of competing definitions. 
Schmid and Jongman exhaustively examined 109 different definitions of terrorism, from which 
they identified twenty-two concepts. From their examination and analysis, they provide the 
following synthesized definition:  
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) 
clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political 
reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) 
victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it 
into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 
28) 
 
This all-encompassing definition provides a broad overview of anything that could be 
considered terrorism, but lacks conciseness and a degree of clarity. A shorter, more precise 
definition is offered by Crenshaw (1995, 4), who describes terrorism as “a conspiratorial style of 
violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multitude audiences. It targets the few in 
a way that claims the attention of the many. …Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but 
rather the direct activity of small groups.” Tilly (2004, 5) defines terrorism as a strategy of 
“asymmetrical deployments of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside 
the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime.”   
                                                 
11 The concept of ‘state terrorism,’ on the other hand, follows far more closely with the theories of the authors of the 
Reign of Terror. 
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Sandler’s (2003, 780) definition stresses the nature of the violence; “Terrorism is the 
premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political 
objective through intimidation or fear of a targeted audience.” Stern (2003, xx) defines terrorism 
as “an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, 
intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience.” This emphasis on the targets of terrorism is 
also seen in Daase’s (2007, 187) definition; “Terrorism… can be seen as a situation in which a 
non-state actor uses organized violence against civilian targets (means) in order to spread fear 
and terror among the public (aim) to compel a state government actor (actor B) to change its 
policy.” O’Neill (2005, 33) concurs, noting that, “Terrorism is herein defined as the threat of use 
of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order 
to achieve various political objectives.”  In sum, then, the key distinctions for terrorism appear to 
be a focus on acts of violence, usually directed against civilians, intended to cause or inspire fear 
in a larger audience. Terrorists do not typically focus on attaining a military objectives, such as 
control of territory or the defeat or destruction of forces, or attempt to provide governance over 
an area. 
As a rebel strategy that emphasizes extranormal violence against civilian targets, 
terrorism can also be seen as a campaign; this claim is backed up by both history and modern 
theory on the phenomena. The French Revolution’s ‘reign of terror’ is interesting primarily 
because it was seen as a system of intimidation—multiple events, over time, were to combine in 
order to achieve the effects desired by the Reign. The word ‘system’ has a remarkable similarity 
to the concept of campaign as used by this research; it implies that a number of activities were 
coordinated over time to be part of a larger project. As the standard dictionary definition puts it, 
a system can be defined as “an organized set of doctrines, ideas, or principles usually intended to 
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explain the arrangement or working of a systematic whole.”12   Switching from history to the 
present, the number of contemporary theorists who, in describing terrorism refer casually to 
‘terrorist campaigns,’ is quite large.13  Some examples include Pape (2005, 4), who notes that 
“suicide terrorist campaigns are directed toward a strategic objective. From Lebanon to Israel to 
Sri Lank to Kashmir to Chechnya, the sponsors of every campaign have been terrorist groups.” 
Crenshaw (2008, 24) remarks that “the benefits of a successful terrorist campaign would 
presumably be shared by all individual supporters of the group’s goals.” Sandler and Enders 
(2008, 17) describes the “costs from a sustained terrorist campaign as greater than that of 
conceding to terrorists’ demands.” Thus, the concept of terrorism as a campaign, as part of a 
strategy which links ends, ways, and means is not at all foreign to social science literature; as 
Tilly (2005, 27) reminds us, “When it comes to terror, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize it 
as a strategy.”      
 Insurgency  
Insurgency, like terrorism, suffers from a surfeit of definitions. There is also considerable 
overlap in the usage of the word insurgency with that of guerrilla. Insurgency comes from the 
Latin roots surgere (‘to rise’) and in (‘on’) (Skeat 1993, 396). Insurgency and guerilla warfare 
can, and often are, used interchangeable in contemporary literature, as can be seen in the 
following discussion of the etymology of the term guerilla:  
The term guerilla warfare, is derived from the Spanish word for war or guerra, and 
“guerrilla” literally means “little war.” Military historians date the use of the term to the 
popular insurgency by Spanish resistance forces against the invasion of Napoleon and his 
French troops in 1808. (Morales 2006, 728-729) 
 
                                                 
12 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, s.v. “system,” accessed February 10, 2014. 
13 Such theorists do not typically define what they mean by a ‘campaign,’ however. 
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Due to this common exchangeability, in the following paragraphs I provide and analyze literature 
on both insurgency and guerrilla warfare, as well as other variants.  
British Army officer and military theorist Charles Callwell wrote an entire work devoted 
to ‘small wars’. From the point of view of the state, he notes the differences between ‘regular’ 
(civil war) warfare and ‘small war’(insurgency):   
…it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all 
parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not 
meet them in the open field… Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon 
hostilities against irregular forces …the conditions of the campaign become distinct from 
the conditions of modern regular warfare. (Callwell 1996, 21) 
 
Contemporary scholars offer similar descriptions. Military historian Max Boot (2013, 
xxii) distinguishes guerilla warfare from criminal activity; “the use of hit-and-run tactics by an 
armed group directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or 
religious reasons. Bandits in search of nothing more than lucre are excluded; they are usually not 
interested in shaking up the established order, just in profiting from it.” O’Neill describes it in 
comparison to terrorism:  
In contrast to terrorism, guerilla warfare is more complex and requires more resources. In 
essence, guerrilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by lightly to moderately 
armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability. 
…[activities] consist of relatively modest engagements followed by withdrawal and 
dispersal rather than large positional battles designed to seize and hold the territory. 
(O’Neill 2005, 35) 
 
In a similar vein, political scientists Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75) offer a specific definition of 
insurgency, “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands 
practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas.” 
Given this broad consensus on the term ‘guerrilla warfare,’ why then does there also exist 
in the literature the term ‘insurgency’? Military theorist David Galula, a French Army officer 
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who served in Algeria in the 1950s, is credited with being the writer “who popularized the 
concept of ‘insurgency’” (Freedman 2013, 189). Galula (2006, 2) defines insurgency as  “a 
protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate 
objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.” This definition seems to simply 
reiterate a basis similar to that of guerilla war, and as such is not particularly helpful.  
Clarity on this issue is offered Bernard Fall, a scholar of Indochina, who wrote an article 
entitled “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency” (Fall 2015). In this 
article, Fall proposes a formula to illuminate how insurgency—or, as he refers to it, 
revolutionary war—differs from guerilla warfare:  
This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerilla methods 
to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This is the real difference between 
partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and everything else. “Guerrilla” simply means “small 
war,”… Political action, however, is the difference. … any sound revolutionary warfare 
operator… most of the time used small-war tactics… to establish a competitive system of 
control over the population. Of course, in order to do this, here and there they had to kill 
some of the occupying forces and attack some of the military targets. (Fall 2015, 41) 
 
Thus, Fall (2015) makes the point that guerrilla warfare is a style of military tactics, and 
insurgency is the overarching political strategy, one focused on competing for political control, 
that utilizes those tactics. This corresponds with Lyall’s (2010, 175) definition, “a violent, often 
protracted, struggle by nonstate actors to obtain political objectives such as independence, 
greater autonomy, or subversion of the existing political authority.”  
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In this light, the definition proposed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in 
its Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, provides additional detail on what exactly insurgency 
is.14 
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or 
partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces 
and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity – including guerilla warfare, 
terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and 
covert party organization, and international activity – is designed to weaken government 
control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common 
denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This 
objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose 
objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling 
a given area or country. (Central Intelligence Agency c. 1980)  
 
Drawing on these definitions, insurgency is a rebellion which may utilize guerilla or 
terror tactics, but not large-scale, high-magnitude force-on-force violence; it is focused on 
political, rather than military, control over people or territory. Insurgency is different than 
terrorism in that insurgency seeks to provide governance or offer control over an area or 
population; terrorism does not. Further, while insurgents may attack military targets (unlike 
terrorists), they tend toward subversion rather than focusing their efforts on large battles against 
the military, which would be more the case in civil war, as described below. 
As with terrorism, a preponderance of scholars writing on the subject of insurgency seem 
comfortable with conceiving this phenomenon as a campaign. Recall Galula’s (2006, 2) 
definition, which requires “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step,” in other 
words—a series of actions taking place over time. The term campaign is very common in 
                                                 
14 I use the widely cited undated (c.1980) version of the definition because it provides more descriptive detail about 
possible insurgency identifiers, which are of value for this discussion. The 2012 version of this guide offers an 
updated definition. Refer to Appendix B of the 2012 version for a discussion of why and how the definition was 
revised.  
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histories of rebel groups; Connable and Libicki (2010, 32) describe the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in this way: “The LTTE was formed in the 1970s and began fighting an aggressive 
and efficient insurgency campaign circa 1983.” Beckett (2001, 86) points out that, in southeast 
Asia, “the United States, France and Britain, respectively, encountered Maoist-style insurgency 
campaigns.” In social science literature, Byman (2008, 169) points out that a rebel group’s 
“actions would not be terrorism if they were a byproduct of a military campaign and thus not 
intended to send a broader political message.” Thus, there appears to be sufficient support in the 
literature to make the claim that insurgent campaigns are a recognized phenomenon.      
 Civil War  
To describe the history of civil wars is far beyond the scope of this project; civil wars 
have presumably been around since the establishment of civilizations in which to wage them. 
Civil wars are arguably part of the gestalt of humanity; their discussion ranges from the 
philosopher Plato (2013, 527), in The Republic, who distinguished between factional strife and 
war, with the former referring to conflict against those known personally, and the latter referring 
to conflict against outsiders or foreigners, to the eponymous song by the rock band Guns N’ 
Roses (1991) which questions, “What’s so civil about war, anyway?”15  
Small and Singer, in their seminal work Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 
1816-1980 (1982, 210), define civil war as “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action 
internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) 
effective resistance by both sides.” This definition is similar to a definition proposed by Kalyvas 
and Kenny (2010, 284): “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign unit 
                                                 
15 For a further discussion of the influence of Plato and his contemporaries on modern understandings of civil war, 
see Kissane (2016). 
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between organized entities subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities.” However, 
both of these definitions, while emphasizing the distinction between interstate war and conflict 
internal to the state, lack clarity on how civil war differentiates itself from insurgent activities.  
Sambanis (2004, 829-830) provides further detail, articulating nine component principles 
of a civil war: the war occurs inside of a state’s territory; both sides in the war are politically and 
militarily organized; the government of the state is a combatant; the rebel group should be 
comprised (at least in part) of within-state actors, and should control territory within the state; the 
first year of the war should cause 500-1,000 deaths; the war should show sustained violence over 
time; the weaker side should be strong enough to inflict 100 deaths per year; wars end with 
effective peace treaties that cause a caesura of hostilities; if rebels win the war and start a new 
regime, but fighting continues, this is considered a new civil war. However, Sambanis does not 
make any concessions for the size of the state population, and thus the numbers he provides are 
minimum thresholds that do not control for the size of the state experiencing conflict. But this is 
not an uncommon problem, and the use of minimum thresholds does provide a way of 
differentiating between different magnitudes of sub-state violence; as Fearon (2007, 4) points 
out, “Everyday usage of the term ‘civil war’ does not entail a clear threshold for how much 
violence is necessary to qualify a conflict as a civil war, as opposed to terrorism or low-level 
political strife.” Hironaka (2005, 3) also addresses the issue of magnitude, defining civil war as 
“large-scale, organized, and sustained conflict between a state and domestic political actors. 
…civil wars are defined as high-intensity conflicts. They involve major casualties and significant 
amounts of resources, in contrast to less deadly forms of social conflict.”   
What Sambanis (2004) and Hironaka (2005) seem to be offering in their definitions is 
that the power relations between the opposing sides in the conflict, though they may not be 
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absolutely symmetric, are at least more symmetric than that of other forms of sub-state violence. 
Stathis Kalyvas (2006), a noted civil war expert, explicates on this point in his widely cited book, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War: 
Civil war is defined here as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities. 
…”Armed Combat” (implying a degree of organization on both sides and violence of a 
certain magnitude) serves political aims when it challenges existing authority, even when 
also serving additional goals. …The key intuition is the violent physical division of the 
sovereign entity into rival armed camps. This entails a de facto territorial division. At the 
war’s outset, the rivals are subjects to a common sovereign or authority. (Kalyvas 2006, 
17) 
 
In common with Kalyvas, Galula (2006, 5) defines civil war as a war between two or more 
groups, all of which control territory and organized armed forces, and where “[t]he war between 
these groups soon resembles an ordinary international war except that the opponents are fellow 
citizens, such as in the American War Between the States and the Spanish Civil War.”   
All of these civil war definitions appear to coordinate well with each other, though some 
definitions stress certain aspects—administrative, territory, violence magnitude—more than 
others. There seems to be a general consensus that civil war is, in effect, the exact same form of 
violence as war in the general sense of conflict between two states; the only difference is the pre-
conflict allegiance of both sides to the same government. As such, civil war can be seen as 
distinct from insurgency; civil wars have a greater focus force-on-force confrontation and 
outright defeat of or division with the state, whereas insurgency focuses on political control 
measures such as shadow governments, and typically does not engage in large force-on-force 
battles with the state. 
Civil wars can be characterized as campaigns, and they lend themselves to that 
categorization quite easily. A number of histories comment on the presence of campaigns in a 
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variety of civil wars. Ash (2009, 95), writing on the Roman Empire, mentions that “Vespasian’s 
civil war campaign is hijacked by the rogue Flavian general Antonius Primus.” In the American 
Civil War, historian Rowena Reed notes that “Despite the lack of dramatic results, no Civil War 
campaign better demonstrates the superior advantages of water communications than the 
Peninsular operations” (Reed 1993, 187). In El Salvador, “By late 1980, the opposition had 
committed itself to civil war. The disparate guerilla groups unified to become the Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which waged an increasingly successful military 
campaign against the government” (Stanley 1996, 2). In Africa, the “DRC has been torn by civil 
war since 1996 when Laurent Kabila started a rebel campaign that ousted President Mobutu one 
year later” (Ngoie and Omeje 2008, 137). 
Theorists of civil war as a conflict phenomenon also identify the presence of campaigns. 
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) argue for a greater usage of the campaign as the unit of analysis 
for both violent and non-violent campaigns, and utilize civil war data to identify their ‘violent’ 
campaigns. Mattes and Savun (2009, 739), note that, in civil war, “The government cannot trust 
the rebels to end their military campaign once they have been granted concessions.” DeRouen Jr. 
and Sobek (2004, 308) state that the civil war definition provided by Doyle and Sambanis 
implies the use of “rebels who launched a campaign that opposed the state.”  
As these examples demonstrate, both civil war theorists and historians appear to agree 
that the campaign is an integral component of intrastate war. Ultimately, the capstone argument 
as to why campaigns exist in civil wars is due to the primary definition of the campaign as an 
aspect of the operational level of war. If civil wars are simply a type of war, and the concept of a 
campaigns is drawn from war-focused military theorists, then it follows that if interstate wars 
have campaigns, intrastate wars also experience that phenomenon.    
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 Conclusion   
The above review of the literature provides broad theoretical support for conceptualizing 
terrorism, insurgency, and civil war as campaigns of violent activity, and provides a starting 
point for delineating between these campaigns. Civil war campaigns are rebel violence of the 
largest magnitude within a state, and such campaigns tend toward larger-scale battles, though 
smaller attacks and terrorist events may also occur. Insurgent campaigns can be seen as smaller-
scale conflicts that may mix elements of guerilla warfare with elements of terrorist activity. 
Terrorist campaigns typically do not encompass in military battles, but emphasize violence 
against civilian targets. In sum, by distinguishing between campaigns, this project offers insight 
into the specific types of ways in which rebel violence is organized. But what causes rebels to 
choose a specific type of campaign? That question is addressed in Chapter 4, which focuses on 
the means, or structural conditions that influence choices of campaigns.  
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Chapter 4 - The Means of Rebellion 
In the preceding chapter, I developed a typology of rebel campaign types. This chapter 
seeks to develop hypotheses that explain how rebels might choose between campaign types 
based on structural, causal factors. Drawing on the theory of policy substitution (Most and Starr 
1984), this project claims that rebels can, and do, make choices between the different types of 
political violence campaigns they will pursue. Building on Bell et al. (2013)’s organizational 
structure, I argue that there are three causal factors that explain rebel choice: coercion, state 
capacity, and rebel capacity. This chapter reviews extant literature on these concepts and how 
they relate to rebel choices, and then develops hypotheses as to how those factors influence rebel 
choices between campaign options.  Unlike previous literature, which typically analyzes a 
specific type of rebel violence in isolation from other choices rebels could make (or, in a few rare 
cases, selects between two types of violence), this project makes a theoretical contribution to the 
literature by identifying a full spectrum of choices that a rebel group could make, and developing 
novel predictions as to when a rebel group may choose one type of violent campaign rather than 
another.  
 Structural Approaches and Substitutable Options 
The study of the causes of political violence has been approached via many different 
paths.16 This project focuses on structural conditions; the goal is to identify causal factors in the 
environment that may shape rebel choices. As opposed to other sub-state conflict research paths, 
this structural approach emphasizes the means that are permissive or limiting factors for rebel 
                                                 
16 These include including structural, psychological, ideological, biological, environmental, and criminological 
models (cf. Gurr 1970; Ross 1993; Tilly 1978; Jurgensmeyer 2008; Romano 1984; Skocpol 1994; Turk 1989; Sanín 
and Wood 2014; Keenan 1987; Jo 2015). 
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group choices. This approach argues that certain observable factors are correlated with the onset 
and occurrence of political violence. These factors can include state coercion, which causes 
population grievances against the state; the state’s ability to respond both administratively and 
militarily to the rebels’ actions; the resources of the rebel group and the population in which it 
operates, including administrative and military ability; and the involvement of external actors 
(Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1994; Gurr 2000; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Regan and Norton 2005; Weinstein 2007; 
Kalyvas 2006).  
By looking at these structural causal factors, this project focuses on preconditions rather 
than precipitant factors. Preconditions are underlying factors that shape the environment that 
rebels operate in, and may be permissive or enabling (Eckstein 1965; Thompson 2003; Saxton 
and Benson 2006). In contrast, precipitant factors tend to occur immediately prior to an event, 
and may be seen as the direct, or inciting, cause (Eckstein 1965; Thompson 2003; Crenshaw 
1981, 381).17 The advantage to studying structural, preconditional factors is that such factors are 
more generalizable across time and space, which allows researchers to identify broad trends and 
relationships. The disadvantage, of course, is that such a broadly applicable approach by 
necessity cannot go into the details of the precipitant causes of individual conflict events 
(Eckstein 1965, 140-143). However, since the focus of this research is to develop of theory of the 
                                                 
17 For example, in 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) planned to hijack a TWA flight at 
the same time as President Nixon was scheduled to meet with the Zionist Organization of America (Khaled 1973, 
128-31). The Nixon meeting was the precipitant factor in this case; but the reason the PFLP existed, had undertaken 
their strategy of rebellion, and had decided that terrorist tactics would serve their ends, could be explained by 
preconditional factors. 
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overall relationships between means and ways in rebel campaign choice, the choice of focus on 
preconditional rather than precipitant factors is supported by this project’s scope.   
Numerous researchers have already analyzed different structural conditions that lead to 
civil conflict, but this extant literature does not usually specify the type of conflict events most 
likely to occur. Instead, it typically focuses on binary measures of conflict occurrence 
(conflict/no conflict) or on rough measures of magnitude of conflict (high-medium-low, 
actual/expected). 18 In contrast, this research develops novel hypotheses that address a range of 
distinct conflict types. Drawing from the theory of policy substitution, it argues that rebel groups 
can substitute different types of violence in for one another. 
The majority of the extant literature in the field of policy substitution argues that states 
are actors who use different options as substitutes, depending upon environmental conditions.19 
However, this concept of policy substitution has only rarely been applied to rebel actors or other 
non-state groups.20 When it has been applied to rebels, the majority of this subfield is focused on 
the choice between violent and non-violent actions, or tactical choices between attack types (e.g. 
hostages versus bombings).21 To the best of my knowledge, the only research that looks at rebel 
                                                 
18 For binary measures, cf. Hegre and Sambanis (2006); for measures of magnitude, cf. Regan and Norton (2005); 
Gurr (1968); Bell et al. (2013). 
19 The policy substitution field is large; major articles in this field include the seminal work by Most and Starr 
(1984), as well as Bennett and Nordstrom (2000), Morgan and Palmer (2000), Moore (2000), Cioffi-Revilla and 
Starr (1995), Most and Starr (1989), Starr (2000), Palmer and Bhandari (2000), Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 
(2002), and Regan (2000). Literature that identifies state domestic (rather than foreign) policy substitution also 
exists; such substitution efforts still focus on the state, rather than the rebel, as the actor who is doing the substitution 
(Davies 2016; DeMeritt et al. 2015; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014; Shadmehr 2014). 
20 Such non-state actor literature includes minority groups (Martinez Machain and Rosenberg 2016), ethno-national 
groups (Saxton and Benson 2006, 2008), and dissident groups (Moore 2000). 
21 The same violent/non-violent substitution choice for rebels is argued, most notably by Lichbach (1987), but also 
by Moore (1998), Demirel-Pegg (2014), Dahl et al. (2014), and Eyerman (1998). Additional literature looks at the 
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choices in a similar style are: conventional (civil war) versus unconventional (an amalgam of 
insurgent and terrorist) (Bueno de Mesquita 2013); duration-based (short civil wars versus 
longer-lasting guerilla-style civil wars) (Cunningham et al. 2005); and target-based (attacks 
against the state versus against another rebel group) (Frisch 2009). 
In line with this literature, I apply such substitution theories to rebel actors, noting that 
rebels are a collective, policy-choosing organization that must interact with its external 
environment in ways similar to a state.22 I argue that rebels choose between multiple types of 
violent campaigns (as well as having a non-violent option). By developing hypotheses that look 
specifically at the substitutable choices between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns, 
this project sheds light on previously unexamined relationships, and furthers research in this 
field.  
What are these structural conditions that serve as causal factors of political violence? I 
draw upon the organizational structure proposed by Bell et al.:  
[W]e identify three main conceptual factors that affect the degree of political violence 
within a state: coercion, coordination, and capacity. We argue that coercion, defined as 
violations of physical integrity rights, makes citizens more willing to commit acts of 
political violence. Coordination, defined as the availability and ease with which domestic 
groups can cooperate, organize, and mobilize, increases the ability of citizens to commit 
acts of political violence. Conversely, capacity, typically thought of as the ability of a 
state to project its power throughout its territory, decreases the opportunity of citizens to 
engage in political violence by raising the costs for potential rebels. (Bell et al. 2013:241) 
                                                 
substitutability of rebel group tactics within a specific type (e.g. different types of terrorist attack) (Landes 1978; 
Enders and Sandler 1993; Enders and Sandler 2004; Enders and Sandler 1995; Clauset et al. 2010; Im et al. 1987; 
Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2008; Sandler et al. 1983).  
22 Rebels often, though not always, seek to form ‘pseudo’ or ‘proto’ states; in this sense, a rebel group is a state actor 
in potentia, and would presumably practice behavior quite similar to that of a state (Middleton 2015; Lia 2015; 
Coggins 2014). 
41 
These three concepts are very useful, since they tie together much of the social science 
research findings on the major causal factors of sub-state violence. While Bell et al. (2013) look 
specifically at violent protest, I argue that these conceptual categories can be easily extended to 
explanations of violent campaigns, as well. I follow the conceptual approach outlined by Bell et 
al. (2013) by utilizing three similar explanatory variables: coercion, the ability of states to 
accommodate dissenters and discourage, suppress, or resist rebellion, and the ability of rebel 
groups to rebel. 
Coercion, discussed more fully below, refers to measures taken by the state against its 
population.23 However, instead of differentiating between state capacity and rebel coordination 
as Bell et al. (2013) do, I view capacity as a key factor for both rebel groups and states. This 
approach is in line with Buhaug (2010, 116), who argues that “[d]eterminants of rebel strength 
are not radically different from those of the state.” Within this larger concept of capacity, 
however, I incorporate variables that are also related to coordination for both the rebels and the 
state.   
Such an aggregation of coordination and capacity is theoretically defensible because, as 
discussed in the sections below, the literatures on both topics tends to overlap in terms of what 
coordination and capacity mean in terms of what a state or rebel group can do. Indeed, 
disaggregation of the concepts of capacity and coordination may be less justifiable, as state or 
rebel actors that are able to coordinate well are also probably groups that have some level of 
capacity. Looking at the capacity of both actors is important, because the power relationship 
                                                 
23 The coercive actions taken by the rebels in response to state coercion would be the rebellious ways of violence 
outlined in Chapter 3, and are thus the outcome in this model; therefore, they are not also be included as a causal 
factor, as this would present a serious endogeneity problem. 
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between the two can affect the way a conflict plays out. Further, in cases where multiple rebel 
groups are operating in one state, capacity can vary between the different rebel groups. Both 
state and rebel capacity can also change over time, affecting not only campaign choice at onset, 
but also changes in campaign choice over the span of rebel activity. 
In the following sections, I establish definitions for coercion, state capacity, and rebel 
capacity, and review the extant research surrounding each concept. I highlight literature on 
terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars that describe the relationship between the specified 
phenomenon and its associated levels of coercion, rebel capacity, and state capacity. Drawing 
from this literature review, I develop novel hypotheses that take into consideration the full range 
of choices available to a rebel group, and describe how coercion and capacity explain the choices 
rebels make.  
 Coercion  
Coercion refers to actions taken by the state that lead to grievances against the state by 
members of its population. While the term coercion is used in this chapter to signify deliberate 
actions taken by the state, the expectation is that such coercive actions will lead to grievances in 
that state’s population (Bell et al. 2013; Gurr 1968). However, as discussed in detail below, it is 
also important to remember that states typically have a reason for committing coercive acts. 
States may wish to extract more resources from their populations than the populace would prefer. 
Further, states may use their coercive power to punish what they perceive to be criminal acts—
though that perception may not be shared by the population. In both cases, the state’s coercive 
actions may lead to grievances that, in turn, may provide a rationale for members of the populace 
to rebel.  
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States face a dilemma when it comes to the use of coercive action (Martinez Machain et 
al. 2011). Coercive action may encourage an aggrieved population to rebel, but states are also 
expected to use coercive actions to keep the peace and control their populations – otherwise, they 
abdicate the Weberian dictate that states retain a “monopoly of legitimate physical violence” 
(Weber 1994, 310-311). Thus, states are in a quandary when choosing to use coercive action, 
since either using or not using coercive actions could potentially spark grievances. Byman 
discusses this dilemma in detail: 
If they crack down too hard, they risk alienating the population and creating support for 
organizations where none previously existed. Failure to crack down, however, can 
decrease confidence in the state and make it easier for proto-insurgent groups to mobilize 
would-be followers, since they need not fear that they will be arrested. In addition, a 
weak crackdown may lead rival communities to act on their own. If a group is singled out 
for repression because of its ethnicity, religion, or other features, the salience of that 
identity increases. Similarly, state repression can politicize a community that previously 
was wary of politics. …In using such measures, the state validates the cause the proto-
insurgents espouse. (Byman 2008, 192-193) 
 
Based on this dilemma, coercion is expected to be a significant causal factor in explaining 
violent campaign choices.  
In line with previous literature on this topic (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981; Bell et al. 
2013), this chapter identifies three areas of coercive action that may lead to grievances and 
willingness to rebel: physical security, economic security, and societal security. Physical security 
refers to actions taken against the corporeal bodies of people within the state. Such actions 
include torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. In this case, 
grievances arise due to pain or physical suffering caused by the state, and these physical security 
transgressions pave the way for rebellion to occur by increasing incentives to rebel (Kalyvas 
2006; Bell et al. 2013). Economic security refers to actions taken by the state to provide or limit 
its citizens’ access to economic opportunities. In this case, grievances can arise when people 
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perceive insurmountable economic inequalities within the state, where differences in economic 
opportunity between groups or individuals are vast (Regan and Norton 2005; Collier 2003). 
Sources of economic grievances can include inequalities in both income (Muller and Seligson 
1987) or land rights (Midlarsky 1988). Finally, societal security refers to the marginalization or 
prosecution of different social groups within the population of the state. Coercive actions taken 
by the state could include supporting an official state religion while limiting the expression of 
non-sanctioned religious beliefs, or denying suffrage to specific groups, thereby excluding 
women or minorities from government participation. Grievances arise as marginalized groups 
with fewer social protections see state as a threat to their societal security (Caprioli 2005; Fox 
2000; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003).  
 Terrorist Campaigns and Coercion 
As Crenshaw (1981, 388) describes it, “some [terrorist] groups are weak because 
weakness is imposed on them by the political system they operate in, others because of 
unpopularity.”  This quote offers insight into two different relationships between terrorism and 
coercion. Some rebel groups may choose terrorist campaigns because they operate in a state with 
democratic processes by which the grievances of most of the population can be addressed, 
thereby limiting the numbers of rebel supporters and recruits (Weinberg and Eubank 2007; 
Sandler 2008). If the state takes low levels of coercive action, it is likely that the majority of the 
population perceives the state as legitimate, and has no reason to participate in rebellious 
activities; thus, only a few members of the population are likely to have reason to rebel (Gurr 
1970; Crenshaw 1981; Schmid 2007). Alternatively, some rebel groups may choose terrorist 
campaigns because the state is so highly coercive that any larger-scale rebel groups—or even 
groups perceived as potentially being rebellious—are crushed as soon they come to the 
45 
knowledge of the state (Findley and Young 2011). In such an environment of high coercion, only 
the smallest of groups are likely to be able to survive. Whether or not the population as whole is 
sympathetic to the goals of the rebel group, they are unlikely to be able to offer little in the way 
of help, due to fears of the consequences of such actions.  
 Insurgent Campaigns and Coercion 
As counterinsurgency expert Kilcullen (2010, 7-8) notes; “Insurgents tend to ride and 
manipulate a social wave of grievances, often legitimate ones, and they draw their fighting power 
from their connection to a mass base.” Indeed, some level of grievance-causing coercion appears 
to be a strong indicator that rebels will choose insurgency (Peceny and Stanley 2010). Yet too 
much coercion may decrease the likelihood of an insurgent campaign. Muller and Seligson 
(1987, 444-445) note that increasing coercion will lead to increased impetus for an insurgency, 
but that very high levels of coercion will have a dampening effect on insurgency. This decrease 
in insurgent activity at high levels coercion is also supported by Jenkins et al. (2014, 470), who 
find that insurgency is likely in areas “a history of social and political marginality and 
opposition” but that as coercion intensified, insurgent activity in these areas decreased. 
Therefore, insurgent campaigns appear more likely at intermediate than high levels of coercion. 
On the other hand, as discussed in the previous section, at very low levels of coercion, support 
for rebellion is also likely to be low. Rebels who choose an insurgent campaign often capitalize 
or highlight state coercive action in order to build support for their activities (Davis et al. 2012; 
O’Neill 2005). Thus, too few grievances against the state may mean too few supporters to make 
an insurgent campaign likely. 
 Civil War Campaigns and Coercion 
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In general, mass grievances caused by high levels of coercion are expected to lead to 
widespread civil conflict (Gurr 1968), and in particular civil war (Rost 2011). As grievances 
caused by coercion diminish, fewer members of a state’s population are likely to commit to the 
rebel actions that could be potentially costly. As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007, 182) note, there 
appears to be no lack of ‘political entrepreneurs’ willing to lead rebel groups, but it is rather 
more difficult to find “a mass of followers willing to take the necessary risks” by joining those 
groups. Since civil war tends to require a significant amount of population mobilization, it 
follows logically that widespread coercive action would be expected to have a positive effect on 
the occurrence of civil war campaigns, since such coercion would increase incentives to rebel 
(Olson 1965; Tullock 1971; Lichbach 1995; Lichbach 1987; Muller and Opp 1986; Gurr 2000; 
Goodwin 2001). As Regan and Norton (2005, 16) put it, “highly repressive states have a far 
greater probability of experiencing a civil war.”  
 Coercion Theory 
How would the level of coercion affect rebel campaign choices? At high levels of state 
coercion, the population may be highly aggrieved. At first glance, this would suggest that 
widespread rebel mobilization and violence would lead to a civil war campaign, and this would 
be likely. In some instances, this is probably exactly what happens; the state is highly coercive, a 
large part of the population rebels en masse, and a civil war breaks out. Correspondingly, as 
coercion decreases, popular support and willing rebel recruits are also both likely to decrease. 
Without numerous fighters or high levels of support, civil war campaigns become less likely. 
Therefore, I argue that the relationship between coercion and civil war campaigns will be a 
positive and linear, with relatively more occurrences of civil war campaigns when coercion is 
high. 
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However, civil war is not the only option that rebels have when coercion is high. If the 
state, in addition to being highly coercive, also has high levels of capacity, there may be too high 
a cost for most of the population to rebel. For example, in an efficient, effective police state 
people may have a reason to rebel, but the punitive expected costs of rebellious activity in such a 
state would discourage most from becoming rebels. Additionally, in such a state, if the military 
were strong, choosing to fight it in force-on-force major battles would be a suicidal undertaking. 
In sum, the ability of rebels to take effective action against the state would be limited, and it is 
more likely that you would see rebels substitute small groups instead of mass action, and 
undertake extremely limited violent action, probably against ‘softer’ civilian targets. In this case, 
even though coercion is still high, rebels would be more likely to choose a terrorist campaign. 
But terrorist campaigns are not only likely when coercion is high; they may also be likely when 
coercion is low. If the state is not very coercive, the majority of the population may be happy 
with the state, and not choose to rebel. Terrorist campaigns do not require much in terms of 
recruits or materiel; therefore, if only a few people in a state want to rebel and there is little to no 
popular support for rebellion, terrorist campaigns are also highly likely. Given these two 
differing reasons for action, the primary relationship between coercion and terrorist campaigns is 
expected to be a positive nonlinear relationship, with a U-shaped distribution, as relatively more 
occurrences of terrorist campaigns are expected to occur when state coercion is at either very low 
or very high levels.  
At intermediate levels of coercion, there are probably still enough grievances that there 
are some rebel recruits and some level of popular support, but not enough of either that the rebel 
group is able to achieve a high magnitude of violence against the state. Rather, with such 
intermediate support a rebel group may choose a more protracted, more undercover approach; an 
48 
insurgent campaign is more likely. When coercion is low, however, too few people have 
grievances at the government, so rebels lack a support base of recruitment and resources for an 
insurgent campaign. When coercion is high, as discussed above, either civil war or terrorism is 
more likely. Interestingly, the insurgent campaign’s relationship to coercion is almost the exact 
opposite of that of terrorism, as the relationship between coercion and insurgent campaign onset 
is expected to be an inverted U-shaped distribution, with relatively more occurrences of 
insurgent campaigns occurring when coercion is at intermediate levels.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at low or 
high levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at 
intermediate levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is high. 
 
 Capacity  
While grievances may provide the raison d’etre for rebellion, the viability of such 
rebellion is also constrained by the capacity of the state to prevent rebellion, and the capacity of 
rebels to take action.  These structural factors are captured in the concepts of rebel and state 
capacity. Tilly (2003, 41) defines government capacity as “the extent to which governmental 
agents control resources, activities, and populations within the government’s territory,” and Bell 
et al. (2013, 241) define capacity as “as the ability of a state to project its power throughout its 
territory.” Hendrix (2010, 273), one of the preeminent researchers on state capacity, notes that 
for states, capacity assessments should consider both the ability to repress via coercive power 
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and the ability to accommodate via resource redistribution. Correspondingly, rebels similarly 
have a critical requirement for institutional resources as well as personnel with coercive ability 
(Buhaug 2010).  
In terms of defining capacity, this chapter draws upon Hendrix’s (2010) two-part 
delineation, which encompasses bureaucratic/administrative capacity and military capacity. 
However, while Hendrix (2010) specifically talks about state capacity, this chapter, in line with 
Buhaug (2010), extends similar measures of capacity to rebel groups as well. For both the state 
and the rebels, capacity is defined as the ability of an actor to enact and implement activities via 
administrative and military means across its sphere of control. With limited capacity, actors are 
expected to retain only fragile control of their spheres, and may be unable to adequately or 
appropriately respond to changes in their environments.  
Additionally, both states and rebels may receive external help from other actors, which 
means that measures of capacity are not dependent only on resources held internally by either 
actor. Salehyan (2009) argues that intrastate conflict cannot be fully understood without looking 
at external actors, either singular or multiple, and who may be supporting either side in a 
conflict. External groups which provide such help may be other states or extrastate groups, such 
as diasporas. Such external help may encompass bureaucratic support such as programs to assist 
with governance, development, conflict resolution; or military support; or some combination of 
both. Therefore, it is important to measure both external and internal variables that may affect 
state capacity.  
 State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
As described in the following paragraphs, the concept of state bureaucratic capacity can 
encompass different aspects, including the state’s ability to extract financial resources as well as 
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the institutional effectiveness of the state’s government. The financial resources of a state can 
include both internal funding through taxation and resource extraction rent, while the 
institutional resources of a state involve aspects of governance. Additionally, a state may also 
receive external assistance that may support its internal bureaucratic and administrative capacity. 
Internal financial resource extraction across a population base is typically undertaken via 
some form of taxation. Herbst (2000), Hanson and Sigman (2013), and Besley and Persson 
(2009) all use tax revenue to measure the effectiveness of government bureaucracy; the higher 
tax revenue, the higher the ability of the state to make itself administratively present and exert its 
will across its territory. As Herbst (2000, 113) notes, “If a state does not effectively control a 
territory, it certainly will not be able to collect taxes in a sustained and efficient manner.”  
Rentier states, on the other hand, possess a different type of fiscal resource and are 
correspondingly expected to have a different form of state apparatus. Mahdavy (1970, 428) 
defines rentier states as “countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external 
rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or 
governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country.” One of the most 
predominant forms of rentier states is that of countries which are oil-rich but lack a strong 
industrial base. Unlike states that rely upon tax revenue to fund activities, rentier states can 
possess large fiscal reserves without effectively penetrating into and administering their 
societies. However, rentier states may be able to buy the happiness of their populations, meaning 
that such states may still be able to discourage rebellion, even if they lack the bureaucracy and 
administrative capacity of states with high taxation (Mahdavy 1970).   
State bureaucratic and administrative capacity can also vary in terms of institutional 
effectiveness. Limitations in such effectiveness may imply serious constraints on the ability of 
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states to effectively carry out activities such as accommodating dissidents or repressing rebellion. 
States are expected to be less effective when there is high corruption and other forms of 
inefficient bureaucracy, and when factionalized elites are present (Feigenbaum et al. 1993; Sacks 
and Levi 2010; Le Billon 2001).   
Corruption limits the ability of the government to act by increasing the cost of state 
action, as well as potentially decreasing the amount of the action carried out. Corruption may 
also decrease the ability of the state to respond by skewing resources towards favored sectors at 
the expense of other programs (Sacks and Levi 2010, 2328-2329). Inefficient bureaucracies slow 
the pace of government response, for example, in equipping or transporting military or 
administrative personnel (Weber 1994). As Feigenbaum et al. (1993, 48) note, “characteristics of 
the bureaucracy may also influence coordination: for example, bureaucracies at the ministry 
level may be highly autonomous from central leadership and committed to their own goals.” 
Such divisive bureaucracies make it more likely that a government is only weakly able to 
respond in a timely manner to population grievances.   
Beyond corruption, another marker of institutional ineffectiveness is the presence of 
factionalized elites. When the governing elite is composed of competitive factions, infighting 
between or within sections of the government can result. This can lead to a situation of deadlock, 
wherein orders to action are never implemented. In very polarized situations, certain segments of 
the political elite may actually support rebel actors either as a way to take power in the state, or 
to use rebel activities as a leverage for effecting policy change (Cederman et al. 2010; Le Billon 
2001, 573-574). Rotberg (2010, 9) points out that the presence of favored elites may itself 
encourage conflict; once states are “devoted almost exclusively to the fortunes of a few or to a 
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favored ethnicity or community, there is every reason to expect less and less loyalty to the state 
on the part of the excluded and disenfranchised.”   
Finally, state capacity may also be influenced by external support. While revenue 
extraction variables emphasize the extent of the transactional relationship between state and its 
internal population, a state is not only limited to the financial resources that it can provide for 
itself. States may also receive assistance from international organizations or other states; these 
outside actors may find that it is in their best interest to provide assistance either as part of a 
foreign policy or in hopes of preventing conflict which could then spread (Brown 1996). 
Additionally, these foreign assistance programs may also encompass support to institutional 
effectiveness (Dollar and Levin 2006; Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
 Terrorist Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
Currently, there is a debate in the literature over how state administrative capacity could 
affect the occurrence of terrorism. High levels of state economic resources do not appear to have 
that much of a negative effect on the ability to carry out a terrorist campaign (Chenoweth 2010). 
Overall levels of poverty or the financial resources of the state only have an indirect bearing on 
levels of terrorist activity, as it is elites, not the poor, who typically stage such campaigns 
(Krueger and Malečková 2003; Piazza 2006; Malečková 2005; Crenshaw 1981). Piazza (2011, 
537) “suggests that wealthy countries are more likely to experience terrorism than poorer 
countries—a finding consistent with some of the empirical literature and with the theoretical 
argument that wealthy countries afford more targeting opportunities for terrorist movements.” 
Alternatively, Hendrix and Young (2014) find that terrorist activity is less likely in higher 
bureaucratically capable states, an argument which is supported by Tikuisis (2009), who finds 
higher levels of fatal terrorism in failing or failed states, but challenged by Sánchez-Cuenca and 
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de la Calle (2009), who argue that terrorism is more likely in developed countries. How can these 
competing claims on the relationship between state administrative capacity and terrorist 
campaigns be squared? 
This disparity in the literature on the relationship between terrorist campaigns and state 
administrative capacity is perhaps best explained by Newman (2007) and Coggins (2015). 
Newman (2007) exhaustively examines the issue of the relationship betweens state capacity and 
terrorism, and notes that such a relationship is complex; he finds that terrorism can occur in 
states across the range of capacity, and that this is due to a number of interrelated factors that 
may affect the occurrence of terrorism, including the presence of other forms of sub-state 
violence, or the presence of state coercion. In effect, Newman (2007) makes an argument in line 
with this project; that multiple factors influence the expression of terrorism, of which state 
bureaucratic capacity is only one. Coggins (2015) agrees with Newman (2007), noting that many 
of the indicators used to identify weak capacity states (including the presence of armed conflict 
and state coercion) are probably also related to terrorism. Drawing from this literature, then, it 
appears that much of the previous research on this topic does not clearly delineate the differences 
between the effect of state bureaucratic capacity, coercion, or the presence of a larger rebel 
campaign (unlike this study, all of the research cited above looks at terrorist attacks, rather than 
the aggregate campaign of violence). Therefore, all else being equal—in the absence of coercion 
or other armed sub-state conflict—I argue that states with higher administrative capacity are 
more likely to experience terrorist campaigns because, in line with the understanding of terrorism 
as a weapon of the weak, states with higher administrative capacity are likely to be a more 
permissive environment for terrorist than for insurgent or civil war campaigns. In low capacity 
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states, the state may not be able to counter rebel activity effectively, leaving rebels with far more 
options. 
 Insurgent Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
Byman (2008, 165) identifies the problems an insurgent campaign has when facing a 
state, which, in contrast to the rebel group’s resources, “is relatively rich, has thousands or even 
millions of administrators, policemen, and soldiers, and enjoys considerable legitimacy.” When 
state bureaucratic capacity is high, the state may be more able to effectively administer its 
territory and quash any rebels residing within it. Indeed, there appears to be a general scholarly 
agreement that weak governments breed insurgent campaigns; scholars that posit this view 
include Fearon and Laitin (2003), Jones (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Findley and Young 
(2007) find that states that pursue a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy—which includes good 
governance measures—are more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency. This apparent 
consensus in the literature, that high state capacity leads to a lower chance for insurgent 
campaigns, appears to hold not only for insurgent campaigns, but, as discussed below, for civil 
war campaigns as well.  
 Civil War Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
States with weak capacity are expected to experience a far greater likelihood of civil war 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2002; Fjelde and de Soysa 
2009). Hegre and Sambanis (2006) point out that two aspects of state administrative capacity, 
political instability and ‘inconsistent’ institutions, are quite robustly linked to civil war. Thies 
(2010), when looking at the fiscal strength of the state, finds a similar result; states with high 
fiscal capacity are less likely experience civil war. Overall, there is strong scholarly support for a 
relationship between state administrative/bureaucratic capacity and civil war incidence. 
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 State Administrative/Bureaucratic Theory 
States with ineffective governance, due to issues such as corruption or poor institutions, 
may find it difficult to provide adequate government services to their populations. Or, if the 
services they are providing are unpopular, they may lack the ability to change or improve those 
services. States that have poor fiscal health have fewer resources to draw on in order to change 
their institutions or their policies. States with factionalized elites may be so wrapped up in 
institutional infighting for power that the population’s relationship with the state is marginalized. 
How does the level of state administrative/bureaucratic capacity affect rebel campaign 
choices? First, with low capacity, states may be providing reasons for their population to rebel. A 
state that is unable to effectively govern its territories, or to provide basic services to its 
population, may leave a gap that rebel organizations can fill. Second, when states have low levels 
of administrative capacity, they are poorly equipped to deal with the reasons their citizens might 
choose to rebel. Thus, at low levels of state administrative capacity, if a population has a reason 
to rebel, the state is both unlikely to be able to change its own behavior in order to lessen support 
for rebellion, and at the same time, its own ineffectiveness makes for a highly permissible 
environment in which rebellion may be seen as less costly. 
Given these problems, it makes sense that states with low capacity are more likely to 
experience civil war and insurgent campaigns. For both of these campaign types, a state with 
weak capacity is not that much of a threat to rebel activities, which may flourish in a permissive 
environment. Popular mobilization for rebels is also likely to be easy, given the lack of state 
governance which would otherwise be able to deter rebel recruitment or change policies to make 
the rebels look like a less attractive option. Conversely, when state bureaucratic capacity is high, 
the state is able to better ‘see’ and understand its population, provide government services, and 
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take actions such as policy changes when necessary to respond to the needs of the state’s 
population. Therefore, I expects there to be a negative, linear relationship between state 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity and the likelihood of both insurgent and civil war 
campaigns. In this instance, the effect of state bureaucratic capacity does not differ between rebel 
choice for insurgent and civil war campaigns; the chances for both are expected to increase as 
state capacity decreases. The literature is fairly clear on this; both campaign choices are more 
likely in weak states and less likely in states with high capacity.24  
However, the effect of state administrative capacity on terrorist campaigns is the opposite 
of that hypothesized for insurgent and civil war campaigns. For rebel groups facing a highly 
capable bureaucratic state, a terrorist campaign may be their best, if not only, violent option. 
Since states with weak capacity are unlikely to be able to effectively stop rebel activity or 
recruitment, the costs for civil war and insurgent campaigns go down, so terrorist campaigns are 
probably less likely as insurgent and civil war campaigns become more easy to undertake, and 
therefore more easily substitutable. In states with high capacity, however, where the population 
may not support the rebels and the state may be able to effectively govern its territory, terrorist 
campaigns are a far more feasible undertaking. Therefore, the relationship between state 
administrative capacity and terrorist campaigns is expected to be a positive linear correlation, 
with relatively more occurrences of terrorist campaigns occurring when state capacity is at high 
levels. 
 
                                                 
24 As noted in previous chapters, the advantage of this project’s research methods are such that multiple explanatory 
factors can be used to understand when a certain campaign type is more likely; while the effects of state 
administrative capacity may be quite similar for insurgent and civil war campaigns, the effect of the other causal 
factors varies between the two campaign types.  
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HYPOTHESIS 4: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at higher levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
 
 State Military Capacity  
The state’s military capacity is considered the sine qua non of state capacity by some 
authors, given its assumed ability to squelch rebellion. As Kocher (2010, 143) points out, “This 
view of strength is highly intuitive: big, expensive armies win wars and deter would-be 
aggressors. …Domestic groups that might otherwise see opportunities to capture the state or 
detach territories from it are likely to be deterred or defeated quickly before large-scale 
challenges can develop.” Thus, the military is perhaps the most important state tool that potential 
rebels evaluate prior to deciding whether or not to take action. As Hendrix (2010, 274) explains, 
“Rebellion is an inherently militarized act that entails the risk of capture, injury, imprisonment, 
and death, and we assume potential rebels factor the size, strength, and skill of state forces into 
their decision to rebel. Ceteris paribus, a smaller or less organized army should pose less threat 
than a larger or more organized one.”     
 Terrorist Campaigns and State Military Capacity  
Minimal research has been done on the relationship between the state’s military and 
terrorism. This may be because, in general, terrorism does not typically directly confront the 
state’s military forces. In the research which most directly addresses the issue, Hendrix and 
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Young (2014, 336) find that increases in the state’s military capacity will lead to an increase in 
the amount of terrorist attacks, noting that “military capacity may incentivize terror tactics 
because it makes other means of violent contestation relatively more costly.” Similarly, Sánchez-
Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) note that terrorism is chosen over guerilla warfare when states are 
stronger; in weak states rebels are more likely to choose guerilla (insurgent) warfare. Lake 
(2002) also concurs, arguing that the goal of the terrorist campaign is to use the state’s strengths 
against it. In sum, then, it appears that high levels of state military capacity appear to be linked to 
a higher likelihood of a terrorist campaign. 
 Insurgent Campaigns and State Military Capacity  
As Buhaug (2006) notes, rebels in an insurgent campaign still have to fight state military 
forces, even if their goal is area denial or hit and run attacks, rather than annihilation of the 
state’s forces. However, given the ‘shadow government’ nature of an insurgent campaign, very 
high levels of state military capacity may not be necessary or effective to adequately counter an 
insurgency. Sepp (2005) argues that military forces typically play only a supporting role in 
successful counterinsurgencies, with the burden of effort falling instead on other areas of the 
state apparatus. Lyall and Wilson III (2009) also find that the military capacity of the state may 
not matter all that much to insurgents, who are more likely to avoid than seek out direct, 
conventional battles with military forces. Jones and Johnston (2013, 7) go even farther, stating 
that guerilla strategies are “the most difficult for a large, conventional military force to counter.” 
Given this literature, it would appear that high levels of military might have little effect on the 
choice of an insurgent campaign. However, a strictly negative relationship between state military 
capacity and the likelihood of an insurgent campaign is also unlikely, for if the military is very 
weak, the rebel group may choose instead to undertake a civil war campaign and directly 
59 
confront such weak state military forces in more conventional combat. Indeed, in states with 
such weak military capacity that there exists at state of ‘contested sovereignty’ between multiple 
actors, civil war is likely ongoing or soon to start (Florea 2012).  
 Civil War Campaigns and State Military Capacity  
As noted in the previous section, Florea (2012) argues that as state military capacity 
decreases, civil war becomes more likely. This view is supported by other literature. Collier and 
Hoeffler (1999) find that increases in the government’s military strength is negatively associated 
with civil war. Hendrix (2010, 274) concurs, noting, “Ceteris paribus, a smaller or less organized 
army should pose less threat than a larger or more organized one,” and this deterrent effect of 
high state military capacity is also noted by Gibler and Miller (2014). Overall, it appears that a 
larger state military force is seen as a greater threat to potential rebels, and will therefore depress 
the incidence of civil war campaigns.  
 State Military Capacity Theory 
When state military capacity is high, it serves as a powerful deterrent to rebel groups. At 
high levels of capacity, the military can defend itself effectively against any potential rebel 
attack, and threaten harsh reprisals should an attack occur. Yet this dampening effect on 
rebellious violence varies based on the type of rebel campaign.  
Recall from Chapter 3 that civil war typically includes major force on force battles 
between the rebel group and the state. Of the three campaign types, in civil war the rebels are 
most likely to be directly challenging and confronting the forces of the state. It follows, then, that 
the state’s military capacity has a very direct effect on rebel forces during a civil war; a higher 
level of state military capacity would make it more difficult for rebel military forces to 
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effectively combat their state equivalents. Therefore, increases in state military capacity are 
expected to result in lower levels of civil war campaign incidence. 
Unlike civil war campaigns, insurgent campaigns are not likely to have the same negative 
relationship with military might. Rather, insurgent campaigns may be more likely at moderate, 
rather than low or high levels of state military capacity. Insurgent campaigns tend to focus on 
setting up alternate governance institutions and taking on military actions that avoid directly 
engaging the state’s forces in major battle. Implicit in these calculations is the expectation that 
the state can and will choose to oppose the rebel group, so high levels of state military capacity 
are expected to decrease the likelihood of an insurgent campaign. However, at very low levels of 
military capacity, the state’s forces may pose such a weak threat—or no threat at all—rebels may 
see no need for an insurgent campaign. Instead, the rebels would be more likely to pursue a civil 
war campaign given that the cost of direct confrontation of the state is minimal. Therefore, the 
relationship between state military capacity and insurgent campaigns is expected to be nonlinear, 
with relatively more occurrences of insurgent campaigns occurring when state military capacity 
is at moderate levels, and fewer occurrences when state military capacity is at low or high levels.  
Finally, state military capacity may have a different effect of the choice of terrorist 
campaigns. For rebels who what to pursue violent action, when state military capacity is high, 
terrorist campaigns may be the best bet for two reasons. First, the high level of capacity may 
limit the feasibility of insurgent or civil war campaigns, as discussed above. Second, as Lake 
(2002) noted, a very strong state may also encourage terrorist campaigns, due to the hope that a 
poorly-conceived or disproportionate military response to that terrorist campaign might serve to 
push more of the population to support the rebels. Therefore, it appears that high levels of state 
military capacity are unlikely to have a dampening effect on terrorist campaigns; rather, there 
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appears to be a positive relationship between state military capacity and the rebel choice of 
terrorist campaign. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at higher levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at intermediate levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 9: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at lower levels. 
 
 Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
While rebel capacity and state capacity are both analyzed in terms of bureaucratic and 
military capacity, some of the aspects of these concepts may vary, due to their different 
circumstances. In particular, rebel bureaucratic effectiveness can perhaps best be evaluated by 
not only looking at the ability of the rebel organization itself, but also by assessing resources that 
indirectly provide the rebel organization the ability to undertake rebellious activity. This is 
because rebels operate in, and develop their support from, a population. Therefore, this project 
looks at both internal and external aspects of rebel bureaucratic/administrative capacity. These 
aspects include the ability of the rebel group to extract financial resources, the cohesiveness of 
the rebel organization, and the ability of the state population as a whole—in which the rebels 
operate—to assemble and communicate.  
As described above in the state bureaucratic/administrative capacity section, one aspect 
of bureaucratic effectiveness is the ability to extract financial resources. For rebels, successful 
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financing implies extant administrative ability and rebel coordination, as well as the presence of 
an income stream that provides the resources to undertake operations. Such financial support can 
come from donations by sympathetic members of the population, imposed taxation or extortion 
on areas under rebel control, or links to or facilitation of organized crime (Weinstein 2007; 
Mampilly 2011; Ross 2003a; Ross 2003b). Another source of financial resources are the 
extraction and sale of so-called ‘lootable’ resources. Literature looking at this subject has 
typically focused on the presence and amount of exploitable resources within a state that rebels 
could utilize (Ross 2003a; Ross 2003b; Buhaug et al. 2009). As Thies (2010) points out, such 
natural endowments may provide financial resources to both the state and the rebel group. Yet, 
lootable resources are important specifically for rebel groups, since the capture of such loot may 
result in personal gain for the rebels who take possession, as well as providing financing for the 
larger rebel organization (Lujala 2010; Weinstein 2005; Ross 2004).  
In addition to measures of potential internally-controlled economic resources, external 
financial support to rebel groups is also important (Salehyan 2009; Byman et al. 2001). Diaspora 
groups are one notable supporter (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Diaspora groups “often feel a 
genuine sympathy for the struggles of their brethren elsewhere,” and rebels can “actively play on 
this sympathy and guilt to secure critical financing” (Byman et al. 2001, xv). Such diaspora 
groups may provide financial support in the form of remittances, host state-in-exile 
administrators, publicize the rebel’s movement and rally the international community’s support. 
Similar forms of external support may also be provided from governments hostile to the state in 
which the rebels are operating (Salehyan 2009; Salehyan 2010).  
Administrative and bureaucratic effectiveness in rebel organizations can also be linked to 
the overall ability of a state’s population to assemble and communicate. Since the state typically 
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either does not know the identity of the rebels in its territory, or cannot access known rebels due 
to limitations or constraints on its use of power, the state tends to struggle with precisely 
targeting rebels with countermeasures. Instead, what the state can do is to implement broad 
controls on assembly and civil society for the entire population, on the assumption that 
population-wide controls will hinder any rebels operating within that population (Bell et al. 
2013). Given this logic, the ability of a population to communicate and coordinate its actions is 
part of rebel administrative capacity, as such communication and coordination permits rebel 
operations. This communication and coordination capacity can take many forms. Two aspects 
discussed below are population’s access to communications technology, and the social 
constraints on a population’s ability to communicate with itself. 
The focus on access to communications technology, such as mobile phones and the 
internet, is based on argument that such technology increases the ability of population to contact 
others (Bell et al. 2013, 248; Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). It 
enables physical coordination and assembly efforts as well as creating virtual environments 
where geographically separated rebels can interact and communicate (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 
2013). As Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010, 231) note, internet access both “facilitates and 
supports (traditional) offline collective action in terms of organization, mobilisation and 
transnationalism” as well as permitting “new forms of online protest activities.” 
However, having the technology to communicate and coordinate does not necessarily 
mean that such activities are taking place; societal divisions may limit inter- and intragroup 
coordination (Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These 
divisions, such as ethnic and religious group rivalries and different languages, can all affect rebel 
administrative capacity. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) explain this linkage, noting that “Rebel 
64 
coordination would be more difficult both in societies in which the entire population was from 
the same group, so that there was no obvious distinction between government and rebel 
supporters, and in societies which were so highly fractionalized that rebellion required 
coordination across multiple distinct groups (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 567).”  
Terrorist Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
As the ‘weapon of the weak’, terrorism has long been associated with rebellious activity 
carried out on the cheap, and therefore rebel groups with smaller levels of administrative 
capacity are likely to still be able to organize a terrorist campaign, even if they are unable to 
support an insurgent or civil war campaign (Gray 2007, 247).  Hendrix and Young (2014, 335) 
note that choices between different types of rebellion “are informed both by the organizational 
capacity and resources available to dissidents... On the organizational side, terrorism is an 
appealing tactic for relatively small, newer groups and for groups whose conventional strength 
has waned.” Rebel bureaucratic capacity may serve to limit rebel choices; as capacity increases, 
the ability to undertake an insurgent or civil war campaign also increases. In this way, higher 
levels of rebel bureaucratic capacity offers rebels more options, whereas low rebel bureaucratic 
capacity may limit options. 
 Insurgent Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
At low levels of rebel bureaucratic capacity, limits in personnel and funding may restrict 
rebel groups from undertaking insurgent campaigns; Byman (2008, 169) notes that “small groups 
cannot effectively wage guerrilla war and conduct widespread political mobilization. …Other 
things being equal, larger size is a great benefit in insurgent war.” Kilcullen (2010, 7) argues that 
rebel ‘connectivity’ is the key to understanding rebel group power, noting, “The center of gravity 
of an insurgent movement—the source of power from which it derives its morale, its physical 
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strength, its freedom of action, and its will to act—is its connectivity with the local population in 
a given area.” Kilcullen’s ‘connectivity’ bears a close resemblance to this chapter’s description 
of rebel group administrative and bureaucratic capacity; therefore, based on Kilcullen’s 
construction, the primary relationship that would imply a greater likelihood of the rebel choice of 
an insurgent campaign is a high level of rebel administrative capacity. Additionally, Fearon 
(2008, 295) argues that rebel group ability to limit information about themselves is perhaps the 
most important aspect of success in an insurgent campaign, noting that “the central problem of 
counterinsurgency is not to marshal adequate forces to defeat rebel units, but to gain good 
intelligence on who and where the active rebels are.” Thus, the capability of a rebel 
administration to conceal its actions from the state appears to be necessary for an insurgent 
campaign to occur (Hendrix 2010, 274). Finally, Ahmad (1982, 246) argues that rebel 
administrative capacity matters far more than military capacity in insurgent campaigns, stating 
that, “popular support is essential because the disparity of military strength rules out a clear-cut 
victory by the insurgents.” Given these descriptions, rebel administrative capacity appears to 
play an important role in insurgent campaigns, with higher levels of capacity encouraging a 
greater likelihood of insurgent campaign. 
 Civil War Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity  
In terms of the relationship between rebel administrative capacity and the incidence of 
civil war, DeNardo (2014) argues that the ability for rebel groups to strategize effectively may 
help rebel groups undertake civil war campaigns, as good strategy may reduce the danger or cost 
of rebelling on such a scale; such rebel strategy is understood as a function of the administrative 
strength of the rebel group. In a similar vein, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød, (2008) find that the 
exclusion of ethnic minorities will increase the risk of civil war, due to the ability of the 
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ethnically excluded groups to politically mobilize. Buhaug (2010) notes that more organized, 
administratively capable groups are more likely to challenge the government in larger conflicts 
which are closer to the government’s base of power. In sum, it appears that, as with insurgent 
campaigns, higher levels of rebel administrative capacity will lead to a greater likelihood of civil 
war campaigns.  
 Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity Theory 
When rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity is low, the rebel group appears to be 
simply not capable of undertaking insurgent or civil war campaigns. This makes intuitive sense: 
with low bureaucratic skills and weak or nonexistent coordination and communication, any 
organization would struggle to be effective. An inability to coordinate or communicate is perhaps 
especially critical for rebel groups, as their illicit nature means they must usually be covert in 
their administrative actions. Without a functioning bureaucracy, managing personnel or building 
up resources is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Because of this, when rebel 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity is low, it would seem that options for the rebel group 
become limited. Terrorist campaigns, which of all three violent campaign types appear to require 
the least in terms of administrative ability or organization, thus become most likely. Therefore, 
relationship between rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity and terrorist campaigns is 
expected to be a negative linear correlation for both administrative and military capacity, with 
the likelihood of onset decreasing as the level of rebel capacity increases.  
When rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity increases, so do the options for rebel 
groups. At high levels of capacity, the rebels can much more effectively operate, and therefore 
have a wider range of options. Indeed, insurgent campaigns are predicated on the idea that rebels 
can out-govern, rather than militarily defeat, the state. As described above, in choosing an 
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insurgent campaign, rebels seek to subvert the state, setting up their own ‘shadow’ governance 
institutions. This requires a high level of administrative capacity; the rebels must not only 
oversee their own members, but also, if they are successful, govern part of the population. Rebel 
bureaucratic capacity is thus critical to the implementation of an insurgent campaign. 
Accordingly, this project expects there to be a positive relationship between rebel administrative 
capacity and the choice of an insurgent campaign; as capacity increases, so too will the chances 
for such a campaign.  
 This same argument, that bureaucratic capacity is critical to effective rebel operations, 
also applies to civil war campaigns. Civil war campaigns are focused not only on governance, 
but also on direct conflict with state forces. In order for such conflict to occur, a great deal of 
rebel organization is required. Personnel must be recruited to fill rebel ranks, and war materiel 
must be found, maintained, and moved to the location of battle. These are large demands to make 
of an organization, and therefore the incidence of civil war campaigns is likely to require high 
levels of rebel bureaucratic/administrative capacity.  Thus, rebel bureaucratic capacity is 
hypothesized to have the same relationship for both insurgent and civil war campaigns; as 
capacity increases, the likelihood of both of these campaigns also increases. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 10: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 11: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
administrative capacity is at higher levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative 
capacity is at higher levels. 
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 Rebel Military Capacity  
The capacity of the rebel military is important because ultimately rebel specialists in the 
use of force carry out the violent campaigns. Further, the size of the group may also inform the 
type of activities they are capable of carrying out. Buhaug (2010, 115) notes, “[c]ontenders that 
are able to muster scores of soldiers clearly constitute a greater threat to the government than do 
tiny bands of rebels.” The number of rebel personnel by itself, however, is not necessarily highly 
correlated with the chosen campaign type, as the ratio between rebel and state forces is probably 
of far more importance to choice of campaign; Byman (2008, 170) explains that “A force of 500 
fighters would be quite large against a weak government like that of Tajikistan or in a tiny 
country such as Brunei, but it would be rather small in a country as large as China.”  
Rebel forces are comprised both of local fighters and the foreign fighters who battle 
alongside. Local forces are important, as foreign fighters may be more likely to lack support, be 
isolated from, or inflict violence on, a civilian population, whereas local fighters, coming from 
the population, can more easily garner its support (Weinstein 2007). Yet, at the same time, 
foreign fighters can grow the size of the rebel force, and may offer specialized knowledge in 
combat operations, to the benefit of less-trained local rebels (Malet 2010).  
 Terrorist Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity  
In general, the expectation is that rebel groups that lack military capacity typically 
undertake terrorist campaigns. Crenshaw (1981, 388) argues that rebels undertaking terrorist 
campaigns do not have high levels of military capacity, though they may hope to achieve higher 
levels of capacity by undertaking the campaign, becoming popular, and subsequently mobilizing 
a larger portion of the population. This reasoning is in line with Wood (2014, 462), who states 
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that “Relatively weak groups may therefore more frequently rely on terrorism as a substitute for 
more conventional strategies of war specifically because they lack the resources necessary to 
engage their adversary directly.” Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009, 35) concur, noting that, 
“In the continuum between military power and the power to hurt… terrorists can only employ 
the power to hurt.” 
 Insurgent Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity  
In terms of military capacity, Buhaug (2006, 694), drawing on Bueno de Mesquita and 
Siverson (1995) and Horowitz (1985), notes a difference in the aims of rebel groups that seek 
smaller conflict goals (regional autonomy) rather than large conflict goals (taking over the state). 
These different goals are roughly aligned with this project’s differentiation between the conflict 
type of an insurgent campaign versus that of full-blown civil war. Buhaug (2006, 694) claims 
that the difference between these aims is the ‘amount of force’ the rebel group possesses. 
Therefore, Buhaug (2006) would seem to suggest that insurgent campaigns would be more likely 
to happen when rebels possess moderate or medium levels of force, compared to the forces of the 
state. This view concurs with that of Crenshaw (1981, 387), who places guerilla-style warfare in 
the middle of a spectrum of rebel military capacity, between ‘weapon of the weak’ terrorist 
activity and ‘conventional’ war, an argument that Gray (2007) would agree with. Overall, the 
literature suggests that insurgent campaigns are more likely at moderate levels of rebel military 
capacity. 
 Civil War Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity  
Hironaka (2005, 3) points out that civil war is resource-intensive; the scale of conflict, 
greater than that in terrorist or insurgent campaigns, requires more inputs from the rebel group. 
She notes; “Regardless of the intensity of the grievance, however, few groups acting alone have 
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access to sufficient resources to wage large-scale civil war over long periods of time” (Hironaka 
2005, 3). Correspondingly, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009, 5) note that the creation and 
deployment of a standing rebel military is “both prohibitively expensive and extremely 
dangerous.” Lidow (2016) suggests that civil war campaigns, rather than insurgent campaigns, 
are more likely when the military forces of the rebels and the state are near parity (as opposed to 
the rebels having far fewer personnel). Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød (2006) find similar results to 
Lidow (2016), though they look specifically at ethnic civil wars. All of these authors appear to be 
in agreement that when rebel military capacity is high, civil war is more likely. 
 Rebel Military Capacity Theory 
The level of rebel military capacity should have a strong relationship with the choice of 
violent rebel campaign. When rebel military capacity is low, rebels are less able to undertake 
violent actions, and also less able to defend themselves should they face action from the military 
forces of the state. However, even as rebel military capacity increases, rebels may still face 
significant opposition from the state’s forces. This project argues that at different levels of rebel 
military capacity, different types of campaigns become more likely.  
At low levels of rebel military capacity, the rebels are most constrained in what actions 
they can carry out. Due to a lack of capability, a direct or indirect confrontation with state 
military forces is likely to prove catastrophic. Even if rebels have the capability to carry out a 
few indirect attacks, it is unlikely that they would be able to pursue an entire campaign of this 
sort; with fewer personnel to put at risk, minimizing losses becomes a concern, for if enough 
rebels are lost the rebel organization may simply cease to exist. Because of this limitation, at low 
levels of rebel military capacity, this project expects rebels will be more likely to choose terrorist 
campaigns. Such campaigns offer perhaps the most ‘bang for the buck’, as terrorist attacks may 
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require only one or few rebels to carry out attacks, and these attacks, often at civilian targets, 
offer less risk of confrontation with the military forces of the state.  
At moderate levels of military capacity, the rebels still may not wish to directly challenge 
the military forces of the states in large battles. However, at these intermediate levels of capacity, 
rebels may see some options for more limited military actions. In line with Buhaug (2010), 
rebels with some military forces may be able to challenge the government’s forces in certain 
areas, or at certain times. For instance, rebels may be able to ambush a small patrolling unit of 
state forces, even if they would not directly attack the home base of that patrol. That ambush 
would be less likely if rebel forces were so weak they could not either find the means to 
challenge the patrol, or if they were so strong that they could challenge the home base of the 
state’s forces. Thus it appears that there may be a ‘sweet spot’ in terms of rebel military capacity; 
too much capacity may encourage rebels to undertake larger or more direct challenges to the 
state’s forces, while too little capacity may limit rebels from undertaking much of anything in 
terms of challenging state forces. Accordingly, it appears that insurgent campaigns are more 
likely when rebel military capacity is at moderate levels. 
When rebel capacity exceeds those intermediate levels, rebels may switch to a preference 
for civil war campaigns. Civil war campaigns are focused on large-scale violence, typically 
involving force on force battles. In order to carry out such a campaign and directly confront the 
might of the state, rebel military capacity will need to be quite high. If rebel capacity were low, 
the state forces could easily crush them; this is why, as argued above, rebels are likely to choose 
terrorist campaigns when their military capacity is limited. Therefore, the relationship between 
rebel military capacity and civil war campaigns is expected to be a positive and linear, with 
relatively more occurrences of civil war campaigns when rebel military capacity is high. 
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HYPOTHESIS 13: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military 
capacity is at lower levels.  
HYPOTHESIS 14: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military 
capacity is at intermediate levels. 
HYPOTHESIS 15: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military 
capacity is at high levels. 
 
 
 Campaign Onset 
The hypotheses presented above provide a novel explanation of when specific types of 
rebel campaigns are most likely to occur, and are tested in the following chapters. But are 
conditions different in onset—the first year of a rebel campaign—as opposed to changes when a 
rebel activity is already underway? This research also examines the question of whether or not 
the onset of a new campaign of rebel violence is predicated differently than the overall incidence 
of violence. In other words, is there a different decision calculus at work for when rebels choose 
to start any form of sub-state violence, versus the decision of remaining in conflict? 
Extant literature suggests that a change from nonviolence to a violent campaign might 
have different requirements than simply remaining in either activity. First, such a change to 
violence, or campaign onset, can be seen as a ‘phase transition’ between two states 
(violent/nonviolent). In social science literature, such transitions mark a distinct change in the 
behavior of a group of actors (Ball 2003; Levy 2003; Samet 2012). Though the concept of phase 
transitions is still relatively new within literature on political violence, there are a few articles 
that do specifically identify the change between political nonviolence and violence as ‘phase 
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transitions’; these include Ferguson (2010), Cioffi-Revilla and Midlarsky (2004), Farley (2007), 
Johnson et al. (2013), and Galam and Mauger (2003). One key aspect of a phase transition is that 
some form of energy is required to shift the actors (Ball 2003; Samet 2012). This would imply 
that rebels need an impetus to switch to violent campaigns.  
 Campaign Onset Theory 
What would such an impetus be? I hypothesize that state coercion may serve as the 
impetus that is needed to shift a rebel group to a violent campaign. As Gurr (1970) and Arena 
and Hardt (2014) point out, because rebellion is a costly undertaking with very high downside 
risks for the potential rebel, grievances must be high enough to make the cost of rebellion 
comparatively less than it would be otherwise. This claim is supported by Regan and Norton 
(2005), who find that increased levels of repression by the state discourage nonviolent protest, 
but are a strong predictor of both ‘rebellion’ and civil war.  
Once a rebel campaign has started, however, the rebels may face a lower requirement for 
the level of coercion required to continue in that campaign. For instance, once a rebel group has 
committed to a violent campaign, they are an enemy of the state, and will face prosecution (and 
even death) if they are caught—even if the group later decides to cease their violent activities.25 
Therefore, drawing together the literature on phase shifts and coercion, I argue that the onset of 
any type of rebel campaign will require a higher level of coercive activity by the state than that 
required for the overall incidence of that campaign type.  
                                                 
25 An example of this phenomenon is described in the case study of the LTTE in Chapter 8. Scholars argue that the 
reason the LTTE turned down a very conciliatory peace offer by the Sri Lankan government, one that addressed the 
majority of rebel grievances, was because, while the rank-and-file rebels might have approved, their leadership 
faced not only a loss of despotic power, but also potential punishment for war crimes. Thus, the LTTE continued to 
fight even though it might have been in the group’s best interests to switch back to nonviolent political activities. 
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HYPOTHESIS 16: The onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger 
positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of 
rebel campaign. 
 
 Conclusion 
In the following chapters, I test these hypotheses by both quantitative and qualitative 
means. Quantitative testing is described in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 describes the process by 
which the independent coercion and capacity variables are generated and tested using a latent 
variable methodology. Chapter 6 further describes the development of the multi-state, multi-year 
dataset used in this project, and then discusses the methodology and models used to test the 
hypotheses, and assesses the results of those models. Qualitative testing is performed in Chapters 
7 and 8, which look at two case studies of rebel campaigns in Kenya and Sri Lanka. The use of 
mixed-methods to test the relationships between ends and means provides challenges to both the 
breadth and depth of the applicability of the hypotheses. Chapter 9 concludes by providing an 
overall analysis of the theory proposed in this project, a review of the hypotheses’ performance 
under testing, and a description of paths for further research on this subject. 
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Chapter 5 - Constructing Coercion and Capacity 
While Chapter 4 defined the terms coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity 
conceptually, in order to carry out empirical testing of the hypotheses it becomes necessary to 
define these terms operationally. One of the difficulties of doing so, however, is that these terms 
can encompass a number of measurable phenomena.26 While each of these measures may capture 
part of overall state capacity, no one measure is definitely better than the others. Further, some 
measures may actually overlap with each other in terms of the actual effect they are trying to 
proxy. In order to incorporate multiple measures of each of these concepts, I draw on statistical 
techniques for measuring latent variables. The term ‘latent variable’ refers to a variable which 
cannot be directly captured, but which can be indirectly measured via other variables. Little 
(2013, 103) defines the latent variable as “the unobservable ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ that gives rise to 
the observed measurements represented by the manifest indicators.”   
In latent variable methodology, measurements of a theoretical construct (e.g. state 
capacity) are inferred from multiple variables that are more easily measured. Latent variable 
modeling aggregates of a number of observed variables that all capture some aspect of the latent 
variable. The shared variance, or the amount in which these observed variables ‘hang together’, 
is assumed to be from the underlying latent variable. Once generated via confirmatory factor 
analysis and evaluated for model fit, estimates of this latent variable can then be used in 
statistical analysis.   
In the following sections, I lay out a methodological approach for generating a latent 
variable measure of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. I first describe the advantages of 
                                                 
26 For example, in the extant literature, state capacity has been measured using a broad array of proxies, everything 
from gross domestic product to rough terrain. 
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a latent variable approach, and explain why this novel approach is complimentary to existing 
approaches in the literature. Next, I describe why confirmatory factor analysis is the most 
methodologically appropriate way in which to develop the latent variables for this project. 
Following the description of the methodological approach, I describe the construction of the 
latent variables, and analyze the results of that construction. 
 The Advantage of a Latent Variable Approach 
There are no observable overall measures of state coercion, rebel capacity, and state 
capacity. Rather, researchers interested in these, or related, concepts typically operationalize 
proxy variables with which to capture some aspect or aspects of the underlying theoretical 
variable. As Loehlin (2011,1) notes, “the variables they [researchers] directly manipulate and 
observe are typically not the ones of real theoretical interest but are merely some convenient 
variables acting as proxies or indexes for them.” While the use of a proxy variable (e.g. using 
GDP as a proxy for state capacity) offers one way to measure the theoretical variable of interest, 
latent variables offer another, arguably more comprehensive construct for this measurement. As 
Hendrix and Young (2014, 340) note, the use of latent variables is preferable when competing 
measures of a specific phenomenon are expected to be highly correlated (thus leading to 
problems if they are included in a model simultaneously) but when using a single measure may 
not capture the full spectrum of the phenomenon. 
Thus, instead of using one proxy variable, latent variables are constructed by drawing 
information from several potentially related observable proxy variables that may each capture 
aspects of the theoretical variable of interest. Once these proxy variables are identified, they are 
grouped as a ‘factor’, and then that factor is analyzed to see if those proxy variables do indeed 
share variance with each other. If they do share variance, this suggests that the factor is capturing 
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the theoretical variable of interest better than the group of proxies—as individual variables—can.  
Once this shared variance factor is identified, the next step is to generate an estimate of the latent 
variable. Once generated, this latent variable is then subjected to further analysis to check for the 
goodness of fit of the model, or if modifications to the model are in order. Following this 
process, the final estimate of the latent variable is generated; this estimated latent variable, which 
incorporates information from all of the included proxy variables, can then be used as a variable 
in further quantitative models that test the hypotheses (Bentler 1980). A further description of the 
standards used to check for shared variance and model fit is described in the following section. 
The usage of latent variable techniques is not novel in social science literature writ 
large.27 However, its use in research related to international relations and security studies is far 
more limited. To the best of my knowledge, only one extant article uses this methodology in a 
manner directly in line with that of this project: Hendrix and Young (2014) use latent variable 
modeling for independent variables dealing with state capacity. Other, less closely-related works 
in the field of international relations and conflict studies include the following. Fearon (2010) 
notes, within a summary article on governance, that the concept of state governance might be 
better understood as a latent variable, though he does not perform that analysis. Andvig (2008) 
utilizes a latent variables construction of corruption and analyzes its effect on civil wars. 
D’Orazio (2012) argues for the use of latent variables when considering foreign policy 
similarities, which is in some ways related to state capacity. Fariss (2014) develops latent 
variables that measure human rights practices. Treier and Jackman (2008) develop latent variable 
measures of democracy. Overall, however, the application of latent variables to better understand 
                                                 
27 Latent variable techniques are especially common in the field of psychology, where they are used to capture 
feelings such as ‘love’ or ‘depression’ 
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concepts related to sub-state conflict, while theoretically justifiable, is still a somewhat novel 
methodology in this area of research.  
In line with this research, this project utilizes latent variable construction for its 
independent variables, and notes that this methodology provides distinct advantages in the area 
of conflict-studies research. Such latent constructs capture, perhaps more accurately, holistic 
measurements of the concepts of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Instead of including 
proxies which may capture only certain facets of coercion, such as torture or income inequality, 
the use of latent variable techniques permits multiple observed variables, each measuring 
different aspects of state coercion, to be amalgamated, and the shared variance between those 
variables to be captured, generating a broader, multi-faceted measurement of vital concepts. 
Such a methodology addresses the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4, which describes the 
multiple facets within the concepts of coercion and capacity. In particular, measures of capacity 
may be informed by both administrative and military efficacy, and a latent variable methodology 
can help capture these different aspects of the concept.    
While latent variable modeling is of use for more holistic representations of coercion and 
state capacity, it is of particular value for quantitative analysis of rebel capacity. In this project, 
the data used in developing latent variable measures of coercion and state capacity are measured 
at the state level; there are relatively good data sources for these variables. However, data at the 
rebel group level, which is used for developing latent variable measures of rebel capacity, are far 
more limited in scope and availability.28  
                                                 
28 The original dataset is built using the rebel group-year as the unit of analysis. The rebel capacity latent variables 
are generated using this level of analysis. However, the data was compressed to the state-year level of analysis when 
the state level latent variables (coercion and state capacity) are generated. Once all of the latent variables are 
generated, the state level variables are added back into the rebel group-year dataset. 
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In general, there are two major issues that rebel capacity data face. First, there are 
multiple incentives for rebels to misrepresent or conceal their true capabilities from the public 
writ large, as that public includes the state, which is very interested in suppressing and 
destroying the rebel force. Thus, rebels may wish to ‘fly under the radar’ and reveal as little as 
possible about their capabilities. Conversely, rebels may wish to appear more capable than they 
actually are when attempting to recruit personnel from the public or convince the government of 
the size of their popular support, so rebel groups may also broadcast inflated estimates of their 
own capabilities. Given these dual incentives to misrepresent, any rebel data collected via public 
sources is prone to issues of under- or over-reporting. Second, the overall amount of data on 
rebel capacity is, at the time of this writing, simply less available than that of data on states, in 
terms of the quantity of measures, the number of groups measured, and the time scale over which 
data is available. There are also significant problems with missing data on rebel groups, far more 
so than with state data. This can be due either to successful secrecy measures by the rebel group, 
or simply the lack of good public reporting on that group by the sources that are mined for rebel 
data collection efforts (Eck 2012). 
 Due to these issues with data on rebel capacity, latent variable modeling offers distinct 
advantages. Primarily, the capturing of shared variance between multiple discrete observations 
from separate data sources on rebel groups means that latent measures of rebel capacity are 
likely to be much more robust than the inclusion of a single specific measure. Since latent 
variable methodology captures shared variance, issues of under- or over-reporting of rebel 
capability in a specific data source may be less likely to skew an overall measure of capacity that 
draws from multiple sources (though, of course, such issues still remain problematic). 
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Furthermore, by meshing multiple data sources together, the odds of having at least some data 
for a given rebel group dramatically increase, which decreases the problems associated with 
missing data, and increases the universe of observable groups. For example, the most 
comprehensive datasets of non-state actors are focused on active groups, and provide data only 
for years in which the group chose an active campaign (i.e. groups are listed in the Global 
Terrorism Database or the Armed Conflict Dataset only in years that they are violently active). 
Other data sources, such as those that provide rebel finance information, provide some 
information on rebel capacity even in years in which the rebel group does not undertake a violent 
campaign. By combining these data, a better picture of rebel group capacity variation across time 
can emerge.  
To the best of my knowledge, no other research has utilized latent variable methods in 
order to capture measures of rebel capacity. Therefore, the method outlined in this chapter may 
provide a new, more efficacious way of approaching old issues associated with the quantitative 
analysis of rebel group data, as well as the larger study of sub-state conflict. While this method, 
as with all others, still faces issues with missing or underreported data, the use of latent variable 
methodology provides new approach that may help to mitigate these issues when studying rebel 
groups.29 In sum, then, the latent variable methodology utilized in this project provides a method 
for more holistically capturing measures of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Such a 
methodology may be especially helpful in addressing extant issues with data on rebel groups. 
The particulars of how the concepts of coercion and capacity are operationalized are described in 
the following section.  
                                                 
29 Missing data issues are discussed further in the following section. 
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 Latent Variable Construction 
Given the above-described, theoretically-determined sets of observed variables for 
coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and 
rebel military capacity, the next step is to develop latent variables from these observed variables. 
Within the broader methodological approach of latent variable modeling, there are several 
statistical approaches that can be taken, including factor analysis, item response theory, latent 
profile analysis, and latent class analysis. All of these methodological approaches are non-
controversial; the choice of a specific method simply depends on the type of variables under 
analysis.30 Bartholomew et al. (2002, 145-146) distinguish between these statistical approaches 
and identify which approach is best suited to a particular endeavor, based upon the classification 
of the observed and latent variables. Following their guidelines, this chapter utilizes factor 
analysis since both (some of) the observed and (all of) the estimated latent variables are 
continuous. Given the continuous nature of variables, then, factor analysis is the most 
appropriate technique for generating measures of the latent variable. While factor analysis is 
perhaps less common than item response theory for the construction of latent variables, use of 
this technique does exist in previous literature; Hendrix and Young (2014) utilize factor analysis 
when they look at measures of state capacity.  
                                                 
30 For example, Treier and Jackman (2008) develop both binary and continuous latent variable measures of 
democracy, using, respectively, an ordinal item response model and a latent class analysis. Similarly, item response 
theory models are used when data are ordinal.  D’Orazio (2012) uses graded response models, a form of item 
response theory, because the majority of his data is coded into ordinal categories. Similarly, Fariss (2014) uses item 
response theory models for human rights measures. However, Fariss, as with D’Orazio, uses only ordinal and binary 
observed variables (Fariss 2014, 305). It is this use of specific types of indicator variables that makes item response 
theory models less applicable for this project’s data. 
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There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory. While exploratory 
factor analysis is atheoretical in approach and seeks to search within data for potential latent 
factors, confirmatory factor analysis is utilized to determine if an a priori theoretical construct is 
supported by analysis of the empirical data (Brown and Moore 2015). In this chapter, the 
observed variables that contribute to the latent variables of coercion and capacity are drawn from 
the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4, and therefore confirmatory factor analysis, rather than 
exploratory factor analysis, is used in testing the development of the latent variables in this 
chapter. 
 In order to test the latent variable models hypothesized in Chapter 4, the following 
goodness of fit measures were used, in line with generally accepted standards for this 
methodology.31 The measures used include: Cronbach’s alpha, the Kaiser criterion, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy, the root mean square error of approximation, the p-
value test of close fit, the comparative fit index, and the coefficient of determination. The first set 
of measures—Cronbach’s alpha, the Kaiser criterion, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test—are pre-
estimation checks of the shared variance between the theorized set of observed variables. These 
checks should ensure that the variables to be included in the latent variable estimation do appear 
to share variance as theorized.  
First, Cronbach’s alpha is used to determine the inter-item covariance for a given set of 
variables, and provides a test scale that is a standard measure of the internal consistency of the 
variables as a set (Cronbach 1951). The use of this measure helps to ensure that all of the items 
included in the latent variable are correlated with each other, showing that there is, indeed, 
shared variance between all of the variables that can be captured in the construction of the latent 
                                                 
31 Statistical analysis in this chapter was performed using STATA 13.1. 
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variable. Following George and Mallery (2003), Cronbach’s alpha is considered to be adequately 
fitted if the test scale falls between 0.5 and 1.32 Once the observed variables set meets the 
Cronbach’s alpha requirement, the next goodness of fit check is the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser 
1960). This is done by running a factor analysis on the observed variables set, which generates a 
number of potential factors (potential latent variables) and denotes the Eigenvalue, or measure of 
the total variance accounted for by each factor. The Kaiser criterion requires that at least one of 
the potential factors should have an Eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1 to ensure that the factor 
is capturing a large-enough share of the variance of the set (Kaiser 1960). Basic factor analysis 
commands provide Eigenvalues for each identified factor, as well as the proportion of the total 
variance among the observed set of variables for all identified factors. While there is no 
established standard for the proportion of variance that a factor should capture, this proportional 
measure does offer further information as to how much variance the proposed factor is actually 
capturing from the set of observed variables. The third measure of goodness of fit is the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy (Kaiser 1974; Cerny and Kaiser 1977; Dziuban and 
Shirkey 1974). This statistic checks to see if the set of observed variables is measuring a 
common factor among all variables, or, instead, if there are shared variances between some, but 
not all, variables within the set. Again, in developing a latent variable, ideally all observed 
variables in the set have some common variance, as this shared variance is what the latent 
variable is capturing. For the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test, the common shared variance is 
considered adequate if the overall score ranges between 0.5 and 1 (Kaiser 1974). 
Once the set of observed variables appears to be a good set based on shared covariance, 
the next step is to generate the initial estimate of the latent variable. The basic latent variable 
                                                 
32 All variables were standardized. 
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model estimation utilizes maximum likelihood with listwise deletion of observations with 
missing values.33 Such deletion is problematic, since this project’s dataset has numerous missing 
values, due in part to its nature as a compilation of data from a variety of sources.34 Instead, for 
this chapter, latent variables were estimated using a form of maximum likelihood estimation that 
incorporates observations that have missing values; this provides for a far more inclusive use of 
the available data. This maximum likelihood multiple imputation model is considered to be the 
best estimation model possible for dealing with missing values, as it is unbiased and more 
efficient than the alternatives (Enders and Bandalos 2001; Soley-Bori 2013).35  
 The missing values inclusion version of maximum likelihood estimation requires two 
assumptions about the data: joint normality and ‘missing at random’ missing values (Acock 
2015). The ‘missing at random’ assumption means “either that the missing values are scattered 
completely at random through the data or that values more likely to be missing than others can 
be predicted by the variables in the model (Acock 2015, 4).” In this chapter, the missing values 
are assumed to meet these requirements. While it might be difficult to determine that this data is 
missing at random, because there could conceivably be bias, for example, in what the press 
chooses to report (which is the basis for most observations in datasets), the state of the field is 
such that this assumption is routinely made.36  
                                                 
33 All models were run with standardized errors. 
34 The P>|z| and coefficients for the model are substantively the same between the listwise deletion and missing 
values incorporated versions of the maximum likelihood estimation. 
35 Multiple imputation is alternatively called full imputation; the terms are interchangeable.  
36 There is no test to determine whether or not data is missing at random; Enders (2010, 17-21) notes that it is not 
possible to test missing at random versus missing not at random since the information that is needed for such a test is 
missing. However, if this assumption is not true, the results of the latent variable estimation are likely to be biased.  
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Once the latent variable is estimated, a number of standard post-estimation checks for 
goodness of fit of the overall latent variable model are run, including root mean square error of 
approximation and associated p-value test of close fit, the comparative fit index, and the 
coefficient of determination.37 The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is an 
absolute measure of model fit; adequately fitted models should have a RMSEA value between 
0.01 (excellent) and 0.08 (adequate) (MacCallum et al. 1996). Computation of the RMSEA also 
includes information about the p-value test of close fit (pclose) for specification error; adequately 
fitted models should have a pclose that is not statistically significant, with a value greater than 
0.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1993). The comparative fit index (CFI) compares the chi-square of a 
null or baseline model to that of the hypothesized one; the CFI in an adequately fit model should 
be equal to or greater than 0.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999). Finally, the coefficient of determination 
is a pseudo-R2 measure which provides information on the proportion of variance explained by 
the model (StataCorp 2011). 
After this initial estimate is generated, modification indices are checked to see if, 
alongside the common shared variance among all observed variables in the set, there are also 
instances of shared covariance among only specific pairs of variables within the set. 
                                                 
37 Some other standardized goodness of fit tests were not utilized, for the following reasons. The chi-squared test 
statistic was not used as this statistic is problematic when applied to large (N>200) datasets, as appropriate models 
tend to be rejected (Gatignon 2010). The Akaike and Bayesian information criteria were not included, as these 
statistics only provide information on different variations of the same model (i.e. if more than one latent variable for 
coercion was created, and the two needed to be compared). Finally, STATA does not report the standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR) for models which estimate missing values, as this chapter does. As a robustness 
check, some of this chapter’s models were run without the estimation of missing values in order to generate the 
SRMR (very few of the models would actually compile without missing). In all models that met the goodness of fit 
criteria outlined above (RMSEA, pclose, CFI, CD), the SRMR was also within adequate bounds (per Hu and Bentler 
(1999), a SRMR value less than .08 is a good fit). 
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Unsurprisingly, given the nature of the data included, such specific covariances do exist in this 
dataset.38 Once the appropriate modification indices are identified, the latent variable model, 
including those modifications, is estimated again, and the post-estimation checks are repeated. 
The results of the latent variable estimates and goodness of fit statistics are detailed below.  
 Operationalizing the Concepts 
In the following paragraphs, I describe the observed variables that are included in the 
development of the coercion and capacity latent variables. Each of the three subsequent sections 
lays out what observable variables were chosen for inclusion in the latent variable, and explains 
the basis for their selection. While coercion is captured in a single latent variable which includes 
measures of physical, economic, and social security, the state and rebel capacity variables are 
split into administrative and military capacity subsections. This is line with the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 4, which notes that some states may have a strong administrative capacity 
but simultaneously retain a weak military capacity, or vice versa. Such disaggregation permits 
more fine-grained analysis of the processes that may influence rebel campaign choice.39 
Additionally, such a division of capacity into two separate variables is in line with 
Hendrix and Young (2014). Hendrix and Young (2014) develop a state capacity variable is 
roughly comparable with this chapter’s state capacity variable, but they look at data from a 
limited sample of country-years, using elite surveys which capture only bureaucratic quality and 
                                                 
38 More information on the specific theoretical underpinnings for the inclusion of covariance modifications in the 
model is described for each latent variable in the results section, below. 
39 As a robustness check, one latent variable for overall capacity (combining administrative and military variables) 
was also created for states and rebel groups. Results were not widely disparate from those for the split capacity 
variables. While single capacity variable creation remains an option, the disaggregation of administration and 
military capacity provides a more nuanced understanding of the interactions between different types of capacity in 
conflict processes. 
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law and order. Their state military capacity variable looks at forces and money spent on those 
forces (Hendrix and Young 2014, 340-342). This project’s state capacity variable encompasses a 
larger set of variables that capture additional aspects of bureaucratic capacity, including the way 
in which states fund themselves, as well as attempting to capture additional nuances about the 
capability of state military. Hendrix and Young (2014) do not develop latent variables that 
address rebel capacity; this project does develop rebel capacity latent variables, built along the 
same lines of administrative and military capacity. Therefore, this chapter serves to extend 
research in the development of latent variables for both state and rebel capacity. 
 Coercion 
The coercion variable measures the actions taken by a state that can cause grievances. In 
order to capture the multiple ways in which a state may seek to exert control or force over its 
population, the latent coercion variable is comprised of three sub-areas: physical security, 
economic security, and societal security. The specific variables used in each sub-area are 
outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Physical security is measured utilizing the physical integrity rights variable from the 
Cingranelli and Richards (2010) Human Rights Data Project (CIRI). The physical integrity rights 
variable is “an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political 
Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators (Cingranelli et al. 2013, 13).”40 Utilizing the CIRI 
                                                 
40 As a robustness check, an alternate construction of this latent variable included the four separate variables from 
the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project—torture, political killings, disappearances, and political 
prisoners—rather than the single index variable. However, these four variables are so highly correlated to each other 
that the alternate specification model did not compile due to collinearity issues. This makes theoretical sense; a 
government that is likely to torture its citizens is also likely to ‘disappear’ them. In order to overcome this 
collinearity issue, the additive index of these four variables, the physical integrity rights variable, was utilized 
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physical integrity rights variable as a credible measure for state coercion is in line with much 
previous research in the field; the CIRI dataset is one of the top two commonly cited human 
rights-issues dataset (Schmitz and Sikkink 2013, 828). The other human rights dataset, the 
Political Terror Scale, is not an additive index of different discrete types of human rights 
violations, but only offers an overall assessment of the level state terror (Wood and Gibney 
2010). Given the additional clarity provided by the CIRI data disaggregation of different types of 
human rights violations—physical harm, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, etc—this 
chapter utilized CIRI data in order to be certain that only physical security issues were being 
captured, a level of detail that the PTS data did not offer.41 
Economic security is measured via two observed variables. The first is the Gini index, 
which is a measure of “the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) 
among individuals or households within an economy [which] deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution (World Bank 2015a).” The second economic security variable is the land Gini, an 
inquality measureument of for land distribution from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). The Vollrath 
and Erickson (2007) data extends the widely used dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996) to 
additional countries, though for most countries (in both datasets) this measure includes only one 
observation, and is thus time-invariant. Despite this single-observation limitation, the Vollrath 
and Erickson (2007) datset is the best-available dataset for land Gini measures; unfortunately no 
other broad multi-country survey of this measure of inequality exists.  
                                                 
instead. This index variable permits information from all four physical coercion variables to included, and provides 
additional information on cumulative overall levels of physical coercion. 
41 The CIRI and PTS datasets are the two most widely-cited datatsets used in the social sciences to capture aspects 
of state coercion. Additionally, these two datasets offered the best available coverage over the time series used in 
this data. 
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While the World Bank Gini index is focused on income distribution, the land Gini is 
focused on measures of the distribution of land ownership. The inclusion of both income and 
land distribution equality variables ensures the capture of a greater scope of economic 
inequalities; including both measures is standard for research on economic inequality and growth 
(Alesina and Perotti 1994, 363). Both Gini variables range from zero (perfect equality) to one 
(perfect inequality). These variables are included because they measure the ultimate outcome on 
the population when state economic policies on taxation, welfare, job creation, and land 
ownership laws are implemented.42  
The third type of coercion, societal security, encompasses three different variables, each 
of which focuses on a specific type of social equality. As described in Chapter 4, societal 
coercion may be captured by looking at how free a society is to practice religious expression, 
provide rights for the typically disenfranchised, and permit free expression, to include 
government criticism, by a population. In order to capture these aspects, this chapter utilizes the 
Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). As 
described above, the CIRI data is disaggregated by type of human right, which enables the 
capture of specific measures. 
                                                 
42 While these measures are imperfect, government actions on economic policies typically are focused on benefitting 
certain group(s) in that state; for example, a state which is more socialist is more likely to try to address income 
inequality through wealth redistribution programs (i.e. higher levels of taxation, the funds from which are used to 
provide social programs such as food aid, education, jobs training, medical care, home and land ownership focused 
on improving the lot of the poorer levels of society). The benefit of using measures of inequality, rather than direct 
measures of state policy (such as taxation levels) is that the measures of inequality more directly capture the effect 
of state policies on the population (whereas measures of state policy may provide information about the intent of the 
state, but not how well that intent is being implemented, or what its actual effect is on the population). 
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Other data on societal rights and coercion are also available, which include the Freedom 
House Freedom in the World data, the Minorities at Risk data, and the World Bank Human 
Development Index (which includes a gender inequality variable). CIRI data was utilized due to 
fact that it had the most in-depth data available covering the time for which data on rebel groups 
was also available.43  
Therefore, using the CIRI data, the three specific variables included in the coercion 
model are freedom of religion, women’s political rights, and freedom of speech. Freedom of 
religion measures the ability of a population to practice whatever religion they so choose. 
Women’s political rights measure the ability of females to actively participate in politics, and 
freedom of speech measures the amount of government censorship on overall expression.44  
Thus, the overall coercion latent variable was created to capture physical, economic, and 
societal coercion. In order to do this, the following observed variables are included in the 
creation of the latent variable: physical integrity rights, Gini, land Gini, freedom of religion, 
women’s political rights, and freedom of speech. This collection of variables captures multiple 
aspects of state coercion of its population, including physical, economic, and social security 
areas.  
                                                 
43 Further research in this area could certainly utilized other sources for this data, but such research would be limited 
by the fewer years available for Freedom House and Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets. The Minorities at Risk 
dataset, in particular, would be a useful addition. However, the MAR dataset implemented a significant change in 
their collection methodology, so that their current dataset only covers the years from 2004-2006. The older version 
of the MAR data runs ends at 2003 (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Given that this project’s dataset runs from 
1996-2011, the MAR data would not have been of great use due to the number of missing years. 
44 A general measure of whether or not all people, regardless of gender, can participate in politics is included in this 
dataset via the polyarchy control variable. Governments that allow only male suffrage may still be considered 
democratic (e.g. the United States before 1920). Thus, this variable is intended to capture social equality for women 
rather than measuring democracy. 
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 Capacity 
There are multiple, sometimes conflicting or overlapping, ways to measure for capacity. 
As described in Chapter 4, this project subscribes to the following two theoretical underpinnings 
for understanding, and then operationalizing, capacity. First, following Buhaug (2010), both state 
and rebel capacity are understood to be similar, as both groups require analogous capacity in 
order to undertake actions. Second, the state and the rebels both specifically require coercive 
mechanisms and administrative institutions (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix 2010; Hoeffler 2002). 
Therefore, measuring the capacity within a state or controlled territory should be a similar 
process for both states and rebel groups (though the specific variables included will differ 
somewhat), and this capacity can be measured by looking at two areas: 1) the administrative 
apparatus of bureaucratic institutions or apparatus, and 2) the military or paramilitary personnel 
and equipage. 
Thus, the concepts of state and rebel capacity are broken down into two parts: 
administrative and military. This disaggregation of capacity is not unique to this project, drawing 
as it does on work on state capacity by Buhaug (2010), Hendrix (2010), and Hoeffler (2002). 
However, this argument is somewhat more unique in literature on the rebel side of the concept, 
though Mampilly (2011) discusses the variation in types of rebel government, nothing that rebels 
are often as much concerned with governance as with violent activities.  
It is easy to conceptualize a state which has a high level of administrative capacity but a 
chooses as a matter of policy low level of military capacity than administrative-peer states. 
Perhaps more theoretically difficult is a rebel group with a similarly high level of administrative 
capacity but low level of military capacity. Yet, as Galula (2006) notes, an insurgent campaign 
may be far more focused on winning the population through the creation of public support for the 
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rebels than in generating a high level of militarized forces. Similarly, states such as military 
dictatorships may have high levels of military forces and capabilities with minimal levels of 
bureaucratic apparatus; certain rebel groups may function in much the same way.  
In order to capture these different mechanisms, capacity is disaggregated into state, and 
rebel, administrative and military capacity, and four latent variables are developed to measure 
these areas. The following sections outline the operationalization of state administrative capacity, 
state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. Though the 
state and rebel measures are intended to capture similar conceptual ideas, the differences in data 
available at the state- and rebel-group levels mean that the concepts are not operationalized 
identically (the data used are described in detail below). To the best of my knowledge, such 
measures provide a first attempt at large scale, cross-sectional measurement of the comparable 
administrative and military capacity of rebel groups and states. As better data become available 
on rebel groups, such measures will undoubted become more refined. Yet, as described above, 
the latent variable methodology utilized in this chapter offers perhaps the strongest available 
method to capture these underlying and difficult to measure concepts. 
 State Administrative Capacity 
State administrative capacity is measured by looking at observed variables of state 
bureaucratic and administrative effectiveness. Such institutional effectiveness is measured by 
looking at the manner in which states receive funding, the effectiveness of state apparatus, and 
divisiveness of the functioning body of the polity.  
The first two observed variables are measures of the extractive capability and processes 
of the state. The first, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, comes from the World Bank (World 
Bank 2015a). Tax revenue indicates the level of government effectiveness and societal 
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penetration in extracting resources from its constituents (Herbst 2000; Besley and Persson 2009). 
The World Bank data is used as it offers the most thorough data available in terms of both 
breadth of countries and depth of time. The second measurement, total natural resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP, also comes from the World Bank, and captures the amount of a state’s GDP 
that is provided by rentier activities (World Bank 2015a). This data source was chosen not only 
for its scope, but also because it offers a more comprehensive coverage of potential rent-
generating activities; it includes oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents.45 Other rentier 
datasets available tend to focus only on oil rents, and emphasize the countries of the Middle East. 
While high levels of tax revenue indicate high levels of bureaucratic penetration, governments 
that receive high levels of rents from natural resources are more likely to not need an efficient 
bureaucracy with which to extract taxes, as they can fund state activities from these rents. Some 
states, of course, may receive both rents and taxes, so the two variables are not rigidly 
dichotomous; both, then, are included in this latent variable.  
The variables which are used to capture the overall effectiveness of the apparatus and 
institutions of the state are also from World Bank data, for the same reasons of scope and 
coverage breadth as outlined above. Four variables from within the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators are utilized. They are: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2015b).46 These indicators describe multiple 
                                                 
45 The World Bank datasets are nonpareil in their scope and breadth of coverage of state-level economic variables; 
they are widely accepted as the first choice for economic data. 
46 The other two Worldwide Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence, were not included in the state capacity variable for the following reasons. First, the Voice and 
Accountability variable is capturing similar information to that already included in the coercion latent variable (in 
the freedom of speech variable), Similarly, the Political Stability and Absence of Violence variable is actually a 
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facets of state governance, and are therefore ideal to be included in this latent variable 
construction.  
The final measurement variable for state administrative capacity, factionalized elites, 
approaches the issue of governance by looking at the level of divisions within the governing 
class. The theoretical argument is that, in states with greater political factionalization, the 
political elites are less likely to be able to work cooperatively, increasing the incidence of 
political stalemates and feuds, rather than efficient, effective policymaking. Such factionalization 
can arguably occur in states across the spectrum of capacity; Goldstone et al. (2005) note that 
there is not a correlation between factionalized political competition and instability, and that all 
types of states—from developed democracies to strong autocracies—can develop polarized 
politics. This variable is taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2013). Within the 
Polity IV data is the variable, competitiveness of participation, of which one of the five coding 
categories is ‘factional’. This category denotes “Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political 
factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas 
and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas” 
(Marshall et al. 2013, 27). States coded as factional in the Polity IV data are coded as having 
factionalized elites in the data; all other categories in the Polity IV data are coded as non-
factional. The Polity IV data was chosen over the only other alternative data source on 
                                                 
different measure of this project’s outcome variables that are measuring rebel political violence. Thus, including 
either of these variables in the construction of this latent variable would cause problems with endogeneity.  
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factionalized elites, the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index Data, due to the greater year range 
of data availability in the Polity IV data (Fund for Peace 2016).47 
 State Military Capacity 
The state’s military strength is measured via five variables, all of which attempt to 
capture different aspects of military capability. The first two variables capture different aspects 
of military personnel. The first, a count variable, is the total number of military personnel, 
captures the objective size of the military, following Clausewitz’s (1976, 194-195) dictum that 
quantity has a quality all its own. The size of the military force, overall, may offer indications as 
to what it can and cannot do. However, since the size of the population of the state also varies, a 
second variable of military personnel is also included; this variable captures the ratio of military 
personnel to that of the overall labor force in a country. Military personnel as percentage of labor 
force is used, rather than as the percentage of total population, as different states have different 
demographic signatures. States with a larger elderly population and smaller youth population 
(such as Japan, currently), may have a smaller overall percentage of population in the military, 
but a larger percentage of the appropriate-age population in service. Conversely, states with a 
youth bulge may find it far easier to contribute larger numbers of younger members to the 
military, while not majorly affecting the availability of non-military labor force personnel. These 
two variables, armed forces personnel, total, and armed forces personnel, percentage of labor 
force, come from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a).  
                                                 
47 The Fragile States Index data only goes back to 2005; Polity IV data starts in 1800 (Fund for Peace 2016, 
Marshall et al. 2013), therefore, Polity IV data were chosen for inclusion based on their greater availability for the 
time period under study. 
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 While the first two variables deal with the state’s military forces in isolation from the 
internal threat they face, the third variable captures the relative strength of state military versus 
the internal threats it is currently facing. Thus, this variable captures a different aspect of military 
capacity; two state militaries with the same strength may be facing widely different threats from 
rebel groups, and the existence and level of the current threat is expected to have an effect on the 
state’s overall military capability.48 Data for the relative strength of the state is developed from 
the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2012; Cunningham et al. 2013). The NSA data 
provides an ordered measure of relative strength for each rebel group, (and is used in that manner 
in developing the rebel military capacity latent variable, detailed below). However, the variable 
included for the state military capacity measure, instead of looking specifically at a rebel group, 
instead notes the maximum level of fighting capacity posed by any rebel group active in the state 
in that year. This maximum value is then assigned to the state, with an obverse ranking (i.e. if the 
maximum fighting capacity of any rebel group arraigned against the state is relatively high, the 
state’s relative capacity over rebel groups in general is coded as being relatively low).49  
                                                 
48 A military that is currently employed fighting rebels (or expects to be so employed in the near future) is likely to 
be preoccupied with that threat, and therefore have a differing capability from an umemployed or unthreatened force 
in many ways, such as: the ability to train (or type of training); ability to recruit forces, and the quality of recruits; 
the retention of forces (who many not wish to fight, or who may desert in support of the rebels); the procurement of 
medical care for combat-wounded troops; and so forth.  
49 For instance, in a given state, there may be three rebel groups that are active. In year one, all three groups have 
low capacity; therefore the relative state military capacity for that year is coded—conversely, since this is the state’s 
relative strength that is of interest—as high. In year two, however, one of the rebel groups attains a high level of 
military capacity; in this year, the state’s relative strength is coded as low, since it is facing at least one competitor 
that is operating at a high level. Thus, this measure is not directly correlated with any given rebel group active in the 
state; it instead looks at the overall threat level posed by the aggregate of rebel groups in the state. 
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The final two variables included in the state military capacity construct focus on the 
military materiel available to its personnel for use. The argument here, in line with Mumford 
(2009), is that better equipped troops will be better able to combat rebel groups, or to discourage 
rebels from initiating conflict. This materiel advantage is captured by looking at the military 
expenditure of the state, as well as the value of arms imports. The variables, military expenditure 
as percent of GDP and arms imports, are from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a). 
 Rebel Administrative Capacity 
As with state capacity, the latent rebel capacity variable measures the bureaucratic and 
administrative ability of a rebel group. However, rebel institutional effectiveness is somewhat 
harder to measure than that of states. While some information is available on rebel financing, 
government effectiveness, and intra-group cohesion, the proxy variables outlined below are not 
exact matches with those outlined for states above. Hopefully, as research on rebel groups 
continues, better data on the way in which these groups organize themselves and administer their 
constituents will become more available. The data listed below are rougher approximations, but 
they are the best data available at the time of this writing. 
 Rebel financing, as described in Chapter 4, may come from a number of sources, 
including ‘taxes’ paid by supporters, the sale of natural ‘lootable’ resources, and international 
support from both states who are supporting the rebels as a form of foreign policy, as well as 
individual remittances from co-ethnics or coreligionists living abroad. Unfortunately, good cross-
sectional data on these variables is not widely available.50 The two variables included are a 
                                                 
50 In general, there is extremely limited knowledge available on rebel groups’ financial resources. There are multiple 
instances of rebel groups receiving remittances from overseas, or taxing the population under their control. 
However, at the time of this writing there is no available dataset on rebel taxation. The World Bank does provide 
data on remittances; however this data is extremely problematic because the recipients are not disaggregated. The 
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variable measuring overall natural resource financing of rebel groups, and international 
administrative or organizational (non-military) support to those groups.  
In order to capture any natural resources that might be financing the rebel group, data 
from Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) were utilized. The variable, finance, used from this data 
captures “whether the conflict episode had a natural resource financing mechanism. All types of 
natural resources may finance rebel groups, including illegal commodities such as drugs” 
(Rustad and Binningsbø 2012, 4). This dataset has the advantage over others that seek to capture 
so-called ‘lootable’ resources in its inclusivity and scope. Other datasets, such as Fearon’s 
(2004), provide information on far fewer rebel groups over a smaller series of years. The Rustad 
and Binningsbø (2012) data has the additional advantage in that it provides data on rebel finance 
even in years when the rebels were not in active conflict.51 
The second source of data is somewhat less loosely connected to finances, as it is a 
measure of all ‘non-military’ support given to a rebel group by both foreign state and non-state 
                                                 
inclusion of such a variable would be in line with Collier and Hoeffler (2004), who argue that diaspora support may 
be linked to higher incidence of intrastate conflict. However, there are two problems with including remittances as a 
financial measure of rebel capacity. First, remittances are not disaggregated in terms of the recipient; those receiving 
money may as easily be pro-state rather than pro-rebel, and therefore the level of overall remittances may be 
confounding as the money could be supporting all sides in a conflict. Second, the assumption that remittances will 
be used to support a cause, rather than pay for non-political personal necessities of the recipient, such as food and 
housing, is also questionable. The robustness check version of this latent variable that included remittances did not 
compile, possibly for these two problems. Should better-disaggregated data become available on the identity of the 
recipients or senders of remittances, this variable should absolutely be reintroduced into measures of rebel capacity; 
current data is simply too uninformative. 
51 Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) follow the Gates and Strand (2004) coding rules for including conflict years that do 
not meet the ACD defined 25 battle-deaths minimum, if those years are associated with a conflict. Because the 
Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) data includes finance information for these non-active conflict years, their dataset 
provides information on rebel finance even when no campaign is identified. See Rustad and Binningsbø (2012, 12-
13) for details. 
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actors (Cunningham et al. 2012). While this data, from the Non-State Actor Data project, is 
capturing non-military support, this support is not delineated in terms of financial support versus 
training or technology transfer. However, since the overall latent variable being captured is rebel 
administrative capacity, the inclusion of this observed variable is still very much in line with the 
overall goal for the latent variable.52 
There are several additional measures this chapter uses in an attempt to capture the 
organization and institutional effectiveness and cohesion of a given rebel group. In particular, 
rebel group cohesion is difficult to measure, as rebel groups can, and often do, simply split if the 
factionalization between the leaders of a group becomes to great (Christia 2012). However, the 
Non-State Actor Data do provide two measures of effectiveness of rebel groups, effective 
centralized control and effective territorial control (Cunningham et al. 2012). The measure of the 
strength of centralized control “indicates the extent to which a central [rebel] command exercises 
control over the constituent groups” (Cunningham et al. 2012:4). In additional to the level of 
centralized control, those rebel groups that control territory are also measured on the 
effectiveness of their territorial control. Extending the arguments of Herbst (2000) and Besley 
and Persson (2009), those groups with higher levels of control over territory are also expected to 
be more likely to control the resources flowing from that territory. NSA data was used for these 
two variables as it is the only available cross-national time series source for such data; this is 
regrettable, as it would be useful to have data on rebel groups that control territory but are not in 
conflict, but no such data is available. However, as described in Chapter 6, the NSA data is split 
                                                 
52 The Non-State Actor Data is, at the time of this writing, the only dataset that offers this type of data on rebel 
groups, which is why it was used. 
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into different types of rebel campaigns, so the information on territorial control is at least 
available across various campaign types.  
As described above, the Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) and NSA data may be skewed to 
measures related to larger rebel groups.53 Therefore, the rebel administrative capacity latent 
variable also includes other measures of rebel capability that may better capture capability across 
a broad spectrum of rebel groups. As discussed above, this ability to include multiple variables in 
a measure of rebel capacity is one of the benefits of the latent variable methodology. These 
additional variables are: political representation, potential untapped community support, and 
ability for a group to communicate both internally and externally. The additional advantage of 
the following variables is that they are not dependent upon the presence of ongoing rebel 
conflict; the values are available across all years, both conflict and non-conflict. 
The link, even if only alleged or tenuous, between a rebel group and a political party or 
movement can provide a form of support for smaller rebel groups, perhaps most notably those 
groups engaged in terrorist campaigns (Kydd and Walter 2006; Ross 1993; Cederman et al. 
2010). Such political support can permit the effective advertising of the rebel group’s political 
objectives. This variable is captured in the presence, acknowledged, alleged, or explicit, of a 
political wing linked to a rebel group, and comes from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et 
al. 2012).  
A further measure of potential supporters for a rebel group is the labor force participation 
rate, as a percentage of the total population (World Bank 2015a). While this measure does not 
                                                 
53 While the measures for effective central and territorial control imply a group large enough to administer territory 
and have constituent sub-groups, these measures may not adequately capture the organizational ability of smaller 
rebel groups. 
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capture manifest supporters, in line with Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1978), the presence of high 
unemployment may indicate dormant dissatisfaction with the current political order, and an 
easier path for the recruitment of potential rebels. 
Finally, two variables from the World Bank are included to measure the ability of rebel 
groups to electronically communicate and coordinate with each other. Bell et al. (2013) note that 
the ability to coordinate across a society may make it easier for rebels to organize and stage 
political violence. Such societal communication capability is captured by looking at the numbers 
of mobile phone and internet subscribers; the number of mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 
people, and the number of internet users per 100 people (World Bank 2015a).  
 Rebel Military Capacity 
As with estimates of state military capacity, several aspects of rebel military capacity are 
captured in the creation of the latent variable.54 These variables are relative overall rebel 
strength, relative mobilization capacity, relative arms procurement, and relative fighting 
capacity, all of which come from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2012).55 And 
additional variable, rebel military support, measures external, explicitly military, aid to rebel 
                                                 
54 The notable absence of a variable capturing rebel military personnel is regrettable but necessary. While there are 
some counts of rebel personnel available (NSA and GTD), the numbers were obviously inaccurate to the point 
where they strained credulity. For example, in 2003, the GTD mean estimate of the Filipino Moro Islamic 
Liberations Front forces is 39 whilst the NSA estimate is 15,000. Even when looking only the NSA data, there is a 
distinct lack of variation across years for the same rebel group; despite a huge level of political violence and several 
histories which remark on the massive attrition of rebel forces during the final years of violence, the Sri Lankan 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are coded as having the same exact number of personnel in every year from 1996 
to 2011. Given these issues, data about the number of rebel forces were deemed to be too unreliable to be included.  
55 As discussed above, and in Chapter 6, the NSA dataset is broken down into multiple rebel campaign types, so that 
the information it provides is not tied directly to a specific type of campaign.   
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groups; this variable is not relative to the state, but simply captures the presence and level of 
external support (Cunningham et al. 2012).56 
 A summarization of the descriptive statistics of the observed variables to be included in 
the latent variable constructions of coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, 
rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, as outlined above, are provided in 
Table 5.1 through Table 5.3. In the next section, these observed variables are used to construct 
latent variables, which are then tested via confirmatory factor analysis.  
 
                                                 
56 As with the rebel administrative capacity variable, there is unfortunately very little data (perhaps none) available 
on the military capacity of rebel groups that are not actively engaging in conflict. As discussed above, this project 
acknowledges the deficiencies of current data, attempts to develop the best measures available given the paucity of 
data, and expects that, as better data becomes available, these measures will be revised.  
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Table 5.1 Coercion: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coercion 
Physical Integrity Rights 2837 4.967219 2.285969 0 8 
Gini Coefficient 778 40.62456 10.02189 16.23 69.17 
Land Gini Coefficient 1504 .8280638 .1293444 .311 .996 
Freedom of Religion 3033 1.316848 .8118737 0 2 
Women’s Political Rights 2836 1.923484 .5868626 0 3 
Freedom of Speech 2840 1.006338 .7297546 0 2 
 
Table 5.2 State Capacity: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State Administrative Capacity 
Taxes, % GDP 1740 16.95466 7.819827 .0205501 65.90292 
Natural Resource Rents, % GDP 3424 8.491154 14.48186 0 89.22044 
Government Effectiveness 2628 -.0079851 1.002954 -2.450038 2.429652 
Regulatory Quality 2628 -.0084197 1.00074 -2.675439 2.247345 
Rule of Law 2689 -.0121907 .997595 -2.668873 1.99964 
Control of Corruption 2634 -.0067718 1.003256 -2.057458 2.585616 
Factionalized Politics 2631 .2113265 .408327 0 1 
State Military Capacity 
Military Personnel, Total* 2634 10.55889 1.892224 3.912023 15.235 
Military Personnel, % Labor Force 2603 1.751948 2.01348 0 16.22963 
Relative State Strength 2634 .0440546 .2802242 0 6.083333 
Military Expenditure* 1465 1.966493 .7848329 -.9604086 6.545068 
Arms Imports* 1613 17.7568 1.938795 13.81551 22.02672 
*Denotes natural log of variable 
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Table 5.3 Rebel Capacity: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Rebel Administrative Capacity 
Rebel Finance 697 .3242468 .4684289 0 1 
External Administrative Support 920 .4402174 .4966832 0 1 
Rebel Centralized Control 924 1.827922 .78006 0 3 
Rebel Territorial Control 345 1.953623 .5371598 1 3 
Rebel Political Wing 965 1.027979 1.3794 0 3 
Labor Force Participation, % Total Population 1693 62.23703 12.0786 37.8 86.8 
Cellular Mobile Subscriptions 1677 22.29676 33.67839 0 180.4453 
Internet Users 1571 6.32365 12.62375 0 75 
Rebel Military Capacity 
Relative Rebel Strength 1394 1.418938 .6094141 1 4 
Relative Mobilization Capacity 946 1.442918 .5514939 1 3 
Relative Arms Procurement 926 1.237581 .4408005 1 3 
Relative Fighting Capacity 947 1.243928 .458249 1 3 
External Military Support 834 .5779376 .4941847 0 1 
  
 Results and Analysis 
 Coercion 
As described above, the observed variables that were utilized to construct the proposed 
latent variable for coercion are physical integrity rights, Gini, land Gini, freedom of religion, 
women’s political rights, and freedom of speech. The Cronbach’s alpha test for this set of 
variables provides a coefficient of 0.6787, which is within the acceptable range. Principal factor 
analysis provided six factors, of which Factor 1 met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 
1.27921. This factor, as a potential latent variable, accounts for about 78 percent of the 
proportion of the shared variance of the observed variables. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) 
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test, which measures sampling adequacy, is also satisfactory, at 0.6112. These results are 
displayed in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 Coercion Pre-Estimation Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Scale Reliability Coefficient 0.6787 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 1.27921 0.34427 0.7857 0.7857 
Factor 2 0.93494 0.97411 0.5743 1.3600 
Factor 3 -0.03917 0.06838 -0.0241 1.3359 
Factor 4 -0.10755 0.06069 -0.0661 1.2699 
Factor 5 -0.16824 0.10291 -0.1033 1.1665 
Factor 6 -0.27115 . -0.1665 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(15) = 453.35  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.6112 
 
After an initial estimation of the model, a check for modification indices was run, and 
several modifications were found to be of interest. The physical integrity rights variable is 
correlated with both economic discrimination and land use discrimination. This is in line with 
research by Landman and Larizza (2009), who specifically look at this issue, and find a robust 
relationship between inequality and human rights. The measurements for Gini and land Gini are 
also correlated; again, this is unsurprising given that ownership of land—or lack thereof—has 
some relationship with income, as ownership may drive some forms of income (Deininger and 
Olinto 1999). Given this theoretical support for the inclusion of these modification indices, those 
three indices were included in the final estimation of the latent variable.  
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Table 5.5 Coercion Modification Indices 
Covariance Modification Indice df P>MI Expected Parameter Change 
cov(e.physint,e.gini) 122.987 1 0.00 -8.106988 
cov(e.physint,e.landgini) 130.957 1 0.00 -.0775146 
cov(e.physint,e.relfre) 13.608 1 0.00 -.1992328 
cov(e.physint,e.wopol) 10.774 1 0.00 -.0720329 
cov(e.physint,e.speech)| 7.858 1 0.01 .1591091 
cov(e.gini,e.landgini) 112.124 1 0.00 .661509 
cov(e.gini,e.relfre) 89.380 1 0.00 2.423767 
cov(e.gini,e.speech) 15.508 1 0.00 .9200491 
cov(e.landgini,e.relfre) 22.517 1 0.00 .0111499 
cov(e.landgini,e.speech) 19.645 1 0.00 .0095849 
cov(e.relfre,e.wopol) 24.363 1 0.00 .0385372 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, below, the latent variable, constructed with the inclusion of these 
modification indices, appears to have an overall good model fit, with all measurement variables 
significant at the 0.001 confidence level, and a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. The model goodness 
of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable range; RMSEA is at 0.050 and the pclose is not 
statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.982. The coefficient of determination (CD) of 0.789 
suggests that this model does well at explaining the variance in the model. Overall, statistical 
analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for coercion.57  
 
                                                 
57 For example, in the estimates, the five states that have the highest level of coercion are Pakistan (2010), Iraq 
(2007), and Myanmar (2003, 2006, and 2007). The five states with the lowest levels of coercion are New Zealand 
(1997 and 2001), Panama (2006), Uruguay (2008), and Lesotho (2002). 
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Table 5.6 Coercion Latent Variable Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Physical Integrity Rights 
cons 
.643927 
 
2.189394 
.0154432 
 
.0341962 
41.70 
 
64.02 
0.000 
0.000 
Gini Coefficient 
 
cons 
.2586988 
 
3.892981 
.0425253 
 
.1069852 
6.08 
 
36.39 
0.000 
0.000 
Land Gini Coefficient 
cons 
-.1814993 
 
6.407797 
.0298552 
 
.1184734 
-6.08 
 
54.09 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Freedom of Religion 
cons 
.6959722 
 
1.62194 
.0148547 
 
.0276327 
46.85 
 
58.70 
0.000 
0.000 
Women’s Political Rights 
cons 
.2817613 
 
3.285879 
.020295 
 
.0473106 
13.88 
 
69.45 
0.000 
0.000 
Freedom of Speech 
cons 
.739009 
 
1.400581 
.0144673 
 
.0259795 
51.08 
 
53.91 
0.000 
0.000 
cov(e.physint, e.gini) -.5184525 .0350962 -14.77 0.000 
 
cov(e.physint, e.landgini) -.3253517 .0264565 -12.30 0.000 
 
cov(e.gini, e.landgini) .5697756 .0329753 17.28 0.000 
 
 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(6) = 52.44 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Number of observations: 3075 
RMSEA:0.050 
     pclose: 0.463 
CFI: 0.982 
CD: 0.789 
 
State Administrative Capacity 
The observed variables that were utilized to construct the proposed latent variable for 
state administrative capacity are taxes, natural resource rents, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and factionalized politics. The Cronbach’s 
alpha test of this latent variable was 0.8723, which is very good. Factor analysis provided seven 
factors, of which one had an Eigenvalue well above the minimum threshold for meaningful 
correlation, at 4.09339. This factor also accounted for over 98 percent of the proportion of 
variance, which is quite high; the data appear to be strongly supportive of this potential factor. 
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The KMO test, at 0.8760, is also well above the minimum standard for sampling adequacy. 
These results are detailed in Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7 State Administrative Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Scale Reliability Coefficient 0.8723 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.09339 3.93604 0.9873 0.9873 
Factor 2 0.15735 0.11416 0.0380 1.0252 
Factor 3 0.04319 0.05517 0.0104 1.0357 
Factor 4 -0.01198 0.00547 -0.0029 1.0328 
Factor 5 -0.01746 0.03233 -0.0042 1.0286 
Factor 6 -0.04978 0.01883 -0.0120 1.0165 
Factor 7 -0.06862 . -0.0165 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 9907.50  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.8760 
 
Following initial estimation of the model, a check of the modification indices for the 
latent state administrative capacity variable was run, as seen in Table 5.8. This revealed high 
levels of covariance between government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and between rule 
of law and corruption. These modifications are theoretically unsurprising, as governments that 
are able to provide regulation are also likely governments that are in general effective, and those 
states enjoying a strong rule of law are also likely to have a lower incidence of or need for 
corruption. A covariance structure was specified between these two sets of variables, and 
included in the final version of the latent state capacity model.  
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Table 5.8 State Administrative Capacity Modification Indices 
Covariance Modification Indice df P>MI Expected Parameter Change 
cov(e.tax,e.rents) 9.442 1 0.00 -7.417459 
cov(e.rents,e.effective) 25.225 1 0.00 .3740715 
cov(e.rents,e.law) 34.030 1 0.00 -.5239158 
cov(e.rents,e.faction) 7.198 1 0.01 -.2899004 
cov(e.effective,e.regulate) 431.849 1 0.00 .0569902 
cov(e.effective,e.law) 273.665 1 0.00 -.0475693 
cov(e.effective,e.corrupt) 10.822 1 0.00 -.0094206 
cov(e.effective,e.faction) 10.645 1 0.00 .0076444 
cov(e.regulate,e.law) 20.722 1 0.00 -.0125913 
cov(e.regulate,e.corrupt) 285.106 1 0.00 -.0470884 
cov(e.regulate,e.faction) 8.184 1 0.00 .0091317 
cov(e.law,e.corrupt) 364.550 1 0.00 .052052 
cov(e.law,e.faction) 16.026 1 0.00 -.0114038 
cov(e.corrupt,e.faction) 9.987 1 0.00 -.0090512 
 
The final version of the latent variable, displayed in Table 5.9, shows overall good model 
fit, with all measurement variables significant at the 0.001 confidence level and a model 
Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. The model goodness of fit statistics are excellent, with a RMSEA at 0.058 
and not statistically significant pclose, and a CFI of 0.992. The coefficient of determination, at 
1.006, is actually over the high end of the expected scale, but this is due to the inclusion of the 
modification indices, which, when included, permit CDs over 1 to be calculated. Given these 
results, this model appears to support the theorized latent variable construct for state 
administrative capacity. 
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Table 5.9 State Administrative Capacity Latent Variable Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Taxes, % GDP 
 
cons 
.3674167 
 
2.118451 
.0218189 
 
.0441406 
16.84 
 
47.99 
0.000 
0.000 
Natural Resource Rents, % GDP 
cons 
-.3270856 
 
.579991 
.0164319 
 
.0185043 
-19.91 
 
31.34 
0.000 
0.000 
Government Effectiveness 
cons 
.9432927 
 
.0254287 
.0065213 
 
.0189678 
144.65 
 
1.34 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Regulatory Quality 
 
cons 
.8905187 
 
.0229294 
.0070835 
 
.0190277 
125.72 
 
1.21 
0.000 
0.000 
Rule of Law 
 
cons 
.9854175 
 
.007382 
.0067161 
 
.0189032 
146.72 
 
0.39 
0.000 
0.000 
Control of Corruption 
cons 
.985687 
 
.0292587 
.0065025 
 
.0189273 
151.59 
 
1.55 
0.000 
0.000 
Factionalized Politics 
cons 
-.2928565 
 
.4728996 
.0190651 
 
.0210267 
-15.36 
 
22.49 
0.000 
0.000 
cov(e.effective, e.regulate) .6093049 .028332 21.51 0.000 
 
cov(e.law,e.corrupt) -1.399477 1.065418 -1.31 0.189 
 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(12) = 153.94 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Number of observations: 3543 
RMSEA:0.058 
     pclose: 0.054 
CFI: 0.992 
CD: 1.006 
  
 State Military Capacity 
To create the state military capacity latent variable, military personnel, military personnel 
as a percentage of the labor force, relative state strength, military expenditures, and arms imports 
were the set of observed variables utilized. The Cronbach’s alpha for this set of variables is 
0.5412, which is within the acceptable range. One factor, of the five generated by factor analysis, 
met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 1.49967. This factor, as a potential latent 
variable, accounts for about 99 percent of the proportion of the shared variance of the observed 
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variables. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) test, which measures sampling adequacy, is also 
satisfactory, at 0.5985. These results are displayed in Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 State Military Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Scale Reliability Coefficient 0.5412 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 1.49967 1.07986 0.9977 0.9977 
Factor 2 0.41981 0.36695 0.2793 1.2770 
Factor 3 0.05286 0.26537 0.0352 1.3121 
Factor 4 -0.21251 0.04416 -0.1414 1.1708 
Factor 5 -0.25668 . -0.1708 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10) = 1011.19  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.5985 
 
The check for modification indices following initial model estimation found some indices 
of theoretical interest. As seen in Table 5.11, the measure of military expenditure appeared to 
have a strong relationship with both overall state strength relative to rebel groups, as well as with 
the percentage of the overall labor force employed by the military. This makes sense; defense 
spending is typically focused on increasing the capability of the military, and is also easily linked 
to personnel increases, as the military can then pay for their personnel’s salaries. Interestingly, 
arms imports appear to be correlated with the overall size of the military. This linkage may be 
due to underlying choices by the state as it attempts to develop military capacity by increasing 
the size of the force, and the materiel available for the force to use; both may signal such a 
choice by the state (Silverson & Starr 1991; Spear 1996). Therefore, these three indices are 
included in the final estimation of the latent variable, as described below. 
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Table 5.11 State Military Capacity Modification Indices 
Covariance Modification Indice df P>MI Expected Parameter Change 
cov(e.logmil,e.logmilex) 32.998 1 0.00 -.386729 
cov(e.logmil,e.logarmsimports) 102.308 1 0.00 3.479959 
cov(e.logmil,e.millabor) 4.507 1 0.03 -.281544 
cov(e.logmil,e.rel_state_strength) 19.452 1 0.00 -.0531678 
cov(e.logmilex,e.millabor) 131.958 1 0.00 .4425954 
cov(e.logmilex,e.rel_state_strength) 136.726 1 0.00 .0612433 
cov(e.logarmsimports,e.millabor) 35.158 1 0.00 -.5766982 
 
As shown in Table 5.12, the estimated state military capacity latent variable, constructed 
with the inclusion of these modification indices. Overall model fit is within the acceptable range, 
with four variables significant at the 0.05 confidence level, and one variable, relative state 
strength, significant at the 0.10 confidence level, and the model Prob>chi2 at 0.0179. The model 
goodness of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable range; RMSEA is at 0.034 and the 
pclose is not statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.996. The coefficient of determination (CD) 
of 0.741 suggests that this model does well at explaining the variance in the model. Overall, 
statistical analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for state military 
capacity, though the model is perhaps not quite as strong as that of the model developed for state 
administrative capacity. 
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Table 5.12 State Military Capacity Latent Variable Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Military Personnel, Total* 
cons 
.8265169 
 
5.577456 
.3600871 
 
.0792587 
2.30 
 
70.37 
0.022 
 
0.000 
Military Personnel, % Labor Force 
cons 
.4267861 
 
.8583006 
.1864819 
 
.0230503 
2.29 
 
37.24 
0.022 
 
0.000 
Relative State Strength 
cons 
-.0497048 
 
-.0497048 
.0291052 
 
.0196011 
-1.71 
 
8.06 
0.088 
 
0.000 
Military Expenditure* 
cons 
.5689201 
 
2.377583 
.2503613 
 
.0519427 
2.27 
 
45.77 
0.023 
 
0.000 
Arms Imports* 
 
cons 
.4442365 
 
8.410049 
.1974009 
 
.1649906 
2.25 
 
50.97 
0.024 
 
0.000 
cov(e.logmil, e.logarmsimports) .5245928 .0965265 5.43 0.000 
 
cov(e.logmilex, e.millabor) .336115 .1883157 1.78 0.074 
 
cov(e.logmilex, e.rel_state_strength) .2793689 .0832244 3.36 0.001 
 
 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(2) = 8.04 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0179 
Number of observations: 2677 
RMSEA:0.034 
     pclose: 0.837 
CFI: 0.996 
CD: 0.741 
*Denotes natural log of variable 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity 
The rebel administrative capacity latent variable was constructed with the following 
observed variables: rebel finance, external administrative support, rebel centralized control, rebel 
territorial control, rebel political wing, labor force participation as a percentage of the total 
population, cellular mobile subscriptions, and internet users. The Cronbach’s alpha test of this 
latent variable was satisfactory, at 0.6225. Factor analysis provided eight potential factors, of 
which two had Eigenvalues greater than one; Factor 1 at 2.35485, and Factor 2 1.04448. 
Proportionally, Factor 1 explains about 63 percent of the variance, while Factor 2 only accounts 
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for about 28 percent of total variance. The KMO overall measure of sampling adequacy is 
0.5533, within range. Results from the factor analysis are provided in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13 Rebel Administrative Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Scale Reliability Coefficient 0.6225 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 2.35485 1.31037 0.6350 0.6350 
Factor 2 1.04448 0.29643 0.2816 0.9166 
Factor 3 0.74805 0.71399 0.2017 1.1184 
Factor 4 0.03406 0.02956 0.0092 1.1275 
Factor 5 0.00450 0.08256 0.0012 1.1288 
Factor 6 -0.07806 0.04073 -0.0210 1.1077 
Factor 7 -0.11879 0.16185 -0.0320 1.0757 
Factor 8 -0.28064 . -0.0757 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(28) = 503.23  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.5533 
 
Modification indices for the latent state capacity variable revealed three sets of 
covariances, as seen in Table 5.14. External rebel administrative support was correlated to the 
presence of a political wing with ties to the rebel group; this makes sense, for the external 
support is likely due to some sort of aligned political consideration on the part of the intervening 
actor. Unsurprisingly, rebel central control and rebel territorial control covary; groups that are 
able to control their constituents effectively are probably also able to effectively control territory. 
Finally, access to mobile phones and the internet covary; this can be easily understood, as 
cellular data service on a phone may serve as the route by which the internet is accessed. All 
three modification indices were included in the final estimation of the latent rebel administrative 
capacity model. 
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Table 5.14 Rebel Administrative Capacity Modification Indices 
Covariance Modification 
Indice 
df P>MI Expected Parameter 
Change 
cov(e.finance,e.reb_terr_control) 9.905 1 0.00 -.2755356 
cov(e.finance,e.reblabor) 27.529 1 0.00 .1992912 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reb_control) 6.327 1 0.01 -.0850469 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support, 
e.reb_terr_control) 
4.100 1 0.04 .1106563 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reb_polwing) 40.388 1 0.00 -.2102424 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reblabor) 26.119 1 0.00 -.1699572 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.cell) 28.375 1 0.00 -.8100791 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.web) 12.908 1 0.00 .1381503 
cov(e.reb_control,e.reb_terr_control) 39.756 1 0.00 .3436988 
cov(e.reblabor,e.cell) 10.157 1 0.00 -.5776471 
cov(e.reblabor,e.web) 21.080 1 0.00 .2033346 
cov(e.cell,e.web) 44.424 1 0.00 18.34133 
 
The final version of this latent variable, shown in Table 5.15, indicates an acceptable 
model, with a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. However, two of the observed variables, rebel central 
control and rebel territorial control are not statistically significant. All other observed variables 
are significant at the 0.01 confidence level. When looking at the goodness of fit statistics, the 
RMSEA of 0.042 was adequate, with a statistically insignificant pclose. The CFI, also in range, 
was 0.973. However, the coefficient of determination, at 0.549, suggests that this model, while it 
is adequate, does not explain all of the variance in the model. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
however, given the lack of specificity in the available proxy variables for rebel capacity. While 
this project does include this latent variable as estimated, the development of further data on 
issues related to rebel governance, such as shadow government corruption or adherence to rule of 
law, would undoubtedly help serve to refine this latent variable.  
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Table 5.15 Rebel Administrative Capacity Latent Variable Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Rebel Finance 
 
cons 
.317893 
 
.6471937 
.0556969 
 
.0433359 
5.71 
 
14.93 
0.000 
 
0.000 
External Administrative Support 
cons 
-.3334941 
 
.900701 
.0510035 
 
.0384332 
-6.54 
 
23.44 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Rebel Centralized Control 
 
cons 
.078437 
 
2.341132 
.0512792 
 
.0512792 
1.53 
 
36.72 
0.126 
 
0.000 
Rebel Territorial Control 
 
cons 
-.0259211 
 
3.627001 
.0754896 
 
.148333 
-0.34 
 
24.45 
0.731 
 
0.000 
Rebel Political Wing 
 
cons 
.1196294 
 
.7390867 
.0464009 
 
.0364738 
2.58 
 
20.26 
0.010 
 
0.000 
Labor Force Participation, % Total Population 
cons 
.6600215 
 
5.15453 
.0790031 
 
.0918453 
8.35 
 
56.12 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Cellular Mobile Subscriptions 
cons 
-.4016499 
 
.6623251 
.0527484 
 
.0269021 
-7.61 
 
24.62 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Internet Users 
 
cons 
-.2817377 
 
.4768146 
.0521158 
 
.0262061 
-5.41 
 
18.19 
0.000 
 
0.000 
cov(e.rebel_admin_support, e.reb_polwing) -.2014483 .0341226 -5.90 0.000 
 
cov(e.reb_control, e.reb_terr_control) .3409928 .0450075 7.58 0.000 
 
cov(e.cell,e.web) .7515673 .0140275 53.58 0.000 
 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(17) = 66.75 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Number of observations: 1695 
RMSEA:0.042 
     pclose: 0.900 
CFI: 0.973 
CD: 0.549 
 
 Rebel Military Capacity 
The last latent variable, rebel military capacity, was developed using the observed 
variables of relative rebel strength, relative mobilization capacity, relative arms procurement, 
relative fighting capacity, and external military support. The Cronbach’s alpha test for this set of 
variables provides a coefficient of 0.6704, which meets the standard. Factor analysis provided 
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five factors, of which Factor 1 met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 1.85145. This 
factor, as a potential latent variable, at first glance appears to account for more than all of the 
proportion of the shared variance of the observed variables. However, this is due to the way that 
proportion is calculated, as the relative weight of each factor in the total variance; since some of 
the smaller factors are negative, the proportionality of the positive factors can be greater than 1 
(Vincent 1971). The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) test, which measures sampling adequacy, is 
also satisfactory, at 0.6253. These results are displayed in Table 5.16. 
 
Table 5.16 Rebel Military Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Scale Reliability Coefficient 0.6704 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 1.85145 1.56445 1.0127 1.0127 
Factor 2 0.28700 0.23416 0.1570 1.1697 
Factor 3 0.05284 0.17207 0.0289 1.1986 
Factor 4 -0.11923 0.12455 -0.0652 1.1333 
Factor 5 -0.24378 . -0.1333 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10) = 1116.61  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.6253 
 
Subsequent to initial estimation of the model, a check for modification indices was run. 
The modification selected was the covariance between relative rebel strength and relative 
mobilization capacity. For a rebel group, this makes particular sense; many of the groups 
included in this data may not have access to or need heavy armaments, and may be fairly small 
organizations. However, popular support, as described in Chapter 3, is absolutely necessary; if 
rebels cannot mobilize the personnel they need, they are unlikely to pose any sort of grave threat 
to the state. Therefore, this modification indice was included in the final model. 
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Table 5.17 Rebel Military Capacity Modification Indices 
Covariance Modification 
Indice 
df P>MI Expected Parameter Change 
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2,e.rel_arms) 78.283 1 0.00 -.1485701 
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2,e.rel_mob_cap) 141.651 1 0.00 .1024394 
cov(e.rel_arms,e.rel_fight_cap) 127.316 1 0.00 .2025748 
cov(e.rel_arms,e.rebel_mil_support) 12.530 1 0.00 .0202288 
cov(e.rel_mob_cap,e.rel_fight_cap) 69.951 1 0.00 -.0511671 
cov(e.rel_fight_cap,e.rebel_mil_support) 7.380 1 0.01 -.0159906 
 
The final version of the latent variable, constructed with the inclusion of this modification 
indice, is displayed in Table 5.18, below. This model appears to have an overall good fit, with all 
measurement variables except external military support significant at the 0.001 confidence level, 
and a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0001. The goodness of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable 
range; RMSEA is at 0.058 and the pclose is not statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.985. The 
CD of 0.857 suggests that this model does fairly well at explaining the variance in the model. 
Overall, statistical analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for rebel 
military capacity. 
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Table 5.18 Rebel Military Capacity Latent Variable Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Relative Rebel Strength 
 
cons 
.6823277 
 
2.3292 
.0208063 
 
.0516068 
32.79 
 
45.13 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Relative Mobilization Capacity 
cons 
.7531187 
 
2.702123 
.0191703 
 
.0726997 
39.29 
 
37.17 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Relative Arms Procurement 
cons 
.1327204 
 
2.529148 
.0342638 
 
.0692938 
3.87 
 
36.50 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Relative Fighting Capacity 
cons 
.8882736 
 
2.599847 
.0178202 
 
.0690013 
49.85 
 
37.68 
0.000 
 
0.000 
External Military Support 
cons 
.0686858 
 
1.156923 
.0365939 
 
.0456779 
1.88 
 
25.33 
0.061 
 
0.000 
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2, e.rel_mob_cap) .3950457 .0291751 13.54 0.000 
 
 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(4) = 22.93 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0001 
Number of observations: 1394 
RMSEA:0.058 
     pclose: 0.243 
CFI: 0.985 
CD: 0.857 
 
 Conclusion 
 The confirmatory factor analysis described above lends support to this chapter’s 
argument that state coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel 
administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity are cohesive concepts. Statistical analysis of 
the theorized measurement variables show that, overall, there is indeed some statistically 
significant shared variance. However, while this chapter demonstrated empirical support for the 
creation of latent variables that measure these concepts of coercion and capacity, it did not test 
the hypothesized relationship between these concepts and the onset and occurrence of sub-state 
political violence choices. The testing of the hypotheses of the relationship between these latent 
variables and rebel campaigns is performed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Empirical Models Testing 
This chapter focuses on quantitative testing of the hypotheses, utilizing a large-N dataset 
to see how well the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 explain political violence choices over a 
broad spectrum of rebel groups, countries, and years. The latent variables of coercion, state 
administrative and military capacity, and rebel administrative and military capacity, developed in 
Chapter 5, are put to the test in this empirical analysis.58 While the latent predictor variables were 
outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter describes the operationalizion of the dependent 
variable, rebel campaign type, as well as the control variables. Following this description of the 
data, I then describe the methodology used to empirically analyze my dataset, and report the 
results. These results are then discussed and analyzed in light the hypotheses. The chapter draws 
to a close with an assessment of what the quantitative testing can reveal about the potential 
validity of this project’s hypotheses.   
 Measuring the Concepts  
As described in Chapter 5, the population of this chapter’s dataset encompasses 
information both on rebel groups as well as the countries in which they operate. Data for this 
dataset is compiled from a number of commonly used, widely accepted social science datasets.59 
                                                 
58 Chapter 5 described the creation of the state-focused latent variables, which were developed using state level data. 
Once developed, these observations were then copied to every rebel group listed as occurring in a specific state and 
year (so that all rebel group-year observations contained the appropriate state data). The rebel-focused latent 
variables were created at the rebel group-year level; these latent variables were included without modification into 
this chapter’s dataset. 
59 Datasets include the Non-State Actor Data, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the Global Terrorism 
Database, and the World Bank. While combining conflict data from different datasets does pose some problems as 
coverage can vary and thus limit the total number of observations, this methodology is common in social science 
121 
The unit of analysis is the rebel group-year. Within the limitations in coverage provided by these 
originating datasets, this project’s dataset encompasses 281 rebel groups active from 1996 to 
2011. These rebel groups were active in 68 of the 234 total countries included in the data; about 
29% of all possible countries. There are a total of 833 active rebel campaign-years recorded, out 
of a possible 1,714 years; active rebel campaign-years comprise 48.6% of all years.60 Table 6.1 
provides the frequencies of rebel campaign types by year. Figure 6.1 displays the overall 
disposition of campaign type, and Figure 6.2 provides the frequencies of rebel campaign types by 
country.   
     
Table 6.1 Rebel Campaigns by Year 
Year No Campaign Terrorist Insurgent Civil War Total 
1996 86 8 43 8 145 
1997 75 6 49 7 137 
1998 67 1 42 11 121 
1999 59 3 38 11 111 
2000 56 4 44 7 111 
2001 65 5 43 7 120 
2002 62 1 41 5 109 
2003 52 1 38 4 95 
2004 54 2 38 7 101 
2005 55 2 37 5 99 
2006 54 0 45 3 102 
2007 38 5 42 4 89 
2008 38 9 42 5 94 
2009 36 7 41 6 90 
2010 41 7 39 4 91 
2011 43 3 48 5 99 
Total 881 64 670 99 1,714 
                                                 
literature that seeks to analyze more than one type of conflict event (cf. Findley and Young 2012; Lai and Larson 
2008). 
60 A state can have zero or multiple active rebel groups within a given year; the number of rebel groups is not a one-
to-one match with the number of states or years. Rebel groups may have more than one active campaign coded per 
year if the group had an active campaign in more than one country in one time period. The percentage of multiple 
campaigns by a single rebel group, as a percentage of all active campaigns ranges between 0% and 10.9% per year. 
For the total 16 year period, the overall percentage of multiple campaigns by a single rebel group is 5.4% of all 
active campaigns. 
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Figure 6.1 Total Dataset Distribution of Campaign Types 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Active Rebel Campaigns by Year 
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Table 6.2 Rebel Campaigns by State 
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Afghanistan 0 9 13 22 Mexico 1 1 0 2 
Algeria 0 20 3 23 Myanmar 0 43 0 43 
Angola 0 10 4 14 Namibia 1 0 0 1 
Azerbaijan 0 1 0 1 Nepal 3 7 4 14 
Bangladesh 1 4 0 5 Niger 0 3 0 3 
Burundi 3 21 0 24 Nigeria 4 4 0 8 
Cambodia 0 4 0 4 Pakistan 4 14 4 22 
Central African Republic 1 6 0 7 Papua New Guinea 0 1 0 1 
Chad 0 16 0 16 Peru 0 8 0 8 
China 1 1 0 2 Philippines 2 44 1 47 
Colombia 3 28 2 33 Russia 1 16 4 21 
Comoros 0 1 0 1 Rwanda 1 7 3 11 
Congo 0 7 2 9 Senegal 0 6 0 6 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 6 0 6 Sierra Leone 0 10 2 12 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2 9 5 16 Somalia 1 8 5 13 
Djibouti 0 1 0 1 South Sudan 0 2 0 2 
Egypt 0 3 0 3 Spain 9 2 0 11 
Eritrea 0 3 0 3 Sri Lanka 1 2 10 13 
Ethiopia 0 32 0 32 Sudan 1 31 9 41 
France 2 4 0 6 Syria 0 1 0 1 
Georgia 0 2 0 2 Tajikistan 0 7 1 8 
Greece 2 0 0 2 Thailand 2 9 0 11 
Guinea 0 2 0 2 Turkey 0 13 4 17 
Guinea-Bissau 0 2 0 2 Uganda 0 24 2 26 
Haiti 0 2 0 2 United Kingdom 2 2 0 4 
India 2 99 7 108 United States 3 10 1 14 
Indonesia 1 9 0 10 Uzbekistan 0 3 0 3 
Iran 0 16 0 16 Yemen 0 2 0 2 
Iraq 5 14 8 27 Yemen Arab Republic 0 2 1 3 
Israel 4 40 0 44 Yugoslavia 0 0 2 2 
Kenya 0 1 0 1 Total 64 670 99 833 
Lebanon 2 2 0 4 
 
Lesotho 0 1 0 1 
Liberia 0 4 1 5 
Libya 0 1 1 2 
Macedonia 0 1 0 1 
Mali 0 4 0 4 
Mauritania 0 2 0 2 
 
 Dependent Variables: Rebel Campaign Types 
The dependent variables identify three rebel campaign types, terrorist campaign, 
insurgent campaign, and civil war campaign, as well as marking when there is no active rebel 
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campaign. The first two dependent variables are both categorical codings of rebel campaign type. 
The first, rebel campaign type, encompasses all years of rebel activity, while the second, onset 
campaign type, encompasses only the first year of every non-contiguous bout of rebel activity 
within a country. In addition, two binary variables mark the occurrence of, respectively, the 
presence of any type of rebel campaign over all years, named campaign dummy, and the 
presence of any type of rebel campaign in onset years, labeled onset dummy.61 Another set of six 
binary dependent variables are generated that identify only the presence of a specific campaign 
type, respectively called terrorist dummy, terrorist onset dummy, insurgent dummy, insurgent 
onset dummy, civil war dummy, and civil war onset dummy. 
Information on rebel group campaigns comes from two sources. The first is the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The ACD dataset is focused 
on instances of conflict and war, with a minimum inclusion threshold of 25 battledeaths per year 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002). The ACD measures conflict, defined as “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25-battle-related deaths” 
(Themnér 2013, 1). However, while conflicts must meet the minimum of 25 battledeaths per year 
to be included in the dataset, there is also an ‘intensity’ level variable included in the dataset 
which codes the difference between ‘minor armed conflict’ and ‘war’. This distinction is also 
based on battledeaths; a ‘minor armed conflict’ is a conflicts with 25 to 999 battledeaths per 
                                                 
61 These dummy variables are used to determine if the independent variables affect the overall occurrence of rebel 
activity, without differentiating between the type of campaign chosen. 
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year, while a ‘war’ has 1,000 or more battledeaths per year (Themnér 2013:9).62 The intensity 
variable was utilized to distinguish between ‘minor armed conflicts’, which were coded in this 
project’s dataset as insurgent campaigns, and ‘wars’, which were coded as civil war campaigns. 
There is another dataset on insurgency, that of Lyall and Wilson III (2009). However, the Lyall 
and Wilson (2009) data code entire multi-year wars as insurgencies, rather than breaking down 
these wars into discrete campaigns. Therefore, their data does not provide the level of specificity 
necessary for inclusion in this project’s dataset.63 
The second data source for campaign type is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
housed at the University of Maryland/START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism 2013). While the ACD was already formatted in a conflict-year 
scheme, inclusion of GTD data into this chapter’s dataset required additional reworking, as GTD 
data is formatted in an event-date scheme; observations in the GTD are focused on specific 
terrorist actions.64 In order to compile this data into a usable format, the following steps were 
taken in order to identify year-long terrorist campaigns.  
                                                 
62 For this project’s dataset, only ACD data of the type ‘internal armed conflict’ and ‘internationalized internal 
armed conflict’ were selected. The primary non-state actor listed for each of these conflicts was identified as the 
rebel group undertaking the campaign. 
63 Additionally, the Lyall and Wilson III (2009) data pulls most of the observations included in its dataset from the 
ACD data; there is a great deal of overlap between the two datasets, so the ACD data was used in this project. 
64 For an event to be included in the GTD, it must meet the following three mandatory criteria: 1) “The incident 
must be intentional”; 2) “The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence”; and 3) “The 
perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism 2014, 8). 
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First, to be included in this dataset, each event was required to meet several criteria 
focused on ensuring that the events included were actually terrorist in nature.65 Then, the 
perpetrators of these events were examined.66 All events with unclear perpetrator attributions 
were excluded from this analysis, as identification of who the rebel group was that undertook the 
action is a critical prerequisite to identifying discrete rebel campaigns. Next, the number of 
events by a specific perpetrator group in a specific year was counted. Only perpetrators who had 
committed at least 12 events (attacks) per calendar year in a specific country were kept; all others 
were dropped. The inclusion of the requirement for 12 events per year is based on this project’s 
discussion in Chapter 2 regarding what the term ‘campaign’ implies; the repeated use of terrorist 
tactics over the course of a year suggests a greater level of intentionality and goal-seeking 
behavior than a single, one-off attack. Therefore, only perpetrator groups which committed 12 
attacks per country-year were coded as having a terrorist campaign in that year.67  
Finally, the campaigns identified in the GTD data were coded as either insurgent or 
terrorist. Drawing upon a method by Carter (2016), the rebel campaigns identified in the GTD 
were classified as terrorist or insurgent according to the type of target attacked. Terror attacks on 
civilian targets are coded as terrorist events, and attacks on military and police forces are coded 
as insurgent attacks. For this project’s dataset, all attacks in a specific rebel campaign-year were 
                                                 
65 See Criterions 1, 2 and 3 in the GTD codebook (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism 2014, 8). 
66 Many events listed in the GTD are attributed to ‘individual,’ ‘unknown,’ ‘anonymous,’ or otherwise unattributable 
perpetrators. 
67 To the best of my knowledge, no other attempt has been made to organize the GTD data in such a way as to 
determine the presence of a terrorist campaign; while terrorist campaigns are discussed in the literature there is no 
extant definition of what level of activity is implied by a ‘campaign’. I argue that a rate of twelve attacks per year 
averages out to one attack per month, and an activity level of one attack per month implies that a rebel group is 
definitely not engaged in one-off violence, but rather has the resources to carry out a sustained series of violence. 
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examined, and if over 50 percent of the attacks were on police or military targets, the campaign 
was coded as an insurgent campaign; otherwise campaigns were coded as terrorist.  
After campaigns were identified in the ACD and GTD datasets, these campaigns had to 
be compared and merged together. Unsurprisingly, many rebel group campaigns appear in both 
the GTD and ACD datasets as active in the same country and year. Due to this overlap, for 
groups that were identified in both datasets, the highest level intensity campaign was coded for 
that rebel campaign-year. For example, if Rebel Group A is coded as having a terrorist campaign 
in Country X for Year 1 from the GTD data, but is also coded as having an insurgent campaign 
in Country X, Year 1 from the ACD data, that group is coded as having an insurgent campaign 
for that country-year.  
As detailed in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3, of a total of 833 active rebel campaign-years, 
there were 153 campaigns which were present in both the GTD and ACD datasets, representing 
18.4% of all campaigns. Such a large degree of overlap supports my argument that violent 
campaigns of different types are best studied comparatively, rather than in isolation. This is 
particularly true when researching insurgent campaigns, where GTD data provided information 
on 24 insurgent campaigns that were not identified in the ACD data. Further, those using the 
GTD dataset to research terrorism may be led astray by the classification of groups included in 
that dataset as ‘terrorists’, for a large percentage of those groups listed in the GTD are were 
actually functioning as participants in larger insurgencies or civil wars. Based on the coding rules 
used in developing this dataset, of the 241 campaigns identified in the GTD data, 177 campaigns, 
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or about 73.4%, were ultimately classified as insurgent or civil war, rather than terrorist, 
campaigns. 68  
 
Table 6.3 Rebel Campaign Overlap Between Extant Datasets 
 Number of Campaigns Percent of Total Campaigns** 
Civil War Campaigns 
ACD Civil War  55 55.6% 
GTD Insurgent  ACD Civil War 17 17.2% 
GTD Terrorist  ACD Civil War 27 27.3% 
Total Civil War Campaigns 99 100% 
Total Civil War Switched Campaigns 44 44.4% 
Insurgent Campaigns 
ACD Insurgent Only* 537 80.1% 
GTD Insurgent Only* 24 3.6% 
GTD Insurgent Matched ACD Insurgent 35 5.2% 
GTD Terrorist  ACD Insurgent 74 11.0% 
Total Insurgent Campaigns 670 100% 
Total Insurgent Switched Campaigns 74 11.0% 
Terrorist Campaigns 
GTD Terrorist 64 100% 
Total Terrorist Campaigns 64 100% 
Total Terrorist Switched Campaigns 0 0% 
Overall Switched Campaigns 
Civil War 44 5.3% 
Insurgent 74 8.9% 
Terrorist 0 0% 
Total Switched Campaigns 118 14.2% 
Overall Campaign Overlap 
Total Switched Campaigns 118 14.2% 
Total Matched Campaigns 35 4.2% 
Total ACD-GTD Overlap  153 18.4% 
*Campaign uniquely identified in only one of the datasets. 
**Based on the final identification of 64 terrorist campaigns, 670 insurgent campaigns, 99 civil war campaigns, for 
a total of 833 violent rebel campaigns. 
                                                 
68 There were 241 total campaigns identified in the GTD data, which, after comparison with the ACD data, were 
ultimately coded as: 64, terrorist; 133, insurgent; and 44, civil war.  
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Figure 6.3 Rebel Campaign ACD-GTD Overlap in Dataset 
 
 
 
 Independent Latent Variables: Coercion, State Capacity, Rebel Capacity 
The predictor variables are the latent variables developed in Chapter 5 that measure the 
concepts of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. For more information on the 
development of these variables, see Chapter 5. All latent variables are continuous in nature. 
 Control Variables  
The control variables discussed below are an attempt to make sure that this research is 
taking into account environmental factors that might otherwise affect the processes under study. 
Drawn from extant conflict literature, these control variables, if not included, might otherwise 
have unmeasured effects on the empirical models.69 For this model, the control variables 
included are three measures of societal fractionalization; population density; polyarchy; gdp; and 
two measures of rugged terrain.  
                                                 
69 Further, incorporating these control variables into the quantitative model permits the comparison to contextually 
similar cases in which violent processes occurred. 
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Measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization may help to capture 
tensions inherent within a society, as well as variations in the ease of societal group interaction 
(cf. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Gates 2002; Piazza 2011). Data on ethnic, language, and religious 
fractionalization come from Alesina et al. (2003), and range on a scale of zero to one.70 While 
this dataset provides the broadest coverage using the most recent sources available, it is still 
somewhat limited, covering 215 countries but only providing one observation per country for 
each of the three (ethnic, linguistic, and religious) variables. It is thus a time-invariant variable, 
but no better variable is commonly accepted or available in the scholarly literature.  
The total population of a state has been found to have a positive correlation with the 
incidence of sub-state politicized violence (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, as noted by 
Sambanis (2004, 821), this may be due more to the minimum battledeath threshold for coding 
instances of violent conflict rather than something inherent about large population states.71 In 
order to control for any effect of gross population size, I include the variable, population density, 
from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a). This variable measures the number of people per 
square kilometer of land and is a more sensitive measure of population than simply total 
numbers.72  
                                                 
70 The indices are computed as one minus the Herfindahl index, the same method used in the seminal ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization variable provided by the 1964 Atlas Narodov Mira (Alesina et al. 2003, 5). While the computation 
is the same, the Alesina et al. data utilize newer sources of information to create their indices. 
71 Other researchers (Alesina and Spolaore 2003) have argued for a more sophisticated causal path to violence than 
simply the size of a population; they note that larger populations may contain a more heterogeneous mix of ethnic, 
religious, or otherwise differentiated groups, and that the presence of multiple minority groups could increase the 
chances that some of these groups are both likely to be aggrieved by the state, and large and cohesively organized 
enough to successfully rebel against the state. Such heterogeneity effects are included in the fractionalization 
measures that are part of the rebel coordination latent variable. 
72 As Buhaug (2010) notes, states with larger areas tend to also have larger populations. 
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This project utilizes the Vanhanen (2000, 2014) Measures of Democracy data to capture 
the type of government in a state. While Polity IV data also measures polyarchy, as multiple 
scholars have noted (Strand 2007; Gates et al. 2006; Vreeland 2008), use of Polity IV is 
problematic in studies of sub-state conflict due to endogenity between the coding factors in the 
Polity scale and the presence of such conflict.73 In order to avoid this potential endogenity 
problem, I utilize the Vanhanen (2014) Index of Democracy variable, which does not include 
sub-state conflict in its coding, and is therefore better suited for inclusion in this project’s 
dataset. 
GDP per capita is perhaps the most overused and theoretically vague variable in conflict 
studies; besides being utilized as a proxy for capacity, it has also been used as a proxy for 
military power, grievances, and so on (cf. Hendrix 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004;  Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003). There is a broad agreement 
among the scholarly literature that GDP per capita should be included, but an equally broad 
disagreement as to the concept that this variable is actually measuring. Since this chapter has 
developed different operationalized measures for capacity and coercion, I include GDP as a 
control variable. The GDP per capita variable comes from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a). 
Finally, I include two variables to capture measures of the ruggedness of terrain within a 
state. The first, mountainous terrain, comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and provides one 
time-invariant observation per country; it provides a percentage measure of the amount of total 
land area that is covered by mountains. The second, a measure of forested terrain, comes from 
the World Bank; it measures the percentage of land within a state that is covered by forest, and 
                                                 
73 Polity IV data codes anocracies, in part, by the presence of violent in-state challenges to the government; such 
challenges are strongly correlated to the onset of civil war (Marshall et al. 2002; Vreeland 2008). 
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does vary by year (World Bank 2015a). Table 6.4 provides the descriptive statistics these 
variables.74 
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
  
                                                 
74 As seen in Table 6.4, the total number of observations varies between rebel-level data and state-level data, This is 
due to the issues discussed above; there is simply less information available for rebel groups than there are for states, 
and data is particularly scarce for rebel groups that are not active, though, as described in Chapter 5, some data was 
available and included.  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Campaigns 1714 .9924154 1.066089 0 3 
Campaigns - Onset Only 1714 .3162194 .7394359 0 3 
Coercion* 4703 -.2405658 1.208445 -3.010786 2.434133 
State Administrative Capacity* 4703 -.4155433 2.584186 -6.780252 6.615726 
State Military Capacity* 4703 .2651668 1.223435 -4.697795 3.923528 
Rebel Administrative Capacity* 1714 0.0000000137 .1070523 -4.697795 .2049727 
Rebel Military Capacity* 1714 0.00000000137 .3205931 -.2448765 1.768986 
Ethnic Fractionalization 1674 .553376 .2240285 0 .9302 
Linguistic Fractionalization 1647 .5600579 .2747855 .008 .9227 
Religious Fractionalization 1677 .3739663 .2173561 .0023 .8241 
Population Density 1693 139.3617 148.4432 2.305327 1112.919 
Polyarchy 1671 12.27588 10.82772 0 39.2 
GDP per Capita** 1515 7.029812 1.34088 4.871513 10.72365 
Mountainous Terrain 1678 23.9449 23.76064 0 82.20001 
Forested Terrain 1689 25.08192 19.97991 .0532423 76.07397 
* Denotes latent variable estimation. 
**Logged 
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 Empirical Methods 
To empirically test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, this chapter primarily utilizes 
multinomial probit models. Multinomial probit models break out the specific relationship 
between each predictor variable and each campaign type. All independent variables were lagged 
one year in order to check for the theoretically proposed causality, that coercion and capacity 
changes lead to rebel campaign choices. (Additional models, including multinomial logit, and 
alternate specification multivariate probit, are presented in the Appendix A.75) 
Multinomial probit is a version of a probit model, however, unlike a basic probit model, 
which has a binary dependent variable, multinomial probit is used when there are more than two 
possible categories for a dependent variable (Crown 1998). Thus, the use of this model, which 
has four categories in the dependent variable (no active campaign, terrorist campaign, insurgent 
campaign, and civil war campaign), is appropriate. Multinomial probit, unlike multinomial logit, 
does not require the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA requires that any 
addition of another category in the dependent variable would not affect the preferences between 
the categories currently in the variable (Alvarez and Nagler 1994). The IIA requirement is 
                                                 
75 Multivariate probit models, while considered, were deemed inappropriate due to the theory of campaigns 
developed in this project. This project made the assumption that rebels would only pursue one campaign in a given 
time period. Theoretically, a rebel group in a single year is expected choose the type of campaign it will pursue, but 
is not expected to simultaneously pursue two or more campaigns. Following this theory development, the dataset 
developed in this chapter has only one observation for campaign type per rebel group year.  
Multivariate probit models require the actor to be able to have correlated actions. In this vein, an example 
would be a rebel group might be more/less likely to choose a terrorist campaign if they were simultaneously 
choosing an insurgent campaign (Chib and Greenberg 1998). Because this assumption about simultaneous choices 
that an actor has was not in line with this project’s theoretical development, multivariate probit models were not 
used. This type of correlated, simultaneous choice is beyond the scope of this project’s research, but is a potential 
area for future research.  
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problematic in this dataset, as there are conceivably categories—such as different types of non-
violent civil protest—that could affect preferences between the violent campaign categories 
identified in the independent variable.76 Therefore, multinomial probit, which does not require 
the IIA, was chosen over multinomial logit as a better estimation method for this project.77 
The raw output of multinomial probit estimation results are provided in z-scores, with the 
base outcome set to no active campaign, which means that outcomes for all three of the rebel 
campaign types can be contrasted relative to no campaign occurring (Long and Freese 2014). 
Models were estimated with Huber-White robust standard errors (Huber 1967; White 1980) to 
ensure heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The model output coefficients, recorded 
below, provide information on the direction of the relationship via their sign, and the significance 
of the independent variables to the model via their p-values. However, the log-odds coefficients 
provided in the initial estimation are somewhat unintuitive to interpret in terms of size of effect, 
so the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable are also provided. 
Standard goodness-of-fit measures for these models are included: the Wald chi-square 
statistic and associated p-value, the count R-squared (base and adjusted), and the Akaike 
information criterion (Long & Freese 2014; Herron 1999). The Wald statistic checks to see if the 
                                                 
76 The ‘no violent conflict’ category could conceivably contain both a condition of ‘total peace’ and a separate 
condition (or conditions, based on type of protest, e.g. riots, strikes, demonstrations, write-in ballots) of ‘nonviolent 
civil conflict’. However, since the focus of this project is on violent campaign choices, the parsing of subcategories 
within the ‘no violent conflict’ category was not undertaken.  
77 There is not consensus in the literature on the ability of multinomial logit to provide accurate models when the IIA 
assumption is violated, however, Kropko (2008) argues that multinomial logit can, even without the IIA, provide 
models which are more accurate than that produced by multinomial probit. To address this possibility, the models 
described in the multinomial probit section were also run as multinomial logit models. The results from the 
multinomial logit models are provided in Appendix A; results were similar to those produced by the multinomial 
probit models. 
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variables included in the model should be included; if the p-value is not significant, this indicates 
that the independent variables should not be incorporated in the model. The generally accepted 
criteria for the Wald p-value is that, if the value is less than 0.05, the test is significant and the 
independent variables included in the model should be so included (Fox 1997; Long and Freese 
2014).78 The count R-squared denotes the proportion of observations in the data which were 
correctly classified by the model; the adjusted count R-squared identifies the most common 
outcome makes that common outline the baseline, and then measures the proportion of 
observations beyond this baseline that were correctly predicted (Long and Freese 2014). Since 
the adjusted R-squared ignores the most common outcome predictions this number tends to be 
smaller than that of the unadjusted count R-squared. This is particularly the case for this project’s 
data, as the base outcome, no active rebel campaign, comprises 51.4% of all observations. 
Therefore, the adjusted R-squared will, at best, correctly predict less than half of all possible 
outcomes. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is not an absolute measure of model fit; 
rather, the AIC measures the relative quality of comparable models. As such, the AIC can be 
used to compare the basic model to a model containing additional variables; the model with the 
smaller AIC statistic is considered to be the better model (Burnham & Anderson 1998; Yang 
2005).79 All four hypotheses are tested via these multinomial probit models, and the results are 
discussed in the following sections.80  
                                                 
78 An alternative to the Wald test is the likelihood ratio test; per Rothenberg (1984) and Greene (2003), both tests are 
substantively similar, however, the Wald test only requires that one model (rather than two) is estimated. 
79 Following Burnham & Anderson (2002) and Yang (2005), the Akaike information criterion was chosen over the 
Bayesian information criteria. 
80 Given the nature of Hypothesis 4, a Heckman probit model was also considered. Heckman models are two stage 
estimation models, which allow for an initial sample selection to correct biases in non-randomly selected samples 
(Heckman 1979). For this project, the application of a two-step model would permit, first, the estimation of the 
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 Results 
Table 6.5, below, provides the results of the multinomial probit models. Models 1 and 3 
estimate a base model for all rebel campaign years and all onset campaign years, respectively. 
Model 2 provides estimations for the expanded version of Model 1, which includes the control 
variables outlined above. Model 4, which was to be the expanded version of the onset Model 3, 
did not converge during estimation after over one thousand iterations. Therefore, an expanded 
version of the onset model is not included in the estimation results provided below. Alternate 
specification models (presented in Appendix A) were also run for Model 4; these failed to 
converge as well.  
 
                                                 
overall probability of a violent campaign onset, and then, second, an estimation of the determinants of violent 
campaign choice. By running such a model, the overall effect of coercion on onset of any campaign type could first 
be determined, and then the effect of the predictor variables on each campaign type, outlined above and in Chapter 
5, could be estimated. Unfortunately, all attempts at Heckman probit models did not converge, and are therefore not 
displayed. This lack of convergence is likely due to the limitations of the overall dataset, specifically the limited 
number of onset cases, and the even more limited number of cases with data on rebel capacity in the years preceding 
onset case. Recall that the independent variables are lagged a year, so that the years prior to onset years are used 
when running onset year models. Unfortunately, the lack of convergence is likely due to a lack of observations for 
which data are available. While the lack of a two-stage selection models is a limitation of the quantitative analysis of 
this chapter, the qualitative analysis provided by the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 serve to address this issue in a 
different manner. 
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Table 6.5 Multinomial Probit Models 
 Variables Model 1: 
All years, 
base 
Model 2: 
All years, 
full 
Model 3: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 4: 
Onset only,  
full 
T
er
ro
ri
st
 
Coercion 0.4558888 
(0.038)** 
0.6999954 
(0.037)** 
-2.164233 
(0.053)* 
Model did not converge. 
Coercion2 0.1209088 
(0.163) 
0.2823611 
(0.025)** 
-1.317285 
(0.009)*** 
 
State Administrative Capacity 
0.0320118 
(0.632) 
-
0.0788487 
(0.479) 
0.3069065 
(0.008)*** 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 
0.0054241 
(0.698) 
-
0.0064269 
(0.75) 
0.0812818 
(0.004)*** 
 
State Military Capacity 0.4609196 
(0.018)** 
0.4855203 
(0.149) 
1.153706 
(0.199) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -
0.1424742 
(0.147) 
-0.27746 
(0.037)** 
-0.0259824 
(0.920) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity -2.093313 
(0.147) 
-4.510391 
(0.085)* 
-10.55759 
(0.447) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 13.55092 
(0.292) 
31.96654 
(0.026)** 
-46.35024 
(0.632) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -5.014672 
(0.015)** 
-32.02971 
(0.02)** 
1.06828 
(0.613) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 3.633653 
(0.004)*** 
-72.62454 
(0.21) 
-0.2569697 
(0.919) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.9100504 
(0.514) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  0.0318643 
(0.973) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  1.187872 
(0.117) 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.002975 
(0.014)** 
  
Polyarchy  0.0401364 
(0.113) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -
0.1975969 
(0.389) 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0068698 
(0.415) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0148711 
(0.149) 
  
Constant -3.035661 
(0.000)*** -6.541821 
(0.005)*** 
-6.445964 
(0.000)*** 
 
 
In
su
rg
en
t 
Coercion -
0.1499687 
(0.175) 
-
0.0617201 
(0.639) 
-0.145642 
(0.468) 
 
Coercion2 -
0.0216043 
(0.63) 
-
0.0104499 
(0.855) 
-0.0709283 
(0.39) 
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Table 6.5 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Models 
 Variables Model 1: 
All years, 
base 
Model 2: 
All years, 
full 
Model 3: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 4: 
Onset only,  
full 
In
su
rg
en
t 
State Administrative Capacity 0.1169716 
(0.003)*** 
0.1383648 
(0.015)** 
0.0095177 
(0.896) 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 -
0.0049638 
(0.561) 
0.0091033 
(0.432) 
0.000768 
(0.956) 
 
State Military Capacity 0.0601594 
(0.493) 
0.1299702 
(0.245) 
-0.0181498 
(0.873) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -
0.0014085 
(0.969) 
-
0.0317161 
(0.484) 
0.0637101 
(0.211) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity 2.790924 
(0.000)*** 
2.965471 
(0.004)*** 
2.63807 
(0.001)*** 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 9.18415 
(0.054)* 
14.60889 
(0.017)** 
0.0256893 
(0.997) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -3.372204 
(0.000)*** 
-2.933861 
(0.000)*** 
1.413227 
(0.022)*** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 2.368605 
(0.000)*** 
2.326829 
(0.000)*** 
-3.700304 
(0.003)*** 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -
0.2380755 
(0.621) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  1.809232 
(0.000)*** 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.03221 
(0.001)*** 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.000362 
(0.652) 
  
Polyarchy  -
0.0145657 
(0.177) 
  
GDP per Capita†  0.1624125 
(0.088)* 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0070855 
(0.022)** 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0018939 
(0.666) 
  
Constant -
0.5629137 
(0.000)*** 
-2.286863 
(0.005)*** 
-2.103746 
(0.000)*** 
 
C
iv
il
 W
a
r
 
Coercion -
0.5798075 
(0.004)*** 
-
0.3332844 
(0.209) 
-0.3664196 
(0.561) 
 
Coercion2 -
0.1333125 
(0.086)* 
-
0.0700651 
(0.516) 
-0.3931579 
(0.152) 
 
State Administrative Capacity 0.0564765 
(0.257) 
0.125977 
(0.114) 
-5.942488 
(0.000)*** 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 0.0250599 
(0.027)** 
0.0339347 
(0.06)* 
-0.8875362 
(0.000)*** 
 
 
139 
Table 6.5 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Models 
 Variables Model 1: 
All years, 
base 
Model 2: 
All years, 
full 
Model 3: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 4: 
Onset only,  
full 
C
iv
il
 W
a
r
 
State Military Capacity -
0.0880095 
(0.455) 
0.2121922 
(0.265) 
-0.0066828 
(0.991) 
 
State Military Capacity2 
0.0151252 
(0.755) 
-
0.0914182 
(0.218) 
-0.4029145 
(0.059)* 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity -
0.6960079 
(0.342) 
-5.267944 
(0.000)*** 
-1.317589 
(0.468) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 -
0.4971674 
(0.943) 
21.11043 
(0.013)** 
40.3167 
(0.036)** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -0.609051 
(0.256) 
0.1477596 
(0.804) 
2.09427 
(0.000)*** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 
0.1570627 
(0.812) 
-
0.1426276 
(0.866) 
-1.876002 
(0.073)* 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.184874 
(0.128) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  0.2911674 
(0.610) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.010525 
(0.015)** 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.0024684 
(0.020)** 
  
Polyarchy  -
0.0122942 
(0.411) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -
0.3844237 
(0.006)*** 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.005237 
(0.220) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.019847 
(0.000)*** 
  
Constant -1.958928 
(0.000)*** 
 
-
0.7370183 
(0.509) 
-12.72692 
(0.000)*** 
 
      
 N 1309 1108 1309  
Wald chi2 
(df) 
241.584 
(30) 
316.422 
(54) 
213.768 
(30) 
 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.000  
R2 Count 0.616 0.596 0.936  
R2 Count (adjusted) 0.189 0.181 0.000  
AIC 2299.139 1948.493 699.192  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
†Logged variable 
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The results of the multinomial probit models are in line with the goodness of fit criteria 
discussed above. The Wald test p-values are at 0.0000 for all three models, supporting the 
inclusion of the coefficients in the models. The base count R-squared for Model 1 is 0.616; for 
Model 2, 0.596; and for Model 3, 0.936. Therefore, all three models appear to be classifying over 
50 percent of observations correctly. As expected, the adjusted count R-squared shows a marked 
decrease in the number of observations correctly classified; the adjusted count R-squared is only 
identifying correctly classified observations outside of the base case. Since the base case in this 
chapter’s dataset, no campaign, is by far the largest category, at over 51% of all observed 
campaign years, removing this category from the count of correctly predicted decreases the 
number of campaigns under analysis. The adjusted count R-squared shoes that Models 1 and 2 
are correctly classifying just under 20% of non-base cases. Perhaps more concerning is Model 3, 
in which no non-base cases are correctly classified. However, Model 3 is the onset model, so the 
number of non-base cases available for analysis is even more limited than in Models 1 and 2. 
However, this lack of correctly predicted adjusted cases may also imply that the relationship 
between the predictor variables and the onset of a violent campaign may need to be further 
examined. Overall, the adjusted count R-squared statistics appear to provide more support for the 
appropriateness of Models 1 and 2 than for Model 3. This may imply that the relationships that 
influence campaign choices during ongoing conflict are different than those that initiate a new 
conflict. The Akaike information criteria (AIC) statistic can be compared between Model 1 and 
Model 2.81 Model 2, with an AIC of 1948.493, has a lower AIC than that of Model 1, at 
2299.139; this suggests that Model 2, which includes the control variables, may provide a better 
                                                 
81 Since Model 4 did not compile, the AIC for Model 3 cannot be compared with a corresponding full model. 
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fit than Model 1. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that some of the control variables are 
significant for some of the campaign types. 
Only some of the proposed hypotheses were supported by the multinomial probit models. 
These results are presented in Table 6.10. For Hypotheses 1-3, which focus on coercion, only 
Hypothesis 1 is supported (in Model 1 but not Model 2); terrorist campaigns do appear to be 
more likely at low and high levels of coercion. For Hypotheses 4-6, which focus on state 
administrative capacity, neither model supported any of the hypotheses. For Hypotheses 7-9, 
which focus on state military capacity, only Hypothesis 7 is supported (in Model 1 but not Model 
2); terrorist campaigns do appear to be more likely when state military capacity is at higher 
levels. For Hypotheses 10-12, which focus on rebel administrative capacity, Hypothesis 10 was 
partially supported (in Model 2 but not Model 1); terrorist campaigns do appear to be more likely 
to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels. Hypothesis 11, that insurgent 
campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels, was 
supported by the results of both models. Neither model provided support to Hypothesis 12. For 
Hypotheses 13-15, which focus on rebel military capacity, only Hypothesis 13, that terrorist 
campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at lower levels, was supported 
by the results of both models. Finally, the models did not provide any support for Hypothesis 16, 
that onset years of rebel campaigns would have a stronger positive relationship with coercion 
than non-onset years.  
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Table 6.6 Summary of Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Finding 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at low or high 
levels. 
Mixed 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at intermediate 
levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is high. No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at higher levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at 
higher levels. 
Mixed 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is 
at intermediate levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 9: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at 
lower levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 10: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative 
capacity is at lower levels. 
Mixed 
HYPOTHESIS 11: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative 
capacity is at higher levels. 
Supported 
HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative 
capacity is at higher levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 13: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is 
at lower levels.  
Supported 
HYPOTHESIS 14: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is 
at intermediate levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 15: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is 
at high levels. 
No Support 
HYPOTHESIS 16: The onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger 
positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel 
campaign. 
No Support 
 
Overall, the quantitative models analyzed here provided some limited support for this 
project’s hypotheses. Additionally, as seen in Table 6.5, in several models there were significant 
results that were opposite to those hypothesized by this project, as well as by previous research 
in the field; such findings may indicate support the arguments made in previous chapters, that 
rebel campaigns should be studied in relationship to each other, not in isolation, and that current 
research does not adequately address the substitutability of rebel campaigns. Further, this project 
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represents a novel attempt to capture measures of rebel capacity, and the rebel capacity variables 
were significant for some campaign types. It is possible that the inclusion of rebel capacity 
variables, not previously widely used in quantitative research on sub-state violence, may help to 
explain the discrepancies between the models’ results and the hypotheses. These results are 
examined in more detail in the discussion and analysis section, below.  
While the coefficients in provided in Table 6.5 offer information about the significance 
and sign of the relationship between the predictor and outcome variables, they are unintuitive to 
interpret in regards to the size of the effect. Table 6.7, below, provides the predicted probabilities 
for overall campaign choice for Models 1 through 3, in order to better understand the effect of 
the independent variables on this choice. For Model 1, the base model for all campaign years, the 
average probability of a terrorist campaign is about 0.02, the average probability of an insurgent 
campaign is about 0.39, and the average probability of a civil war campaign is about 0.06, and 
for rebels to choose not to have a violent campaign, about 0.53. When the control variables are 
included, in Model 2, the average probability of a terrorist campaign remains around 0.02, the 
average probability of an insurgent campaign nudges slightly higher to 0.41, and the average 
probability of a civil war campaign remains around 0.06, and for rebels to choose not to have a 
violent campaign, there is a slight decrease to 0.51. Model 3, the onset model, differs 
significantly from the first two models. The predicted probability of no campaign jumps to about 
0.94. This is as hypothesized, since rebellion is costly, and therefore the status quo is likely to be 
choice to not rebel. The predicted probabilities of all of the three violent campaign choices 
decrease dramatically; the average probability of a terrorist campaign is about 0.003, the average 
probability of an insurgent campaign is about 0.06, and the average probability of a civil war 
campaign is about 0.003.  
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Table 6.7 Multinomial Probit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall Campaign Choice 
Probability of Choosing: Margin Delta-method Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Model 1: All years, base 
No Active Campaign 0.5258175 0.0129285 40.67 0.000 0.5004781 0.5511568 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0191093 0.0036941 5.17 0.000 0.0118689 0.0263497 
Insurgent Campaign 0.3933814 0.0125272 31.4 0.000 0.3688286 0.4179343 
Civil War Campaign 0.0616918 0.0065165 9.47 0.000 0.0489197 0.074464 
Model 2: All years, full 
No Active Campaign 0.5068654 0.0139152 36.43 0.000 0.479592 0.5341387 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0212145 0.0040787 5.2 0.000 0.0132203 0.0292087 
Insurgent Campaign 0.4117965 0.0135927 30.3 0.000 0.3851554 0.4384376 
Civil War Campaign 0.0601236 0.0068219 8.81 0.000 0.0467529 0.0734944 
Model 3: Onset years, base 
No Active Campaign 0.9358039 0.0067088 139.49 0.000 0.922655 0.9489529 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0030025 0.0014957 2.01 0.045 0.0000709 0.005934 
Insurgent Campaign 0.0581272 0.006418 9.06 0.000 0.0455482 0.0707062 
Civil War Campaign 0.0030664 0.0014287 2.15 0.032 0.0002662 0.0058666 
Model 4: Onset years, full 
No Active Campaign Model failed to converge. 
Terrorist Campaign 
Insurgent Campaign 
Civil War Campaign 
 
 While Table 6.7 is useful for an overview of the predicted probabilities of different 
campaign choices, further information is provided by looking at the predicted probabilities and 
average marginal effects of each independent variable in the three models. Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 
6.10 provide the average marginal effect, with confidence intervals, for each of the independent 
variables overall. However, given the continuous nature of the independent variables, instead of 
simply providing a discrete number that represents the average marginal effect, Figures 6.4 to 
6.33 break out these marginal effects by decile for each variable, providing a more in-depth look 
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at how the variables respond across values.82 Table 6.8 and Figures 6.4 through 6.13 present 
estimates for Model 1. Similarly, Table 6.9 and Figures 6.14 through 6.23 present estimates from 
Model 2, and Table 6.10 and Figures 6.24 through 6.33 present estimates for Model 3.  
 
Table 6.8 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 1 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0537752 0.0278759 1.93 0.054 -0.0008606 0.108411 
Coercion2 0.0094811 0.0112996 0.84 0.401 -0.0126657 0.0316278 
S. Admin Cap -0.0273986 0.0096729 -2.83 0.005 -0.0463572 -0.00844 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0003427 0.0020819 -0.16 0.869 -0.0044232 0.0037377 
S. Mil Cap -0.014651 0.0211363 -0.69 0.488 -0.0560775 0.0267754 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0016154 0.0088959 0.18 0.856 -0.0158203 0.019051 
R. Admin Cap -0.5070056 0.1274834 -3.98 0.000 -0.7568684 -0.2571427 
R. Admin Cap2 -2.061495 1.188147 -1.74 0.083 -4.390221 0.2672306 
R. Mil Cap 0.7980294 0.0920419 8.67 0.000 0.6176306 0.9784282 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.5483124 0.1143811 -4.79 0.000 -0.7724953 -0.3241296 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0190555 0.0073937 2.58 0.01 0.004564 0.033547 
Coercion2 0.0047205 0.0027733 1.7 0.089 -0.0007151 0.0101561 
S. Admin Cap -0.0008405 0.002068 -0.41 0.684 -0.0048938 0.0032127 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0001622 0.0004379 0.37 0.711 -0.0006961 0.0010205 
S. Mil Cap 0.0144829 0.0070318 2.06 0.039 0.0007009 0.0282649 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0046834 0.0032538 -1.44 0.15 -0.0110608 0.0016939 
R. Admin Cap -0.10627 0.0475255 -2.24 0.025 -0.1994182 -0.0131217 
R. Admin Cap2 0.3114024 0.4138944 0.75 0.452 -0.4998157 1.122621 
                                                 
82 Per Williams (2012), an alternative way to develop estimates for margins is to use cross-operator notation for all 
variables to be squared, rather than squaring variables prior to model estimation. While overall model predicted 
probabilities are exactly the same, the advantage to this approach is a slightly better estimation of the model when 
graphing out the predicted probabilities at specified percentiles. The disadvantage to this method, however, is that 
the variables that were squared via cross-operator notation are unable to be graphed at percentile; detailed 
information on how these variables respond is therefore lost. The results of the Williams (2012) approach, using 
cross operator notation, as an alternative to the results provided in this chapter, are presented in Appendix A. 
146 
Table 6.8 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 1 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
R. Mil Cap -0.1128794 0.0638952 -1.77 0.077 -0.2381117 0.0123528 
R. Mil Cap2 0.0838581 0.0381337 2.2 0.028 0.0091174 0.1585988 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0242802 0.0270243 -0.9 0.369 -0.0772468 0.0286864 
Coercion2 -0.0025248 0.0108743 -0.23 0.816 -0.0238382 0.0187885 
S. Admin Cap 0.0274157 0.009196 2.98 0.003 0.0093919 0.0454395 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0022382 0.0020413 -1.1 0.273 -0.006239 0.0017626 
S. Mil Cap 0.0118413 0.0214867 0.55 0.582 -0.030272 0.0539545 
S. Mil Cap2 0.001161 0.0089485 0.13 0.897 -0.0163777 0.0186997 
R. Admin Cap 0.7681239 0.1193531 6.44 0 0.5341962 1.002052 
R. Admin Cap2 2.168503 1.142572 1.9 0.058 -0.0708972 4.407902 
R. Mil Cap -0.767497 0.0890651 -8.62 0 -0.9420613 -0.5929326 
R. Mil Cap2 0.5471043 0.1065875 5.13 0 0.3381966 0.7560119 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0485511 0.0180175 -2.69 0.007 -0.0838649 -0.0132374 
Coercion2 -0.0116769 0.0067909 -1.72 0.086 -0.0249868 0.0016331 
S. Admin Cap 0.0008234 0.0040908 0.2 0.84 -0.0071945 0.0088413 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0024188 0.0009677 2.5 0.012 0.0005221 0.0043154 
S. Mil Cap -0.0116738 0.0103529 -1.13 0.259 -0.0319651 0.0086176 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0019072 0.0041939 0.45 0.649 -0.0063126 0.0101271 
R. Admin Cap -0.1548456 0.0616562 -2.51 0.012 -0.2756896 -0.0340016 
R. Admin Cap2 -0.4184272 0.5967427 -0.7 0.483 -1.588021 0.7511669 
R. Mil Cap 0.0823535 0.0447259 1.84 0.066 -0.0053076 0.1700146 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.0826547 0.0555669 -1.49 0.137 -0.1915638 0.0262544 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
As seen in Figure 6.4, the effect of coercion on different types of campaigns not only 
varies by type of campaign, but also by the level of coercion. At a 95% confidence level, 
coercion does not appear to have a substantive effect on the choice of terrorist or insurgent 
campaign. 
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Figure 6.4 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 1 
However, while the overall effect 
of increased coercion is a 
decreased probability for a civil 
war campaign, as coercion 
increases from about the 35th 
percentile to the 90th percentile, 
this dampening effect appears to 
lessen as coercion increases. The 
effect of coercion has an almost opposite effect on the choice of no campaign; as coercion 
increases from the 10th to the 35th percentile, the probability of no campaign decreases while still 
remaining above zero. 
 
Figure 6.5 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion2, Model 1 
  As seen in Figure 6.5, the 
average marginal effects of the 
squared coercion variable are not 
substantively significant for 
terrorist, insurgent, or no 
campaign. For civil war 
campaigns, an increase in the 
squared coercion variable from the 
80th percentile and up has a slight negative effect on the probability of a civil war campaign.  
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Figure 6.6 Predicted Probabilities of State 
Administrative Capacity, Model 1 
 Figure 6.6 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of state 
administrative capacity. These are 
not significant for terrorist or civil 
war campaigns. For insurgent 
campaigns, the average marginal 
effect of state administrative 
capacity is positive and surprisingly stable; state administrative capacity, at any level, increases 
the probability of an insurgent campaign by about 0.025. Similarly, the average marginal effect 
of state administrative capacity on the probability of no campaign is negative and stable; state 
administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of no campaign by about 0.025.  
 
Figure 6.7 Predicted Probabilities of State  
Administrative Capacity2, Model 1 
Figure 6.7 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state administrative capacity 
variable. There is no significant 
effect for terrorist, insurgent, or no 
campaign. The average marginal 
effect of the squared state 
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administrative capacity variable on the probability of a civil war campaign, however, is 
significant from about the 10th percentile to the 85th percentile. This effect is positive; as the 
square of state administrative capacity increases, the probability of a civil war campaign 
increases slightly, from about 0.002 to 0.003. 
 
Figure 6.8 Predicted Probabilities of State Military 
Capacity, Model 1  
Figure 6.8 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of state military 
capacity. These effects are not 
significant for insurgent, civil war, 
or no campaign. The average 
marginal effect of the state 
military capacity variable on the 
probability of a terrorist campaign, however, is significant from about the 10th percentile to the 
25th percentile. Within this percentile range, an increase in state military capacity slightly 
increases the probability of a terrorist campaign. 
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Figure 6.9 Predicted Probabilities of State Military  
Capacity2, Model 1  
Figure 6.9 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state military capacity variable. As 
with Figure 6.8, these effects are 
not significant for insurgent, civil 
war, or no campaign. The average 
marginal effect of the squared state 
military capacity variable on the probability of a terrorist campaign, however, is significant 
above the 80th percentile. In this case, the effect is negative; as the square of state military 
capacity increases, the probability of a terrorist campaign, though negative, increases slightly, 
from about -0.003 to -0.002. 
 
Figure 6.10 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel  
Administrative Capacity, Model 1 
Figure 6.10 showcases a 
number of interesting effects. For a 
terrorist campaign, the average 
marginal effect of an increase in 
rebel capacity, from the 55th 
percentile through the 90th 
percentile, while negative overall, 
decreases as rebel administrative 
capacity increases. For insurgent campaigns, the effect of rebel administrative capacity is 
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positive and stable; any amount of rebel administrative capacity appears to increase the 
probability of an insurgent campaign to about 0.8. For civil war campaigns, the effect of rebel 
administrative capacity is similar to that of terrorist campaigns; the relationship is negative 
overall, but decreases as rebel administrative capacity increases, from about the 35th percentile 
on. For the choice of no campaign, the effect of rebel administrative capacity decreases from 
about -0.4 at the 10th percentile to -0.6 at the 90th percentile. 
 
Figure 6.11 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel  
Administrative Capacity2, Model 1 
Figure 6.11 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
rebel administrative capacity 
variable. None of the average 
marginal effects displayed are 
significant for any of the campaign 
types.  
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Figure 6.12 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military 
Capacity, Model 1 
Figure 6.12 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of rebel military 
capacity. As rebel military 
capacity increases from about the 
10th percentile to the 40th 
percentile, there is a slight 
increased probability of civil war 
campaign, though this effect becomes insignificant at a 95% confidence level after the 40th 
percentile. The average marginal effects for insurgent and no campaigns both demonstrate an 
interesting shape, as they veer sharply at about the 80th percentile. As rebel military capacity 
increases, the probability of an insurgent campaign remains at about -0.8 until the 80th percentile; 
above the 80th percentile, the probability of an insurgent campaign, while still negative, increases 
from about -0.8 to about -0.3. Similarly, as rebel military capacity increases, the probability of no 
campaign remains at about 0.8 until the 80th percentile; above the 80th percentile, the probability 
of no campaign decreases to about 0.3. There appear to be no significant effects displayed for 
terrorist campaigns. 
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Figure 6.13 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military 
Capacity2 , Model 1 
Figure 6.13, displays the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
rebel military capacity variable. 
The squared rebel military 
capacity variable has a positive 
relationship to the probability of 
an insurgent campaign. This 
probability remains at about 0.5 up to the 80th percentile, and then drops to about 0.4 at the 90th 
percentile. The effect of the squared rebel military capacity variable on no campaign is also fairly 
flat; the probability on no campaign remains around -0.5 across the percentiles. There is no 
significant effect from the squared rebel military capacity variable on terrorist or civil war 
campaigns.  
The estimations from Model 1, the base model for all campaign years, can also be 
compared to the estimations from Model 2, the full model for all campaign years. Table 6.9 and 
Figures 6.14 through 6.23, which describe Model 2, are reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
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Table 6.9 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0188319 0.0325083 0.58 0.562 -0.0448833 0.0825471 
Coercion2 0.0016491 0.0139638 0.12 0.906 -0.0257195 0.0290176 
S. Admin Cap -0.033325 0.0137855 -2.42 0.016 -0.060344 -0.0063059 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0033573 0.0028329 -1.19 0.236 -0.0089096 0.0021951 
S. Mil Cap -0.0430282 0.0272948 -1.58 0.115 -0.0965251 0.0104686 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0144286 0.0109853 1.31 0.189 -0.0071022 0.0359594 
R. Admin Cap -0.3099567 0.2511058 -1.23 0.217 -0.8021149 0.1822016 
R. Admin Cap2 -4.411191 1.479972 -2.98 0.003 -7.311882 -1.510499 
R. Mil Cap 1.022612 0.211675 4.83 0.000 0.6077364 1.437487 
R. Mil Cap2 0.4868982 0.8028646 0.61 0.544 -1.086687 2.060484 
Ethnic F. -0.0174559 0.1177179 -0.15 0.882 -0.2481789 0.213267 
Linguistic F. -0.3873567 0.0845421 -4.58 0.000 -0.5530562 -0.2216571 
Religious F. 0.243931 0.0763021 3.2 0.001 0.0943817 0.3934803 
Pop. Density -0.0002278 0.0001854 -1.23 0.219 -0.0005911 0.0001355 
Polyarchy 0.0030424 0.0025895 1.17 0.24 -0.0020328 0.0081177 
GDP** -0.0132124 0.0234634 -0.56 0.573 -0.0591998 0.032775 
Mountain T. -0.0017949 0.0007444 -2.41 0.016 -0.003254 -0.0003358 
Forest T. -0.0015018 0.0010514 -1.43 0.153 -0.0035626 0.000559 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0233339 0.0104105 2.24 0.025 0.0029297 0.0437381 
Coercion2 0.0090176 0.003942 2.29 0.022 0.0012915 0.0167437 
S. Admin Cap -0.0048 0.0033783 -1.42 0.155 -0.0114214 0.0018214 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.000427 0.0005967 -0.72 0.474 -0.0015966 0.0007425 
S. Mil Cap 0.0123955 0.0105447 1.18 0.24 -0.0082717 0.0330627 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0077904 0.0042514 -1.83 0.067 -0.016123 0.0005422 
R. Admin Cap -0.1666814 0.0808973 -2.06 0.039 -0.3252373 -0.0081256 
R. Admin Cap2 0.7073553 0.4375282 1.62 0.106 -0.1501842 1.564895 
R. Mil Cap -0.940486 0.4396646 -2.14 0.032 -1.802213 -0.0787591 
R. Mil Cap2 -2.262237 1.799335 -1.26 0.209 -5.788868 1.264394 
Ethnic F. 0.0280214 0.0423647 0.66 0.508 -0.0550118 0.1110546 
Linguistic F. -0.0262756 0.0287305 -0.91 0.36 -0.0825864 0.0300352 
Religious F. 0.0544122 0.0241821 2.25 0.024 0.0070161 0.1018082 
Pop. Density 0.000079 0.0000402 1.96 0.05 0.00000009.28 0.0001578 
Polyarchy 0.0014795 0.0007973 1.86 0.064 -0.0000832 0.0030422 
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Table 6.9 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
GDP** -0.0073382 0.0068822 -1.07 0.286 -0.020827 0.0061507 
Mountain T. 0.0000924 0.0002549 0.36 0.717 -0.0004071 0.0005919 
Forest T. 0.000372 0.0003153 1.18 0.238 -0.000246 0.00099 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0149859 0.0325632 -0.46 0.645 -0.0788087 0.0488369 
Coercion2 -0.0044841 0.0140561 -0.32 0.75 -0.0320336 0.0230653 
S. Admin Cap 0.0321434 0.013535 2.37 0.018 0.0056154 0.0586715 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0012942 0.0027555 0.47 0.639 -0.0041065 0.0066949 
S. Mil Cap 0.0189517 0.0276001 0.69 0.492 -0.0351435 0.0730469 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0010067 0.0112135 -0.09 0.928 -0.0229848 0.0209713 
R. Admin Cap 0.9906637 0.2435088 4.07 0.000 0.5133952 1.467932 
R. Admin Cap2 2.549973 1.450534 1.76 0.079 -0.29302 5.392967 
R. Mil Cap -0.2815664 0.2321255 -1.21 0.225 -0.7365241 0.1733912 
R. Mil Cap2 1.65574 0.8660116 1.91 0.056 -0.041612 3.353091 
Ethnic F. -0.1124525 0.117088 -0.96 0.337 -0.3419407 0.1170357 
Linguistic F. 0.4491257 0.0840059 5.35 0.000 0.2844772 0.6137743 
Religious F. -0.2462365 0.0779422 -3.16 0.002 -0.3990004 -0.0934726 
Pop. Density -0.0000323 0.0001987 -0.16 0.871 -0.0004218 0.0003572 
Polyarchy -0.0038803 0.0026028 -1.49 0.136 -0.0089817 0.001221 
GDP** 0.0566711 0.0224278 2.53 0.012 0.0127134 0.1006288 
Mountain T. 0.0015264 0.0007476 2.04 0.041 0.0000612 0.0029917 
Forest T. -0.0003856 0.0010497 -0.37 0.713 -0.0024431 0.0016718 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0271798 0.0212097 -1.28 0.2 -0.06875 0.0143904 
Coercion2 -0.0061825 0.0085836 -0.72 0.471 -0.023006 0.010641 
S. Admin Cap 0.0059815 0.0060352 0.99 0.322 -0.0058473 0.0178103 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0024901 0.0013904 1.79 0.073 -0.0002351 0.0052153 
S. Mil Cap 0.011681 0.0152872 0.76 0.445 -0.0182815 0.0416434 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0056315 0.0059576 -0.95 0.345 -0.0173081 0.0060451 
R. Admin Cap -0.5140239 0.1205735 -4.26 0.000 -0.7503436 -0.2777042 
R. Admin Cap2 1.153855 0.6348171 1.82 0.069 -0.0903633 2.398074 
R. Mil Cap 0.1994407 0.0589246 3.38 0.001 0.0839506 0.3149307 
R. Mil Cap2 0.1195991 0.184446 0.65 0.517 -0.2419084 0.4811065 
Ethnic F. 0.1018866 0.0602121 1.69 0.091 -0.0161269 0.2199002 
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Table 6.9 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Linguistic F. -0.0354935 0.0438125 -0.81 0.418 -0.1213644 0.0503774 
Religious F. -0.0521063 0.0323124 -1.61 0.107 -0.1154375 0.0112249 
Pop. Density 0.0001811 0.0000834 2.17 0.03 0.0000177 0.0003446 
Polyarchy -0.0006416 0.0011563 -0.55 0.579 -0.0029079 0.0016247 
GDP** -0.0361204 0.0109076 -3.31 0.001 -0.0574988 -0.014742 
Mountain T. 0.0001761 0.0003313 0.53 0.595 -0.0004732 0.0008254 
Forest T. 0.0015153 0.0004554 3.33 0.001 0.0006228 0.0024079 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
Figure 6.14 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 2 
As seen in Figure 6.14, the 
average marginal effect of 
increasing levels of coercion, from 
the 10th to the 35th percentile, is 
and increasing probability of the 
choice of a terrorist campaign, 
though the increase in probability 
is very slight, perhaps 0.01. High 
levels of coercion, above the 75th percentile, have a negative effect on the probability of a civil 
war campaign choice, though again this is very slight, perhaps -0.01. Coercion does not appear to 
have a significant effect on the choice of insurgent or no campaign. 
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Figure 6.15 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion2, Model 2 
Figure 6.15 shows the 
average marginal effects of the 
squared coercion variable, which 
is not substantively significant for 
insurgent, civil war, or no 
campaign. For terrorist campaigns, 
an increase in the squared coercion 
variable up to the 45th percentile 
has a slight positive effect on the probability of a terrorist campaign. 
 
Figure 6.16 Predicted Probabilities of State  
Administrative Capacity, Model 2 
Figure 6.16 provides the 
effects of state administrative 
capacity. For insurgent campaigns, 
the average marginal effect of state 
administrative capacity is positive 
and surprisingly stable; state 
administrative capacity, at any 
level, increases the probability of 
an insurgent campaign by about 0.035. Similarly, the average marginal effect of state 
administrative capacity on the probability of no campaign is negative and stable; state 
administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of no campaign by about 0.025. 
There are not significant effects for terrorist or civil war campaigns. 
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Figure 6.17 Predicted Probabilities of State  
Administrative Capacity2, Model 2 
 Figure 6.17 shows the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state administrative capacity 
variable. The average marginal 
effect of the squared state 
administrative capacity variable 
on the probability of a civil war 
campaign is significant up to the 45th percentile; as squared state administrative capacity 
increases, the probability of a civil war campaign is stable and positive, at about 0.0025. The 
effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable are not significant for terrorist, 
insurgent, or no campaign choices. 
 
Figure 6.18 Predicted Probabilities of State Military 
Capacity, Model 2  
Figure 6.18 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of state military 
capacity. None of the average 
marginal effects displayed appear 
to be significant for any of the 
campaign types.  
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Figure 6.19 Predicted Probabilities of State Military 
Capacity2, Model 2 
Figure 6.19 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state military capacity variable. As 
with Figure 6.18, these effects are 
not significant for any campaign 
type. 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel  
Administrative Capacity, Model 2 
Figure 6.20 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the rebel 
administrative capacity variable. 
For terrorist campaigns, rebel 
administrative capacity between 
about the 60th and 80th percentiles 
is barely significant at the 95% 
confidence level; between these percentiles, as rebel administrative capacity increases, the 
probability of a terrorist campaign is slightly below zero. For insurgent campaigns, as rebel 
administrative capacity increases, there is a corresponding slight decrease in the probability of an 
insurgent campaign; at the 10th percentile of rebel administrative capacity, the probability of an 
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insurgent campaign is at about 1, at the 90th percentile, the probability has decreased to about 
0.8. Rebel administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of a civil war 
campaign; at the 10th percentile this probability is at about -1, and decreases linearly to the 90th 
percentile, where this probability is at about -0.2. For the choice of no campaign, an increase in 
rebel administrative capacity above the 80th percentile has a slight negative effect on the 
probability of a civil war campaign; at the 80th percentile, the probability of no campaign is at 
about -0.5, and at the 90th percentile, this probability has decreased to about -0.6.  
 
Figure 6.21 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel  
Administrative Capacity2, Model 2 
Figure 6.21 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state administrative capacity 
variable. The average marginal 
effect of the squared rebel 
administrative capacity variable on 
the probability of a terrorist 
campaign is slightly significant only around the 10th percentile; at this percentile, the probability 
of a terrorist campaign is about 1. Similarly, the average marginal effect of the squared rebel 
administrative capacity variable on the probability of a civil war campaign is slightly significant 
only around the 10th percentile; at this percentile, the probability of a terrorist campaign is about 
2. There appears to be no significant effect for insurgent campaigns. 
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Figure 6.22 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military 
Capacity, Model 2 
Figure 6.22 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of rebel military 
capacity. The effect of weaker 
rebel military capacity, up to the 
30th percentile, has a negative 
effect on the probability of a 
terrorist campaign, with a 
probability at the 10th percentile of about -4, increasing slightly to the 30th percentile, with a 
probability of about -3.5. For insurgent campaigns, the effect of increasing rebel military 
capacity, above the 50th percentile, has a negative effect on the probability of an insurgent 
campaign, though this effect decreases slightly, from about -1 at the 50th percentile to about -0.5 
at the 90th percentile. Rebel military capacity has a significant effect on the probability of a civil 
war campaign up to the 45th percentile; this effect is slightly positive and stable. Rebel military 
capacity has a positive, significant effect on the probability of a choice of no campaign up to 
about the 85th percentile. However, this probability decreases as rebel military capacity 
increases; at the 10th percentile, the effect of rebel military capacity on the probability of no 
campaign is at about 3, decreasing to a probability of about 0 at the 85th percentile.  
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Figure 6.23 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military 
Capacity2, Model 2 
As seen in Figure 6.23, 
none of the average marginal 
effects for the square of military 
capacity, displayed above, are 
significant for any of the campaign 
types. 
Having finished with the 
two models that provide estimates 
for all campaign years, this chapter now turns to the estimates from the onset model, Model 3. 
Table 6.10 and Figures 6.24 through 6.33, which describe Model 3, are reviewed in the following 
paragraphs. While Models 1 and 2 can be compared to each other to see the effect of the addition 
of the control variables to the model, unfortunately Model 4, the full onset model, did not 
converge during estimation; therefore, no comparison between the base and full onset models is 
possible.  
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Table 6.10 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 3 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0231084 0.0178482 1.29 0.195 -0.0118733 0.0580902 
Coercion2 0.0134276 0.0077535 1.73 0.083 -0.0017689 0.0286241 
S. Admin Cap 0.0241312 0.0147147 1.64 0.101 -0.0047091 0.0529716 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0034907 0.0022721 1.54 0.124 -0.0009624 0.0079439 
S. Mil Cap -0.0039063 0.0107736 -0.36 0.717 -0.0250223 0.0172096 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0030962 0.0044442 -0.7 0.486 -0.0118066 0.0056143 
R. Admin Cap -0.152167 0.0940863 -1.62 0.106 -0.3365727 0.0322388 
R. Admin Cap2 0.0348781 0.7866925 0.04 0.965 -1.507011 1.576767 
R. Mil Cap -0.1251527 0.0508383 -2.46 0.014 -0.2247939 -0.0255115 
R. Mil Cap2 0.2999212 0.0999873 3 0.003 0.1039497 0.4958928 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion -0.0115249 0.0080743 -1.43 0.153 -0.0273502 0.0043004 
Coercion2 -0.0070264 0.0043019 -1.63 0.102 -0.015458 0.0014052 
S. Admin Cap 0.0016927 0.0009631 1.76 0.079 -0.0001951 0.0035804 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0004438 0.0002516 1.76 0.078 -0.0000493 0.000937 
S. Mil Cap 0.0062161 0.005928 1.05 0.294 -0.0054025 0.0178347 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0001834 0.001396 -0.13 0.895 -0.0029195 0.0025527 
R. Admin Cap -0.0586977 0.0794515 -0.74 0.46 -0.2144198 0.0970244 
R. Admin Cap2 -0.2495478 0.5322182 -0.47 0.639 -1.292676 0.7935807 
R. Mil Cap 0.0046822 0.0116661 0.4 0.688 -0.018183 0.0275474 
R. Mil Cap2 0.0013667 0.0136057 0.1 0.92 -0.0253 0.0280334 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0097842 0.0159361 -0.61 0.539 -0.0410185 0.02145 
Coercion2 -0.0044193 0.0065168 -0.68 0.498 -0.0171921 0.0083534 
S. Admin Cap 0.0047159 0.0060786 0.78 0.438 -0.0071979 0.0166296 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0006259 0.0011334 0.55 0.581 -0.0015956 0.0028474 
S. Mil Cap -0.0022983 0.0090823 -0.25 0.8 -0.0200992 0.0155026 
S. Mil Cap2 0.005395 0.0040619 1.33 0.184 -0.0025661 0.0133561 
R. Admin Cap 0.2195839 0.0660113 3.33 0.001 0.0902041 0.3489636 
R. Admin Cap2 0.0079237 0.6206202 0.01 0.99 -1.20847 1.224317 
R. Mil Cap 0.1106941 0.0498577 2.22 0.026 0.0129748 0.2084134 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.2942497 0.1001837 -2.94 0.003 -0.4906061 -0.0978934 
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Table 6.10 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 3 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0017562 0.0033071 -0.53 0.595 -0.008238 0.0047257 
Coercion2 -0.0019529 0.0017051 -1.15 0.252 -0.0052949 0.0013891 
S. Admin Cap -0.0304494 0.0153404 -1.98 0.047 -0.060516 -0.0003827 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0045476 0.0022641 -2.01 0.045 -0.0089851 -0.0001101 
S. Mil Cap -0.0000312 0.0029423 -0.01 0.992 -0.0057981 0.0057356 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0021085 0.0015008 -1.4 0.16 -0.00505 0.0008329 
R. Admin Cap -0.0085164 0.008829 -0.96 0.335 -0.025821 0.0087882 
R. Admin Cap2 0.2068943 0.1117762 1.85 0.064 -0.012183 0.4259716 
R. Mil Cap 0.0097242 0.0053615 1.81 0.07 -0.0007842 0.0202326 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.0070036 0.0060884 -1.15 0.25 -0.0189366 0.0049295 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
Figure 6.24 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 3  
Figure 6.24 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of coercion. None 
of the average marginal effects 
displayed are significant for any of 
the campaign types. 
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Figure 6.25 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion2, Model 3 
Figure 6.25 provides 
the predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
coercion variable; these effects 
are not substantively 
significant for terrorist, 
insurgent, or civil war 
campaign choice. For the 
choice of no campaign, the 
effect of squared coercion variable is significant up to the 20th percentile; up to this percentile, 
increases in the squared coercion variable are positive, though they decrease slightly, from a 
probability of about 0.11 at the 10th percentile to a probability of about 0.10 at the 20th percentile. 
 
Figure 6.26 Predicted Probabilities of State  
Administrative Capacity, Model 3 
Figure 6.26 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of state 
administrative capacity. These are 
not significant for terrorist or 
insurgent campaigns. For civil war 
campaigns, while the overall effect 
on probability is negative, the 
average marginal effect of state administrative capacity displays an interesting pattern. As state 
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administrative capacity increases, up to the 20th percentile, the probability of a civil war 
campaign decreases, though only slightly. From the 20th to the 40th percentile, as state 
administrative capacity increases there is a more marked decrease in the probability of a civil 
war campaign, from a probability of about -0.2 at the 20th percentile to a probability of about -0.5 
at the 40th percentile. Then, at the 40th percentile, the probability starts to head back closer to 
zero; at the 50th percentile of state administrative capacity, the probability of a civil war 
campaign is at about -0.05. The average marginal effects of state administrative capacity are also 
interesting for the choice of no campaign; these effects demonstrate two humps, one which 
ranges between the 1st percentile, at about a 0.1 probability, up to the 40th percentile, at about at 
0.4 probability, and then back down to zero (and a lack of significance at the 95% confidence 
level) at the 50th percentile. Between the 50th and 70th percentile, there is another hump; peaking 
at the 60th percentile with a probability of about 0.1. 
 
Figure 6.27 Predicted Probabilities of State 
Administrative Capacity2, Model 3 
As seen in Figure 6.27, the 
average marginal effects of the 
squared state administrative 
capacity variable not significant 
for terrorist or insurgent 
campaigns. For civil war 
campaigns, the average marginal 
effect of the squared state 
administrative capacity variable is negative and significant. The effect of the squared state 
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administrative capacity variable increases from a probability of about -0.03 at the 10th percentile 
to a probability of about -0.002 at the 90th percentile. For the choice of no campaign, the effect of 
the state administrative capacity variable is positive and significant up to the 85th percentile. The 
effect of the squared state administrative capacity variable decreases from a probability of about 
0.03 at the 10th percentile to a probability of about 0.01 at the 85th percentile.  
 
Figure 6.28 Predicted Probabilities of State Military 
Capacity, Model 3  
  Figure 6.28 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the state 
military capacity variable; there is 
no significant effect for any 
campaign type. 
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Figure 6.29 Predicted Probabilities of State Military 
Capacity2, Model 3 
 Figure 6.29 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
state military capacity variable. 
These effects are not significant 
for any of the campaign choices. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.30 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel  
Administrative Capacity, Model 3 
Figure 6.30 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the rebel 
administrative capacity variable. 
These effects are not significant for 
terrorist, civil war, or no campaign 
choices. For insurgent campaigns, 
the effects of rebel administrative 
capacity are positive, and the probability of an insurgent campaign increases slightly as rebel 
administrative capacity increases, from a probability of about 0.2 at the 10th percentile, to about 
0.4 at the 90th percentile.  
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Figure 6.31 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel 
Administrative Capacity2, Model 3 
Figure 6.31 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of the squared 
rebel administrative capacity 
variable. None of the average 
marginal effects displayed are 
significant for any of the campaign 
types.  
 
Figure 6.32 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military 
Capacity, Model 3 
Figure 6.32 provides the 
predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects of rebel military 
capacity. There appear to be no 
significant effects for terrorist or 
civil war campaigns. For insurgent 
campaigns, the effect of rebel 
military capacity is significant at 
the 95% confidence level up to about the 45th percentile. This effect is positive and flat; up to the 
40th percentile, increases in rebel military capacity increase the probability of an insurgent 
campaign by about 0.1.  
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Figure 6.33 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel 
Military Capacity2, Model 3 
Finally, Figure 6.33 
provides the predicted 
probabilities and marginal effects 
of the squared rebel military 
capacity variable. As with Figure 
6.32, there appear to be no 
significant effects for terrorist or 
civil war campaigns. For insurgent 
campaigns, as the squared rebel military capacity variable increases, the probability of an 
insurgent campaign, though always negative, rises from about -0.4 at the 10th percentile to about 
-0.1 at the 90th percentile. Conversely, for the choice of no campaign, which is positive and 
significant, the probability of no campaign decreases from about 0.4 at the 10th percentile to 
about 0.1 at the 90th percentile. 
 Discussion and Analysis 
 Coercion 
Hypothesis 1 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at 
low or high levels; this is supported by the results of Model 2, but not Model 1. This finding 
suggests that the control variables are playing a role in determining when the squared coercion 
variable is significant.83 Further, there appears to be some baseline requirement for ongoing 
                                                 
83 The only significant contributing control variable in Model 2 is population density; this is an intriguing finding, as 
Newman (2006, 758-759) specifically examines the relationship of population density (and the related factors of 
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coercive action by the state, as there is also support in both Models 1 and 2 for a positive linear 
relationship between the probability of a terrorist campaign and overall levels of state coercion. 
This intuitively makes sense in terms of the general requirement that rebels, as defined above, 
are seeking to change in some way the political behavior of the state; such change can infer some 
level of grievance. 
In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of 
coercion leads to a corresponding 1.9 percent (Model 1) or 2.3 percent (Model 2) increase in the 
chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign as the means address its grievances. In 
the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a significant effect as it 
increases from low to intermediate levels in Model 2, but is not significant in any decile in 
Model 1. An increase in one unit of the squared coercion variable leads to a corresponding 0.5 
percent (Model 1) or 0.2 percent increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist 
campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a 
significant effect as it increases from low to intermediate levels in Model 2. The overall effect of 
both the linear and quadratic versions of the coercion variable on terrorist campaigns appears to 
be minimal. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at 
intermediate levels. However, based on the data analyzed here, the level of coercion does not 
appear to matter much for insurgent campaign choice; coercion and the square of coercion are 
not significant across any of the models. The results of the models appear to suggest that, overall, 
the level of state coercion is simply not that important to the choice of insurgent campaign. 
                                                 
urbanization and age of population) and finds ‘no clear correlation’ between these variables and terrorism. This 
suggests further research in this area may be warranted. 
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While this is an unexpected result, it may suggest that those variables that were significant in the 
model—state administrative capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military 
capacity—may matter far more than any grievances caused by state coercion. This result would 
appear to support, and extend to insurgencies, the ‘viability’ argument that Collier and Hoeffler 
make about civil wars, i.e. that opportunity may matter more than grievances for such campaigns 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75), 
who argue that grievances, especially those caused by weak governments, may lead to rebel 
recruitment, also note that “conditions that favor insurgency” are not ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ 
grievances. Perhaps what the models are showing, with the introduction of new, more micro-
level data, is a clarification of exactly what those ‘conditions’ are, though even so the results do 
not entirely match those suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
Hypothesis 3 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is 
high. The models tested here do not support this; in Model 1, if coercion increases, then the 
probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. 
Further, the squared coercion variable is negative and significant, suggesting that civil war 
campaigns are more likely at intermediate levels of coercion. Neither coercion variable is 
significant in Model 2. Again, this is a surprising result, given the predominance in civil war 
literature of ascribing higher levels of civil war incidence with higher levels of coercion (c.f. 
Regan and Norton 2005). Given that both coercion variables lose their significance in Model 2, 
this may suggest that the control variables included in that model are having some sort of 
intermediating effect; however, this still does not explain the distinct departure from most 
models of civil war. As with some of the results from the multinomial probit models of insurgent 
campaigns, the suggestion here may be that, in the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate, viability 
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matters more than grievances, though it is still surprising that grievances appear to matter not at 
all in the data analyzed here (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). 
In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of 
coercion leads to a corresponding 4.9 percent (Model 1) decrease in the chance that a rebel group 
will choose a civil war campaign. For the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion 
has a significant, slightly decreasing effect starting at the 35th percentile, in Model 1. An increase 
in one unit of the squared coercion variable leads to a corresponding 1.2 percent (Model 1) 
decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. For Model 1, in the 
decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic coercion variable has a significant 
effect, but only above the 80th percentile. 
 State Administrative Capacity 
Hypothesis 4 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state 
administrative capacity is at higher levels, however, both the regular and squared versions of this 
variable were not significant in either Model 1 or 2. While this result implies that state 
administrative capacity may not have any straightforward relationship with terrorism, perhaps 
instead, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are simply several simultaneous and potentially 
confounding factors that attenuate the relationship between state administrative capacity and the 
probability of a terrorist campaign. 
Hypothesis 5 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state 
administrative capacity is at lower levels. However, this is not supported by the results, for both 
Models 1 and 2 indicate that if state administrative capacity increases, then the probability of 
rebels choosing an insurgent campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus. Again, 
this is quite a surprising result, as the consensus among the scholarly literature would have 
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predicted the opposite relationship (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This 
result may suggest that, instead of having a deterrent effect, increasing state administrative 
capacity in some way acts as an accelerant for insurgent campaigns, though the pathway for such 
a relationship has not been theorized in any literature reviewed in this research. Certainly, given 
this result, further research in this area is strongly suggested.  
In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of 
state administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 2.7 percent (Model 1) or 3.3 percent 
(Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the 
decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, state administrative capacity appears to have a very 
stable significant effect across the entire range of percentiles in Model 1 and Model 2. Thus, the 
overall effect of state administrative capacity on insurgent campaigns appears to be fairly strong, 
significant, and unchanging in its effect across percentiles.  
Hypothesis 6 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state 
administrative capacity is at lower levels. This is not supported by the results in Models 1 and 2, 
which find instead that when state administrative capacity is at very high and very low levels the 
probability of civil war is higher, ceterus paribus. The incidence of higher levels of civil war 
when state capacity is at lower levels is not surprising, based on the extant literature. However, 
the incidence of higher levels of civil war when state capacity is at very high levels is unexpected 
and not explained by previous literature.84 Perhaps civil war is more likely in states with high 
                                                 
84 The polyarchy control variable is not significant in Model 2, so it is unlikely that the incidence of civil war in a 
state with high administrative capacity could be explained away by a highly efficient but very unpopular autocratic 
state. 
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levels of administrative capacity simply because rebels, if they are to combat such an 
administratively strong state at all, may have little choice but to engage in heated conflict.  
An increase in one unit of the squared state administrative capacity variable leads to a 
corresponding 0.2 percent (Models 1 and 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose 
a civil war campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic state 
administrative capacity variable has a significant effect, but only in a mid range from the 10th to 
the 85th percentile in Model 1, and only up to the 45th percentile in Model 2. Therefore, the 
overall effect of the squared state administrative capacity on civil war campaigns, while slight, is 
significant, and the effect appears to be strongest in the mid range of percentiles.   
 State Military Capacity 
Hypothesis 7 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at higher levels. As expected, Model 1 shows a significant relationship between state 
military capacity and the choice of a terrorist campaign; if state military capacity increases, then 
the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris 
paribus. The squared state military capacity variable, which was not hypothesized to have an 
effect, is significant in Model 2, and the relationship is negative. Therefore, something about the 
inclusion of the control variables changes the expression of the relationship between state 
military capacity and the probability of a terrorist campaign. Model 2 would imply that the 
probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no active campaign, decreases, ceteris 
paribus, at low and high levels of state military capacity, but increases at intermediate levels. The 
results from the models appear to counter the arguments of Hendrix and Young (2014) and 
Crenshaw (2007); perhaps these results tie into the argument about the relationship between 
coercion and terrorism, as military forces may be—or are perceived as—an instrument of 
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coercion (Crenshaw 1991), and therefore, the state military capacity variable may be capturing 
further coercive measures or the potential for such further measures, not captured by the coercion 
variable. If so, that would explain the similar, positive linear relationship that both coercion and 
state military capacity have with terrorist campaigns.  
An increase in one unit of state military capacity leads to a corresponding 1.5 percent 
(Model 1) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile 
breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a significant effect in low levels, 
from about the 10th to the 25th percentiles, in Model 1. An increase in one unit of the squared 
state military capacity variable leads to a corresponding 0.8 percent (Model 2) decrease in the 
chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted 
probabilities, the effects of the quadratic do not appear to have a significant effect in Model 2. In 
sum, the overall effect of state military capacity on terrorist campaigns appears to be fairly 
minimal, though significant. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at intermediate levels. Neither state military capacity variable tested here is 
significant across any of the models; it does not appear that changes in the capacity of a state’s 
military have a significant effect on the choice to undertake an insurgent campaign. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, while the expectation was that state military capacity would have an effect on 
insurgent campaign choice, overall, rebels may not be that concerned about state military 
capacity since they are more interested in avoiding than confronting state forces (Sepp 2005; 
Lyall and Wilson III 2009). While the state military capacity results do not support the 
hypothesis, the relatively minor effect of state military capacity on rebels undertaking an 
insurgent campaign does appear to be in line with extant literature. 
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Hypothesis 9 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military 
capacity is at lower levels. However, the state military capacity variable, and its squared version, 
are not significant across all models. This suggests that state military capacity has little overall 
effect on the decision by rebels to undertake a civil war campaign. This finding does not support 
Hypothesis 9, which suggested that there would be a negative linear relationship. One issue here 
may be that of the geographic dispersion of state military forces within a given state; rebels may 
focus their efforts against a specific part of the state’s forces, which are deployed to a specific 
region, rather than attempt to face the entirety of the state’s forces (Buhaug 2010). If such sub-
state issues of troop placement versus rebel location are affecting rebel campaign calculations, 
then the overall strength of the state’s military may well be insignificant (Mack 1975).  
 Rebel Administrative Capacity 
Hypothesis 10 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
administrative capacity is at lower levels. For both rebel administrative capacity variables, the 
only significant relationships are in Model 2. For the full model, if rebel administrative capacity 
increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign 
decreases, ceteris paribus. This result supports Hypothesis 10. However, the model also found 
that, if the squared rebel administrative capacity variable increases, then the probability of rebels 
choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high 
levels of rebel administrative capacity. While the low end of this relationship does not disagree 
with the hypothesis, the finding that high levels of rebel administrative capacity are linked to the 
choice of a terrorist campaign is less explainable. This may be explained by the methodology 
used in this project, where rebel capacity is split into two parts, administrative and military, and 
examined separately; the extant literature generally tends to combine them (Gray 2007; Wood 
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2014). This suggests that there may be more to rebel administration and its effect on campaign 
choice than previous literature would imply. 
An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 16.7 
percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In 
the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel administrative capacity appears to have a 
significant effect as it increases from mid to high levels in Model 2. An increase in one unit of 
the squared rebel administrative capacity variable leads to a corresponding 70.7 percent (Model 
2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile 
breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel administrative capacity variable 
appears to have a significant effect at low levels in Model 2. The overall effect of rebel 
administrative capacity on terrorist campaigns is of a greater magnitude than that of coercion. 
The linear effect appears to be more pronounced as rebel administrative capacity is in its 
midpoint to high levels, while, conversely, the quadratic version of the variable is significant at 
low levels. 
Hypothesis 11 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
administrative capacity is at higher levels. As hypothesized, if rebel administrative capacity 
increases, then the probability of rebels choosing an insurgent campaign over no campaign also 
increases, ceteris paribus. Though not hypothesized, the squared rebel administrative capacity 
variable also has a significant and positive relationship; the probability of rebels choosing an 
insurgent campaign over no campaign increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of rebel 
administrative capacity. This implied nonlinear relationship does not support Fearon’s (2008) 
claim that very large rebel groups will be less likely to pursue insurgent campaigns, but perhaps 
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instead lends support to arguments by Kilcullen (2010), Hendrix (2010), and Ahmad (1982) 
which argue that the summum bonum of insurgencies are the rebels’ administrative capabilities.  
An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 76.8 
percent (Model 1) or 99.1 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose 
an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel administrative 
capacity appears to have a stable significant effect across the entire range of percentiles in Model 
1, and while it is also significant across the range of percentiles in Model 2, it has a slightly 
decreasing effect as rebel administrative capacity increases. An increase in one unit of the 
squared rebel administrative capacity variable leads to a corresponding 216.9 percent (Model 1) 
or 255.0 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent 
campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, however, the squared rebel 
administrative capacity does not appear to be specifically significant in any decile in Model 1 or 
Model 2. The overall effect of rebel administrative capacity on insurgent campaigns appears to 
be quite strong in terms of magnitude, and significant in its effect across the range of percentiles. 
While the quadratic version of the variable has an even stronger effect, it does not appear to have 
the same significance across deciles.  
Hypothesis 12 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
administrative capacity is at higher levels. Neither of the rebel administrative capacity variables 
are significant in Model 1, but both are significant in Model 2. For Model 2, if rebel 
administrative capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign 
over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. This is the opposite of the hypothesized 
relationship.  Model 2 also suggests that the probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign 
over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of rebel administrative 
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capacity. Again, the results here may point to sub-state level interactions and variations between 
rebel groups. Both Weinstein (2007) and Mampilly (2011) suggest that there are a variety of 
types of rebel group governance, presumably some of which are more or less bureaucratically 
capable than others. It may be that certain groups have a high administrative capacity, and are 
thus better able to successfully prosecute a civil war campaign. Conversely, some rebel groups 
may be more loosely organized, with several more or less independent groups organized around 
strong military leaders (who may even be competing with each other). Unfortunately, this is an 
issue where cross-national time series data is simply to scarce too determine if this is the case. 
However, the case studies presented in the following chapters provide examples of this type of 
issue occurring.85  
An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 51.4 
percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. In 
the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities in Model 2, rebel administrative capacity is 
significant across the entire percentile range, with a slight lessening of effect as capacity 
increases. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel administrative capacity leads to a 
corresponding 115.4 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a 
civil war campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel 
administrative capacity variable does not appear to have a significant effect across percentiles. 
While the overall effect of rebel administrative capacity on civil war campaigns appears to be 
fairly strong and significant across percentiles, the quadratic version, though it has a stronger 
magnitude of effect, does not appear to have the same significance across deciles. 
                                                 
85 See the discussion of the Mau Mau organization in Chapter 7, and of Colonel Karuna of the LTTE in Chapter 8. 
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 Rebel Military Capacity 
Hypothesis 13 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military 
capacity is at lower levels. Rebel military capacity, as hypothesized, has a significant negative 
linear relationship with the incidence of terrorist campaigns across both Model 1 and Model 2. 
For both models, if rebel military capacity increases, the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist 
campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. As with the rebel administrative capacity 
variable, there is also an unanticipated relationship that appears in the model; the squared rebel 
military capacity variable is significant in Model 1, and the relationship is positive. This result 
would suggest that at low and high levels of rebel military capacity, the probability of rebels 
choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign increases, ceteris paribus. While the probability 
of rebels selecting a terrorist campaign at low levels of their own military capacity is not 
controversial, the probability that rebels would select a terrorist campaign at high levels of 
military capacity is, as such a relationship is not supported by most of the extant literature.  
An increase in one unit of rebel military capacity leads to a corresponding 11.3 percent 
(Model 1) or a 94 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a 
terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel military capacity 
does not appear to be specifically significant in Model 1, but does have a more concentrated 
effect in Model 2, as it increases from low to mid levels. Given the magnitude of the effect and 
the concentration of the effect to below about the 30th percentile, it appears that there is a very 
strong negative effect on the likelihood of a terrorist campaign, but only as rebel military 
capacity rises from low to mid levels, after which the effect wears off. An increase in one unit of 
the squared rebel military capacity variable leads to a corresponding 8.4 percent (Model 1) 
increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile 
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breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel military capacity appears to have no significant effect 
in Model 1. Thus, the overall effect of rebel military capacity appears to have a much stronger 
affect on rebel choice of terrorist campaign than that of the quadratic variable.   
Hypothesis 14 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
military capacity is at intermediate levels; this is not supported by the data analyzed here. 
Instead, the models show, first, a negative, linear relationship between rebel military capacity 
and choice of insurgent campaign. While not as hypothesized, this is somewhat uncontroversial, 
as, if rebels are too strong militarily, they may switch preferences to a civil war campaign, which 
is in line with the discussion in earlier chapters and Gray’s (2007, 246) claim that rebels will 
choose their fighting style based on military capacity. However, the negative linear relationship 
would also suggest that very militarily weak rebels would be very likely to pursue an insurgent 
campaign, which is not entirely in line with extant literature. However, what the model may be 
capturing here is the overriding importance of rebel administrative capacity; simply put, rebel 
administration may matter far more than rebel military strength when rebels choose to undertake 
an insurgent campaign.  
Models 1 and 2 also show a positive nonlinear relationship between rebel military 
capacity and choice of insurgent campaign, which is the opposite of what Hypothesis 14 
proposed. Rather than rebel groups choosing insurgent campaigns when they are intermediate 
levels of military capacity, the results would suggest that rebels are more likely to undertake 
insurgent campaigns when they are militarily very weak or very strong. This result is not in line 
with extant literature, and, again, it may suggest that there is some sort of intermediating effect 
between rebel administrative capacity and rebel military capacity.  
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An increase in one unit of rebel military capacity leads to a corresponding 76.7 percent 
(Model 1) or 28.2 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose an 
insurgent campaign. For the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities in Model 1, rebel 
military capacity has a slight significant effect as it increases from low to high levels, and then 
the effect becomes sharply stronger in the high ranges, above the 80th percentile.  In Model 2, 
rebel military capacity is significant from the mid to high percentiles, but the effect does not 
share the dramatic shift in slope of Model 1, though there is a clear shift to significance right 
around the 50th percentile. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel military capacity variable 
leads to a corresponding 54.7 percent (Model 1) or 165.6 percent (Model 2) increase in the 
chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of 
predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel military capacity variable has a significant effect 
across the percentiles, but with a slight drop off above the 80th percentile in Model 1. In the 
decile breakdown for Model 2, the effects of the quadratic do not appear to have a significant 
effect.  
Hypothesis 15 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel 
military capacity is at high levels. This was not supported; neither of the rebel military capacity 
variables was significant in the models. Therefore, there is no support for the hypothesized 
positive linear relationship between rebel military capacity and the incidence of civil war. This 
null result may be due to the same reason that there is no support for the hypothesized negative 
linear relationship between state military capacity and the incidence of civil war; simply, rebel-
state military comparisons and calculations may be driven by sub-state geographic location 
rather than state-wide total military capacity (Buhaug 2010). 
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 Campaign Onset 
Hypothesis 16 stated that the onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a 
stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type 
of rebel campaign. However, this claim was not supported, given the null results for coercion 
from Model 3 presented in Table 6.10 and Figure 6.24. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter 
does not support Hypothesis 16, as coercion does not appear to have a significant effect, much 
less an effect of greater magnitude, in the onset of any type of campaign. While statistical 
analysis of the data here does not support this hypothesis, the case studies in the following 
chapters also examine the role of coercion prior to the onset of a violent sub-state political 
campaign, and do appear to offer some support for the hypothesis. 
Broken down by campaign type, when looking at the average marginal effects across 
incidence models, an increase in one unit of coercion leads to: a corresponding 1.9 percent 
(Model 1) or 2.3 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a 
terrorist campaign; a not significant response for insurgent campaigns for either model; and a 
corresponding 4.9 percent chance (Model 1) or a not significant response (Model 2) for civil war 
campaigns. Unfortunately, the overall average marginal effect of coercion on any type of 
campaign, as seen in Table 6.10, is not significant across all campaign types; therefore, there is 
no way to compare the effect of coercion between the onset model and the incidence models.  
Figures 6.4, 6.14, and 6.24 provide predicted probabilities of coercion at deciles. Very little of 
the coercion graphed in these models is significant. In Figure 6.4 (Model 1), there is a slight 
decreased probability of a civil war campaign as coercion increases from about the 35th 
percentile to the 90th percentile. Figure 6.14 shows a slight increase in the probability of a 
terrorist campaign as coercion increases from about the 10th to 35th percentile, and a slight 
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decrease in the probability of a civil war campaign as coercion increases above the 75th 
percentile. Figure 6.24 (Model 3) does not show any significant relationship for any decile of 
coercion. 
One of the more interesting results from the multinomial probit models are the 
differences in the directionality of the relationships between onset years and all years. For 
terrorist campaigns, coercion had a positive linear relationship over all years, but a negative 
linear relationship in onset years. Further, the squared coercion variable had a positive sign in 
Model 2, but a negative sign in Model 3. This change in the direction of the relationship implies 
that there are different mechanisms at work in terms of the relationship between coercion and 
terrorist campaign onset and incidence. For insurgent and civil war campaigns, there is a 
significant relationship between coercion and overall incidence, but neither type of campaign has 
a significant relationship between coercion and onset. Again, this difference between models 
suggests that different processes, or at least variations on the same process, are operating prior to, 
versus within, an ongoing conflict. While the overall hypothesis on the effect of coercion does 
not appear to be supported, these results suggest that more research is needed to understand what 
difference exits between onset and incidence processes of violent sub-state political campaigns.  
 Campaign Choice 
In addition, when looking at the overall results of the predicted probabilities of the 
models, Models 1 and 2 suggest that, once a conflict is underway, the most likely campaign 
choice, by far, is insurgent. However, Model 3 suggests that the choice of campaign at the start 
of an episode of intrastate conflict is far less differentiated. Instead of a difference between a 
predicted probability of about 0.02 for a terrorist campaign and the much higher predicted 
probability of about 0.40 for an insurgent campaign, at the onset of a conflict, the predicted 
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probability for a terrorist campaign at less than 0.01 compares to a predicted probability of an 
insurgent campaign at 0.06. 
As predicted, a higher incidence of terrorist campaigns is more likely when coercion is at 
low or high levels; and when rebel administrative and military capacity is at lower levels. 
However, there also appears to be some nuances that the hypotheses missed, most notably the 
positive linear relationship between coercion and the incidence of terrorist campaigns, but also 
the negative quadratic relationship with state military capacity and the positive quadratic 
relationship with rebel administrative capacity. There appears to be no support from either model 
that state administrative capacity has any bearing on choice of terrorist campaign. In terms of 
magnitude of effect, most variables are modest, except for rebel administrative and military 
capacity; these variables appear to have a far greater influence on the choice of a terrorist 
campaign. 
Insurgent campaigns were the most consistent of campaign types across the two models; 
all of the five significant relationships identified were the same across models. In addition to the 
positive linear relationship with rebel administrative capacity, the models also identified the 
following as significant: a positive linear relationship with state administrative capacity; a 
positive quadratic relationship with rebel administrative capacity; a negative linear relationship 
with rebel military capacity; and a positive quadratic relationship with rebel military capacity. 
There appears to be no support from either model that coercion or state military capacity has any 
bearing on the choice of an insurgent campaign. In terms of magnitude of effect, the state 
administrative capacity variables’ effect was far more modest than that of the rebel 
administrative and rebel military capacity variables. Similar to the results for the terrorist 
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campaign, these variables appear to have a far greater influence on the choice of an insurgent 
campaign than any others proposed.  
There was no direct support for the hypotheses concerning civil war. There were, 
however, some significant relationships between the predictor and outcome variables, though 
they were unexpected. The only variable that was significant across both models was the 
negative quadratic relationship between state administrative capacity and incidence of civil war 
campaigns. Coercion in both its negative linear and negative quadratic forms was significant in 
Model 1, and rebel administrative capacity in both its negative linear and positive quadratic 
forms was significant in Model 2. There appears to be no support from either model that state 
military capacity or rebel military capacity has any bearing on the choice of civil war campaign. 
In terms of magnitude of effect, coercion had a modest effect, state administrative capacity had a 
slight effect, and rebel administrative capacity had a far greater magnitude of effect on the choice 
of a civil war campaign. 
 Conclusion 
While, as hypothesized, the variables of coercion, state administrative capacity, state 
military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity were all, in various 
models, found to be significant predictors of sub-state violent campaign types, the relationships 
between those predictor variables were only rarely in the direction that extant research in the 
field would suggest. In fact, the multitude of ways in which the predictor variables did not follow 
what previous scholarly literature would suggest is perhaps one of the most intriguing findings in 
this chapter. For terrorist campaigns, neither model supported extant research which argues that 
state administrative capacity does have an effect on the choice of terrorist campaigns. Rather, the 
results of this chapter’s model seem to suggest that rebel administrative and military capacity 
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may have more of an effect on rebel choices. Next, insurgent campaigns surprisingly appeared to 
not be affected by levels of coercion or of state military capacity. Finally, for civil war 
campaigns, none of this project’s hypotheses—all of which were based on extant research—were 
supported.  
Why do this project’s models offer such contradictory findings to current research in the 
field? As discussed in the preceding chapters, in some instances, the partition of state capacity 
into bureaucratic and military capacity might confound prior research that examined state 
capacity only in an aggregated manner. Further, while quantitative data, especially on rebel 
groups, remains somewhat limited, research ignoring rebel capacity and focusing only on the 
state appears to be insufficient to explain rebel choices. Rebel capacity, both administrative and 
military, matters; to ignore it is to omit critical pieces of the puzzle. Perhaps one of the strongest 
findings of this chapter is that the magnitude of effect that rebel administrative and military 
capacity has on campaign choice often dwarfs other factors. While the processes by which rebel 
groups choose a specific campaign type definitely need to be subject to more research and 
testing, what this chapter has demonstrated is that rebel groups do appear to make choices as to 
what type of sub-state violent campaign to undertake based on the consideration of several 
factors, both of their opponent, the state, as well as their own capacity.  
Overall, the relationship between these structural factors and the type of campaign rebel 
groups choose is intriguing, and it appears that there are clear, traceable differences between the 
expression of these factors and choice of campaign. However, the results of the empirical testing 
in this model suggest that further detail on how the campaign choice processes occur is needed. 
Therefore, in order to examine these processes in greater detail, the next two chapters assess the 
hypotheses via historical case studies of two different rebel groups. The examination of these 
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case studies of the Mau Mau in Kenya and the LTTE in Sri Lanka provide a different avenue of 
approach for evaluating this project’s hypotheses.  
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Chapter 7 - Case Study: The Mau Mau 
While Chapter 6 tested the breadth of applicability of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 
4 via statistical analysis, the following two chapters are focused on examining in depth how well 
the hypotheses serve to explain rebel campaign choices in a specific set of circumstances. This 
chapter examines the case of the Mau Mau in Kenya, and Chapter 8 examines the case of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. These two cases were chosen in an effort 
to look at conflicts that took place at different times and places. The Mau Mau rebellion was a 
colonial-era rebellion, focused on combatting a foreign superpower. Geographically, the rebels 
were isolated in one country in Africa. Conversely, Sri Lanka had already gained independence 
and was a post-colonial democratic state in South Asia. Rather than being isolated, the LTTE had 
ties to a large population of co-ethnics in southern India, as well as a global diaspora network. 
Therefore, these case studies provide instances of rebel group conflict in two variated 
geopolitical backdrops. However, there are also some similarities. Both conflicts did occur in 
nations which had experienced British colonial rule, and both occurred in the second half of 
twentieth century (though the LTTE conflict did extend into the twenty-first century). 
The methodology used for examining these conflict histories is that of the structured, 
focused case study (George and Bennett 2005). Structured, focused case studies are used “to 
analyze phenomena… in ways that would draw the explanations of each case of a particular 
phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory” (George and Bennett 2005, 67). Since their 
goal is to yield cross-case knowledge, the methodology of structured focused case studies 
compliments this project’s hypotheses, which also seek to identify broad themes that contribute 
to rebel choices, regardless of the country of the rebel. The primary requirements of this method 
are the use of a series of standardized questions across each study in order to facilitate 
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comparisons between cases, and a focus on a specific theoretical focus within the historical 
narrative (George and Bennett 2005, 60-70). The theoretical focus of this project’s case studies 
flow from the hypotheses generated above; instead of a broad narrative, I am primarily 
concerned with how changes in the means of rebel groups changed the type of violence they 
carried out. In line with this focus, the three standardized research questions I will use are tied to 
the means outlined in Chapter 4, and are as follows:  
 How did the coercive action of the state—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel 
campaign onset and occurrence?  
 How did state administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—
affect rebel campaign onset and occurrence? 
 How did rebel administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—
affect rebel campaign onset and occurrence?   
While these structured questions shape the way in which historical inquiry was carried 
out, the results of this research are organized into four parts ; an introduction and a brief narrative 
of the rebel group’s actions in the course of the conflict, a discussion and analysis of how 
coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity affected conflict onset, a similar discussion and 
analysis of how coercion and capacity affected changes in rebel campaign choice, and a 
summary of the implications of that case study to the overall arguments of this research project.    
 Overview: The Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya  
The case of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya offers an historical example of the roles that 
coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity played in affecting rebel campaign choice.  The Mau 
Mau rebels, primarily composed of members of the Kikuyu tribe, had some support from other 
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indigenous Kenyan tribes but were primarily on their own as they faced off against the colonial 
British administration which was backed up by the might—and military—of the British Empire.   
The British Empire established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which became the 
Kenya Colony in 1920. In this colony, the agriculturally productive land of the Rift Valley and 
the Central Highlands were reserved for white ownership, and the farms there depended upon the 
indigenous labor force to work the land (Morgan 1963). This indigenous labor force was mainly 
comprised of the Kikuyu, and related Embu and Meru tribes.   
The Kikuyu, one of the major ethnolinguistic groups in Kenya, comprised around 30 
percent of Kenya’s five million indigenous population (Barnett and Njama 1966, 24). They 
resisted British rule to a greater or lesser extent throughout this period, though this resistance, 
while occasionally violent, was not of a high intensity. In World War II, Kikuyu took part on the 
Allied side as members of the King’s African Rifles; some scholars argue that participation in 
the Rifles led to a greater political consciousness among indigenous Kenyans (Brands 2005).   
In Kenya after 1945, the Kikuyu (and the related Embu and Meru tribes) faced an 
increasingly dismal outlook. A quickly increasing population meant that the indigenous 
reservations in the Highlands were overcrowded, with land in extremely short supply. The 
poorest had no land and were forced to go elsewhere to find work. For those ‘squatter’ Kikuyu 
who were traditionally employed as laborers on the European farms, the increase in mechanized 
agricultural equipment replaced a great deal of the requirement for laborers. Those left without a 
job could either go back to the reservations, which offered little opportunity, or as with the poor 
from the reservations, could go to Nairobi to seek work, though the plentiful supply of labor in 
Nairobi meant that employers there could pay very little (Branch 2009, 5-8).   
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Also following World War II, a number of nationalist organizations arose, which sought 
a greater voice for indigenous Kenyans in the government of Kenya. The organization with the 
greatest prominence was the Kenyan African Union. Though the Union was an organization 
purporting to represent all indigenous Kenyans, it was dominated by members of the Kikuyu. 
The main policy goal of the Union was to increase indigenous land rights at the expense of white 
landowners via non-violent political pressure. When the Union failed to achieve any significant 
success, indigenous support shifted to more militant and radical individuals and organizations 
(Berman 1991).   
As a resistance organization, the Mau Mau in its proto-form started sometime between 
1943 to 1945. Though drawn predominantly from the Kikuyu tribe, the Mau Mau rebels 
encompassed members of the Embu and Meru tribes as well, who were also from the Central 
Highlands. In order to join the Mau Mau, recruits were required to take a ceremonial oath of 
loyalty. One scholar posits that the first oathing ceremony to induct Mau Mau members occurred 
in 1944 at Olenguruoune in the Rift Valley when some 11,000 Kikuyu squatters were expelled 
(Throup 1985, 415). Oathing ceremonies were common by 1947, and the colonial administration 
was enough aware of the organization to proscribe both it and its oathing ceremonies on 12 
August 1950 (Corfield 1960; Elkins 2005; Percox 2003, 122-129). Oathing became widespread; 
one contemporary estimate states that by 1953, 90 percent of the Kikuyu were oathed, either 
voluntarily or by force (Langford-Smith 1953). For those Kikuyu oathed under duress, the 
problem was not so much their willing support for the Mau Mau, but rather fear of both Mau 
Mau and supernatural repercussions if they broke the oath of support (Green 1990).  
Though the Mau Mau are more often remembered as being active in the agricultural areas 
of the Central Highlands and Rift Valley, they also had a presence in the cities, particularly 
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Nairobi. Certainly, the majority of Mau Mau fighters would use the forests as a staging ground 
for attacks, but Nairobi, as the capital city, offered much in the way of intelligence on 
government activity. Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu were also present in Nairobi, where those who 
had been dispossessed, evicted, or simply unable to find work in the agricultural areas made their 
way (Elkins 2005, 24). 
At first, the Mau Mau were not seen as a particular threat; a Kenyan internal security 
working committee, established in August 1950, dismissed the Mau Mau in its November 1950 
report as an organization responsible only for some “minor acts of sabotage on farms” (Internal 
Security Working Committee 1951). The Kenya Police Annual Report in 1951 also describes the 
Mau Mau in terms that seem out of line with what 1952 would bring: “Prosecutions against 
members of the proscribed Mau Mau organization for administering oaths continued… No 
subversive action, apart from the actual administration of the oath, could be attributed to its 
members during the year” (Throup 1992, 139).  
The violence perpetrated by the Mau Mau that would become the Emergency started to 
grow in intensity throughout 1952, with arson attacks on European settler properties as well as 
intra-Kikuyu violence (Branch 2013). Even from the start of what would become the Emergency, 
there were two distinct rebel targets of violence: European settlers and Kikuyu colonial loyalists. 
On 3 October 1952, the Mau Mau killed what was probably their first European victim, and on 9 
October, the Mau Mau killed an important loyalist Kikuyu tribal chief (Elkins 2005, 32; 
Anderson 2005, 54-61). As a result of these two high-profile attacks, in combination with the 
general upswing of violent activity, on 20 October, the British Colonial office declared a state of 
Emergency in Kenya, and that evening launched Operation Jock Scott to round up a number of 
suspected Mau Mau (Bennet 2013).    
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 The Onset of the Mau Mau Rebellion  
The onset of the Mau Mau rebellion, though it took contemporary European observers by 
surprise, can be seen as a logical extension of sustained and growing grievances by the Kikuyu 
as their economic situation deteriorated following World War II. On first glance, it would appear 
that the Mau Mau had very little in terms of administrative or combatant force capacity, but this 
is not exactly the case. The Mau Mau had numerous recruits, thanks in part to the large-scale 
evictions; a better intelligence system than the government it was opposing; and several leaders 
that were capable of staging attacks. Recruits were made more trustworthy via the oathing 
ceremonies, and even if not all of those oathed were willing to fight, the cultural inhibitions 
against breaking the oath meant that the Kikuyu had developed a large base not only of fighters 
but also of friendly neutrals who were unlikely to provide intelligence to pro-state forces. 
Operation Jock Scott, intended to destroy the leadership and thus the organizational capability of 
the Mau Mau, was mostly a failure. The Mau Mau received warning from friendly Kikuyu in 
government service, and the majority of the leaders, including Stanley Mathenge and Dedan 
Kimathi, escaped (Anderson 2005, 63).  
The Mau Mau received further support as non-violent attempts to change the political 
behavior of the colonial Kenyan administration, such as the formation of the Kenyan African 
Union as a political pressure group, were met with failure. Instead, the Kenyan administration 
undertook increasingly coercive measures towards the indigenous Kenyan populations, all of 
which were designed to support the status quo arrangement of European landowners served by 
cheap indigenous labor. While the British officially declared a counter-rebellion campaign with 
the declaration of Emergency in October 1952, the Mau Mau as a rebel group, as described 
above, had been active prior to this time period.    
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 Coercion  
Prior to the onset of the Emergency, the Kikuyu were experiencing high levels of both 
economic and societal insecurity. One scholar describes their plight, noting that as they were 
“[d]enied access to education, land, state institutions, and public services, Kenya’s African 
communities were socially alienated, economically marginalized, and politically 
disenfranchised” (Branch 2009, 7). Physical insecurity, in terms of political imprisonment, was 
also occurring. Even prior to the Emergency, Kenyan police were routinely arresting groups of 
Kikuyu. For example, the police arrested approximately 550 Kikuyu in September 1952 as a 
‘deterrent’ rather than because they had committed a crime (Furedi 1989, 116-119). Immediately 
following the declaration of the Emergency, Operation Jock Scott, implemented on the night of 
20 October in both Nairobi and the Central Highlands, detained approximately 150 suspected 
Mau Mau leaders, imprisoning six after a show trial. Some of the detainees were targeted 
because they were members of the Kenyan African Union; the Union did not have ties to Mau 
Mau, but the colonial administration assumed that it did (Branch 2009, 13).  
The longstanding grievances against the Kenyan colonial administration, combined with 
the post-World War II increased economic stresses, provided ample grievances for the Kikuyu 
peoples. When non-violent attempts to change Kenyan policy toward indigenous populations 
failed, low-level violent activity started to take place. The initial colonial response of 
indiscriminant and widespread detentions, arrests, and imprisonments, served more to incite 
violence than repress it, while the underlying conditions encouraging discontent were left 
smoldering.      
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 State Capacity  
The colonial governors, assigned from Great Britian, supposedly oversaw both civilian 
and military affairs in the colony. In that role, they were able to draw upon the resources not only 
of the agriculturally productive Kenya colony, but also of Great Britain herself. However, 
following World War II, Britain found itself overextended among its colonies, particularly in the 
matter of manpower available to police the Empire (Bennet 2013, 94). This, in part, may explain 
the lag between the beginning of the rebellion and the employment of the forces of Great Britain.  
Kenya itself came into the conflict with at least a moderate level of capacity; Kenya had 
been a prosperous colony for many years. However, a large proportion of that wealth was due to 
agricultural production, which typically came at the expense of indigenous Kenyans (Leys 1975, 
40-43). The administration it had, however, would be nothing compared to the capacity it would 
reach during the Mau Mau rebellion; one author describes notes that, by “1952 to 1956, when the 
fighting was at its worst, the Kikuyu districts of Kenya became a police state in the very fullest 
sense of the word” (Anderson 2005, 5). 
While the colonial administration did have control over a police force and the ability to 
request military forces from the British Empire, what the administration lacked was a good 
understanding of who the Mau Mau were, and in particular the ability to differentiate between 
those who were committed cadres and those who had simply taken the oath. Not only was 
colonial intelligence about the Mau Mau bad, but counter-intelligence was also lacking. News of 
Operation Jock Scott was leaked prior to the arrests, enabling the majority of the hardcore Mau 
Mau to escape into the forests (Anderson 2005, 62-63).   
The military and polices forces available initially were also quite small, and their ability 
to penetrate into the forests and indigenous reservations mainly limited to temporary sweeping 
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operations. There was no committed, long-term presence, so when sweeps occurred in the forest, 
Mau Mau rebels hiding there simply moved deeper into the forest, out of the range of patrols. 
Sweeps in the reservations faced similar problems. “At the Emergency’s declaration, the police 
Special Branch, responsible for political policing, comprised only four officers and a handful of 
rank and file” (Bennett 2013, 15). As Bennett (2013, 13) notes, “Military operations in the first 
months were quite seriously flawed. The initial arrests failed to halt the violence, but generated 
complacency in the government, which was subsequently sluggish in mounting offensive 
operations… [that] achieved no tangible results.”    
 Rebel Capacity  
Similar to the colonial administration, the Kikuyu were also not originally prepared for 
sustained large-scale conflict. Though capable of scattered terrorist attacks against settlers and 
loyalists, the Mau Mau were not particularly well organized. The rebel leaders, including 
Kimathi, Mathenge, and Itote, were each able to control their own gang, but the gangs rarely 
coordinated actions with each other. Had Operation Jock Scott not been compromised by leaked 
information, it is possible that enough of the Mau Mau leadership would have been captured, 
completely disorganizing the rebels, who would then have been unable to achieve much more 
than a continued effort along the same lines of scattered attacks.   
While the Mau Mau initially lacked much in the way of a coherent organizational 
structure, it did have a strong recruitment pool comprised of disaffected youths. Societally, the 
Kikuyu were organized around a patron-client system whereby the patron, usually a chief or 
elder, was supposed to ensured that their clients were able to have the minimum standard of 
living required by society in order to start a family. Faced with a burgeoning indigenous 
population and increasing limitations on available employment due to the coercive actions of the 
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colonial administration, this system was put under severe stress as patrons were no longer able to 
help their clients (Kershaw 1997: 212-247). The young men and women who were unable to find 
employment as clients also found themselves unable to start or support families, and move up the 
societal ladder towards elderhood. These youths were therefore isolated from participation the 
patronage system. As noted by Hudson and den Boer (2004), the generation of a large group of 
disaffected youth who have no reason to support the status quo and dim prospects for the future 
is likely to lead to increasing resistance, both non-violent and violent, against the status quo 
system. These disaffected youths, unemployed and without family responsibilites, have fewer 
constraints against joining rebel groups. Such was the case in Kenya, where the circumstances 
led to an increasing pool of potential Mau Mau rebels.   
The large pool of potential recruits included both these disconnected youths as well as 
members of the Kikuyu who, even if they were part of the patronage system, suffered from the 
widespread coercive actions of the colonial administration. One organizational advantage the 
rebels had was the fact that the pool of recruits, coming from three related tribes, the Kikuyu, 
Embu, and Meru, shared a common culture. A significant feature of this culture was the tradition 
of oathing ceremonies used to create binding agreements. The Mau Mau utilized traditional 
oathing ceremonies, transforming them into a pledge of allegiance to the rebels, which enabled 
them to build a rebel network. While some Kikuyu freely took the Mau Mau oaths, others were 
forced to on threat of retaliation. However, even if oaths had been administered under duress, 
fear of the consequences of breaking the oath resulted in at least passive complicity with Mau 
Mau across wide swaths of the population.   
Along with these oathing ceremonies, the fact that the Mau Mau both came from and 
depended upon local communities for recruits, war material, and intelligence meant that they had 
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a far clearer picture of who was aligned for and against them. The Mau Mau also took advantage 
of colonial blindness to the role of women in supporting the rebellion. Women were able to 
move more freely than men, which made them ideal liaisons between colonial-controlled and 
rebel-controlled areas; they supplied both war material and intelligence to Mau Mau fighters in 
the forest (Presley 1992).  
Thus, the Mau Mau at the onset of conflict had both advantages and disadvantages. In 
terms of personnel and intelligence, they were far superior to the colonial administration, and 
though loosely organized, the widespread oathing ceremonies helped to create a supportive 
network. However, unlike the administration, they lacked any form of external support and were 
limited in terms of resources. The onset of formal hostilities by the administration took the Mau 
Mau by surprise; their organizational transformation into more tightly woven ‘gangs’ lead by 
different Mau Mau leaders happened on the fly in the forests following the first attempts by 
colonial forces to eradicate the rebellion.    
 Campaign Choices During the Mau Mau Rebellion  
The Mau Mau rebellion lasted from approximately 1952 to 1956, and went through three 
distinct phases, preceeded by a proto-rebellion phase that started in approximately 1944, in 
which discontent was obvious but violence was sporadic. This project identifies distinct terrorist, 
insurgent, and civil war campaigns. This identification is in line with Anderson (2005, 250), who 
notes that, “Even for the forest armies the Mau Mau war was not a single strategic campaign.”    
 The Terrorist Campaign, January – October 1952  
While not typically classified as such, I argue that most of 1952, including the lead-up to 
the declaration of the Emergency, should actually be considered a terrorist campaign. The Mau 
Mau rebels committed violent acts that were certainly intended to send a political message to a 
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larger audience. As Anderson (2005, 118) notes, “Each settler killing had an impact upon white 
consciousness in Kenya that far outweighed its actual significance in the context of the war.” 
Indeed, the number of European settlers killed during the entire span of the Emergency is 
astonishingly low; one estimate places the total number of European civilians killed at 32, with 
another 26 wounded (Corfield 1960, 316). Yet it was the attacks on the European settlers that 
directed the military response to the Mau Mau; “[a]ttacks on Europeans initally exerted a 
disproportionate influence on deployment decisions, with small units scattered throughout the 
Rift Valley to protect the settlers” (Bennett 2013, 13-14).  
Government orders intended to isolate and punish Mau Mau through 1952 served to 
incite rebellion, as the coercive actions of the administration increased indigenous grievances 
(Bennett 2013, 19). After each attack on European settlers, widescale evictions of thousands of 
Kikuyu in the area surrounding each attack took place, further delegitimizing the colonial 
administration and leading to the radicalization of evicted Kikuyu due to the destruction of their 
homes and livelihood. Sir Evelyn Baring, the Kenyan colonial governor during this time period, 
noted in a message to the British administration that such government action “has probably led to 
a further facilitation of [Mau Mau] gang recruitment and some diversion of effort on the part of 
the forces of law and order” (Baring 1953). These evictions, combined with those on the run who 
had avoided the Operation Jock Scott round up, precipitated the move to the forests of up to 
10,000 individuals by early 1953 (Anderson 2005).  
As the number of disaffected individuals grew, I argue that the Mau Mau gained the 
capacity it needed, via recruits to the forest gangs as well as a network of supporters both in 
Nairobi and the Central Highlands. Thanks to the actions of the colonial government, the Mau 
Mau had a huge forest army with which to stage attacks. However, organizing the mass influx of 
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recruits is probably one of the reasons that full-scale civil war did not break out until mid-1953; 
as discussed below, both sides appear to have been focused on building their administrative 
capacity while attempting to simultaneously undertake violence. The dual demands of capacity 
building and campaigning probably served as a limiter of sorts. 
 The Insurgent Campaign, October 1952 – March 1953  
Early 1953, as with late 1952, was not marked by a high level of conflict. Some scholars 
refer to this time period as a ‘phoney war’ in which both sides, unprepared for conflict, were 
more focused on organizing for, rather than committing, violence (Branch 2009). Yet, even 
though both sides were still organizing, violence continued. For the Mau Mau, I argue that this 
violence took the form of an insurgent campaign, and that this was because the British forced 
this option upon them:  
Mau Mau’s recourse to insurgency was not at time of its choosing but instead a reaction 
to the commencement of the Emergency. Beyond a vague and ill-defined commitment to 
land and freedom, Mau Mau’s own discussions of aim, purpose, and legitimacy of 
violence were therefore left unresolved. The forests became the location for debate, 
factionalism, and contestation rather than the base for a unified rebel army. (Branch 2009, 
7) 
 
The Mau Mau experienced a vast upsizing of their combatant forces and non-combatant 
supporters, as the estimate of 10,000 fighters above makes clear. With such a popular 
mobilization, the limits of the terrorist campaign, which made political statements but little else, 
expanded into potentially the ability to wage a civil war. Given the fact that the means of the 
Mau Mau increased dramatically during this time period, why did civil war not break out? I 
argue that, though the Mau Mau forces increased, the rebel group capacity needed time to adjust 
to its sudden popularity. When it did so in mid-1953, then civil war did break out.  
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On the other side of the fight, the colonial Kenyan administration was having problems of 
its own. While the colonial Kenyan administration was quite good at coercion of the Kikuyu 
population, it did not, at least initially, have good intelligence on the Mau Mau. As Galula (2006) 
notes, such intelligence is vital to effective counterinsurgency. Early efforts at countering the 
Mau Mau in Kenya were weakened by the critical lack of information on the rebels. Perhaps 
blinded by racism, “[t]he inability—or unwillingness—of the colonial government to distinguish 
between active Mau Mau fighters and those swept into the net by dint of fear and vulnerability 
fundamentally weakened the counter-insurgency campaign” (Anderson 2005, 219).  
Colonial coercion, focused on the physical, economic, and societal security of the Kikuyu 
as a whole, rather than specifically on the Mau Mau, ensured a growing number of radicalized 
individuals, and the forests offered a safe haven from which to plan and stage attacks. Had the 
persecution been less severe, the rebel capacity in terms of manpower might never have reached 
the levels that it did. The influx of recruits into the forests continued throughout this time period. 
New recruits came in not only to escape colonial persecution, but now also to escape the actions 
of the indigenous Home Guard units.   
These Home Guard units were designed to increase the state’s capacity to administer, 
protect, and isolate loyalist Kikuyu from the Mau Mau. The origins of the Home Guards lie in 
Kikuyu resistance movements formed to combat the Mau Mau. These ad hoc groups, comprised 
of loyalist or non-aligned Kikuyu, had existed unofficially prior to the emergency. The decision 
to mobilize these groups into militias was taken by the colonial administration in November 
1952, and less than a month later recruitment into the Home Guards was well underway 
(Anderson 2005, 240-241). By March of 1953, there were over 18,000 Home Guard personnel 
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(Branch 2005, 83-84). The Home Guard were typically organized alongside local power 
structures, with the chief of a community also serving as the leader of the Home Guard unit.  
Despite being organized to combat Mau Mau violence, the Home Guards were 
responsible for large-scale violence against not only committed Kikuyu but also to any political 
challengers seen as a threat by the Home Guard leaders; it was not uncommon for the Home 
Guards to settle scores with other non-aligned or loyalist Kikuyu that had nothing to do with the 
Mau Mau (Anderson 2005). While, as Kalyvas (2006) points out, such hyperlocal, non-conflict-
related score-settling is common in intrastate conflict, the abuses of the Home Guard had a 
further repercussion in that Home Guard actions led many to take refuge from their persecution 
by fleeing to the forests and joining the Mau Mau (Anderson 2005).   
With the steady flow of recruits into the safe haven of the forests, the Mau Mau now had 
the personnel to undertake activities. What the Mau Mau lacked, however, was better 
organization. This organization gradually occurred, as the Mau Mau formed ‘gangs’ around 
specific rebel leaders, such as General China, Stanley Mathenge, and Dedan Kimathi. The 
leaders were responsible for the activities and support of their gang, and each leader had a 
general geographic region within the forests as a basing area. While rebel leaders could and did 
communicate with each other, coordination between gangs was not high (Jackson, Jr. 2003, 179-
185). Nevertheless, coalescence around rebel leaders allowed the Mau Mau to more effectively 
carry out activities. During this time, the attacks staged by the Mau Mau shifted from a focus on 
civilians, notably European settlers and loyalist Kikuyu, to security force units such as the Home 
Guard, police, and army (Jackson, Jr. 2003, 179-185; Branch 2009).    
Thus, by the spring of 1953, both sides were embroiled in a conflict neither had originally 
been particularly well prepared for, though both sides had spent the last year rapidly developing 
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capacity. The colonial forces were struggling with developing intelligence on the Mau Mau, as 
well as undertaking police and military actions and setting up the Kikuyu loyalist Home Guards. 
In the forests, the Mau Mau were organizing themselves into a structure able to withstand the 
increased attention from Kenyan security forces whilst still carrying out violent actions.  
 The Civil War Campaign, March 1953 – October 1956   
The precise date of the transition from insurgent to civil war campaign by the Mau Mau 
is typically marked by a terrorist attack on the community of Lari in March 1953. This attack 
offers an instance of the problematic nature of categorizing events, rather than campaigns, of 
violence. Analyzed in isolation, the attack targeted civilians and was certainly intended to send a 
larger political message to loyalist Kikuyu; it was a terrorist action. Yet, in the context of the 
Mau Mau rebellion, this terrorist event may have actually marked the start of a full-scale civil 
war campaign (Anderson 2005). In mid-1953, the capacity building done by both rebel and state, 
while operations were ongoing, had come to fruition. Both sides now had the fighters and the 
administrative capacity to wage civil war (Bennett 2013). Though there are not good records on 
the Mau Mau side, Kenyan government forces were engaged in “almost continuous attacks” for 
much of mid-1953 on” (Bennett 2013, 20-27). In response to the continued violence in Kenya, in 
June of 1953 General Sir George Erskine was sent in as the new General Officer Commanding, 
East Africa Command. Erskine would be in charge of colonial state’s response to the Mau Mau.  
I argue that 1953 marked the start of the heightened civil war violence. Under Erskine’s 
command, military operations in the reserves and forests increased in intensity, size, and scope, 
leading to an ongoing series of battles between the two combatants. In September, the arrival of 
additional British Army units provided reinforcement and additional capability for operations. 
British Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft also arrived, and provided an new means of access to the 
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Mau Mau in the forests; “because the army was preoccupied with providing security in the 
reserves until January 1955, [the RAF] was the only service capable of both psychologically 
influencing and inflicting considerable casualties on the Mau Mau in Kenya’s vast, inaccessible 
forests” (Chappell 2011, 64). The effect of the increase in military personnel numbers and 
operations meant that the Mau Mau were pushed deeper into the forest, and faced increasing 
difficulty in both staging attacks from the forest and maintaining lines of communication and 
supply from the reserves (Bennet 2013:20-23).   
Perhaps more importantly, Erskine knew that a military-only solution to the conflict 
would not be enough, and, while he did improve the military tactics and intelligence gathering, 
Erskine also worked with the European elites and civilian administration to craft a political 
strategy. Erskine is generally credited with having a better understanding of the rebellion than his 
predecessor, since “[w]hatever previous politicos might have wanted to call the crisis, Erskine 
knew this was a rebellion; and he knew that unless it was fought as professionally as any other 
campaign it would not be defeated. Counter-insurgency tactics were required, and there would 
have to be political concessions as well as military successes” (Anderson 2005, 285). These 
political concessions consisted, in the main, of the proposals of the Swynnerton plan, a land-
reform effort that at least in part addressed the primary grievance that had led to the start of the 
Emergency.  
The year 1953 also saw the start of development of the Swynnerton Plan, an effort to, at 
least minimally, address the political question of indigenous land ownership rights. Developed 
by a Kenyan Department of Agriculture official, Roger Swynnerton, the Swynnerton Plan was a 
reversal previous of land-ownership and production policies for indigenous peoples in Kenya. It 
was not, however, any sort of plan for decolonialization. Rather, its focus was on ending the 
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conflict in the colony and stabilizing the colony (Percox 1998). The focus of the Swynnerton 
Plan was a land redistribution policy, whereby the scattered, tiny holdings of the indigenous 
population would be consolidated—a process helped by the massive Pipeline and later 
villagisation efforts which removed the indigenous population from their lands. Holdings of land 
would then be consolidated and distributed to loyalist Kikuyu, and these loyalists would be 
allowed to grow cash crops, which had been previously prohibited (Harbeson 1971). While 
benefitting some loyalists, the land redistribution policies actually served to disenfranchise and 
permanize the landlessness of Kikuyu tenant farmers—approximately one-third of the Kikuyu 
peoples—who were expected to become craftsman, instead (Odhiambo 1995). The Swynnerton 
Plan was thus not a direct or fair response to the political grievances of the Mau Mau; “convicted 
Mau Mau rebels were usually excluded from land re-allocations and many others were unfairly 
treated in the distribution of holdings decided by the local land committees” (Anderson 2005, 
294).  
The actions taken by Erskine in this year would set up the colonial administration for the 
ultimate suppression of the rebellion. These programs included the introduction of more military 
and police personnel; the increase in operations intended to separate the forest rebels from supply 
lines; the organization and expansion of the detainment, interrogation, work camp, and 
imprisonment system; and the development of a limited land-ownership reform plan.   
While the colonial administration had been screening, detaining, and arresting suspected 
Mau Mau sympathizers since before the declaration of the Emergency, the prison system in 
Kenya was vastly expanded during the Emergency. The bar for evidence required to be detained 
or arrested was extremely low, and civil rights violations were omnipresent. Once detained, 
indigenous peoples were sorted into and held in various prison and work camps. In the camps, 
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assault, torture, and forced labor were ubiquitous. This system of detainment, arrest, 
imprisonment and forced labor would come to be known as the Pipeline; the massive size of the 
Pipeline, and the sheer numbers of people it processed, demonstrated the huge administrative and 
bureaucratic capacity that could be mustered by the colonial administration and its imperial 
backer (Anderson 2005, 311-327).  
In contrast to the organization of the colonial forces, the Mau Mau rebels were hindered 
by internal conflict over command and control issues. There were two major forested areas that 
the rebels operated in. In the Mount Kenya forests, the three main gang leaders managed to 
operate with some communication, but each gang answered to its own leader. One scholar 
attributes the better command and control in this region to the previous British military 
experience of one of the leaders, General China. In the Aberdares forests, however, eight 
different gang leaders jockied for preeminance. In August of 1953, one of the Aberdares leaders, 
Dedan Kimathi, proclaimed himself to be the supreme commander of the Mau Mau, but this was 
not accepted by all of the other eight leaders, and led to serious rifts between the gangs 
(Anderson 2005, 248-249).  
1954 saw the further development of the political and military programs instituted in 
1953. Military operations continued apace, and the Home Guard units grew in size and efficacy. 
The Pipeline, now fully operational, continued to detain and incarcerate thousands of Kikuyu. In 
addition, 1954 saw the introduction of further measures to isolate the Mau Mau, and the growth 
of the colonial intelligence service.   
In June of 1954, a villagisation program in the reserves was announced. This program 
forced the relocation of indigenous peoples in the reserves from scattered farmsteads and 
settlements into villages that resembled armed camps. Villagisation of the scattered settlements 
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of Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu proceeded throughout 1954, with all of the major districts 
completed by August (Elkins 2005, 234-235; Newsinger 1981, 176). This forced population 
consolidation had serious downsides; overcrowding led to malnourishment and widespread 
disease, and residents of the villages were often forced to labor on infrastructure projects. On the 
other hand, villigisation, though unpopular with the indigenous peoples, did help the Home 
Guard and Kenyan security forces to better provide security from Mau Mau attacks. This 
security enabled—or forced—those Kikuyu who had previously been supporting the Mau Mau to 
stop working with the rebels, increasing the isolation of the Mau Mau units in the forest (Bennett 
2013).  
In addition to working to isolate the Mau Mau from their support lines in the reserves, in 
April of 1954 a major operation was staged in the capital city of Nairobi. Operation Anvil 
quarantined the city, swept it for Mau Mau, and succeeded in drastically reducing the flow of 
recruits, funding, and war material from the city to the Mau Mau (Furedi 1973). This operation 
served a major blow to the capacity of the Mau Mau by shutting off a key support line (Branch 
2009:104). General Erskine later remarked that this operation was “the turning point in the 
Emergency” (Erskine 1955). The operation in Nairobi also resulted in a massive wave of new 
detainees in the Pipeline. By December of 1954 there were over 71,000 in confinement. Official 
British figures estimated that one-eighth of Kikuyu males were located within the Pipeline 
(Anderson 2005, 313).  
While the isolation measures sought to remove support from reaching the Mau Mau, 
intelligence efforts attempted to identify and locate the Mau Mau in the forests. In April of 1954, 
in a coup for the intelligence services, General China, one of the Mau Mau leaders, was captured 
and successfully interrogated, providing a wealth of information (Anderson 2005, 232-235). The 
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capture of General China, in combination with a May 1954 restructuring and expansion of the 
military’s intelligence capabilities, led to increased coordination with the police Special Branch 
and improved intelligence on the Mau Mau (Bennett 2013, 18-19). In addition to intelligence 
collection, ‘pseudo gangs,’ groups of captured turncoat Mau Mau that were sent back into the 
forest, offered an effective means of going after the rebel gangs and their leaders (Anderson 
2005, 285-286).   
As the year drew to a close, the Mau Mau found themselves increasingly isolated from 
support: 
By the end of 1954 the combination of military operations and villagisation had largely 
driven the Mau Mau out of the Reserves, inflicted heavy casualites and prevented access 
to logistical and manpower reinforcements. Ther rebels found themselves mainly 
confined to the forests of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya. Not only did the security 
forces manage to inflict losses of over 600 per month on the Mau Mau between October 
and December, but the operational intelligence situation greatly improved. (Bennett 2013, 
26)  
 
While 1954 saw gains by the colonial administration, the Mau Mau rebels still retained 
their forest safe havens. Therefore, the main thrust of the colonial administration in 1955 focused 
on reducing these safe havens though a series of large military sweeps through the forests. The 
last major offensive, a massive sweep in July of 1955, broke up the remaining gangs, leaving 
only remnants in the forests. From the the latter half of 1955 to October of 1956, smaller special-
forces style units worked in the forest to track down remaining Mau Mau; large-scale operations 
were no longer necessary at this point. Dedan Kimathi, the last prominent rebel leader, was 
captured on 21 October 1956, and all forest operations ended a few weeks later (Bennett 2013; 
Anderson 2005).  
1956 saw an end to the active Mau Mau rebellion, but those who had been fighting the 
rebels did not think the problem had been resolved. Lieutenant General Lathbury, General 
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Erskine’s successor, wrote that he had “no illusions about the future. Mau Mau has not been 
cured: it has been suppressed. The thousands who have spent a long time in detention must have 
been embittered by it. Nationalism is still a very potent force and the African will pursue his aim 
by other means” (Lathbury 1955).  
As with earlier phases of the conflict, during the civil war campaign the rebels of the Mau 
Mau did have not have to look very hard to find evidence of widespread and severe state 
coercion. The Pipeline system of detainment, imprisonment, and forced labor proccessed an 
immense amount of the Kikuyu population. Within this system, abuses were so widespread that 
one scholar referred to it as ‘Britain’s Gulag’ (Elkins 2010). The villagisation scheme, while it 
did eventually improve security for those located inside the fortified villages, also disrupted the 
traditional system of Kikuyu society. The Swynnerton Plan for land redistribution and 
production further affected societal and economic security by empowering some indigenous 
loyalists whilst simultaneously permanently disenfranching approximately a third of all Kikuyu.  
However, even though coercion was widespread, with the gradually improving 
intelligence on the rebels coercive activity was at least somewhat more likely to be focused upon 
Mau Mau rebels or sympathizers. Correspondingly, incentives increased for those Kikuyu who 
were considered to be loyalist. While the combination of harsh punishment for rebels and 
rewards for loyalists served to help smother the flames of the rebellion, even this very intense 
coercion was not enough to put out the embers, as those intimately involved in fighting the Mau 
Mau understood.   
The scale of coercive action undertaken by the state was enabled by the high level of the 
colonial Kenyan administration. The creation and expansion of the Pipeline required a fair 
amount of administration, as did the system of villagisation. The Sywnnerton Plan required a 
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complete overhaul of land redistribution. This effort included assessments of who originally 
owned what piece of land, the location and size of the new consolidatied holding, the selection of 
the loyalist who would be granted the new holding, and the associated paperwork involved with 
all of the above. The Swynnerton plan would not have been possible without a highly 
functioning bureaucracy.     
In combination with high state administrative capacity, the colonial administration 
oversaw an increase in military and police capacity during the civil war campaign years. The 
increase in British military ground forces and the introduction of aerial forces were critical in 
securing the reserves and penetrating into rebel strongholds in the forests. The vast increase in 
Home Guard units, in combination with the villagisation program, meant fewer villages which 
grew more and more secure from Mau Mau attacks as the conflict progressed. Military and 
police intelligence also improved dramatically with the capture of General China and the 
creation of effective pseudo gangs.   
In contrast to the very high levels of state capacity by the end of the rebellion, rebel 
capacity peaked and then decreased as the conflict wrapped up. While military ‘mopping up’ 
actions against the rebels were necessary to ultimately defeat the gangs, the destruction of the 
supply and communication lines between the forests and the reserves and Nairobi crippled the 
capacity of the Mau Mau. Separated from the population, the Mau Mau experienced increasing 
scarcities of intelligence, food, war material and new recruits. Without the ability to replenish 
these items, the Mau Mau fought a losing battle against a foe whose supply lines were never 
threatened. The loss of new recruits, in combination with the casualties from ongoing skirmishes 
with the colonial forces meant that the numbers of Mau Mau personnel were steadily decreasing 
from about 1954 on.   
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The rebels also lost the battle for public support. In part, this was due to their own 
actions, as the massacre at Lari provoked outrage among the Kikuyu population. Some of those 
who were in agreement with the political goals of the Mau Mau felt that such violence in pursuit 
of those goals was unacceptable.  In addition, the rewards available to loyalists and severe 
punishments meted out to rebel sympathizers made it harder for sympathizers to continue to 
provide support to the Mau Mau. By late 1954, Mau Mau popular support was in decline across 
all of Kenya; one scholar describes it as “a tangible difference in public attitude” (Branch 2009, 
94). With their supply lines cut, their safe haven invaded, and their popular support decreasing, 
the overall effectiveness of the Mau Mau also decreased. Indeed, it is perhaps a testament to the 
ability of the Mau Mau that, though the initial implementation of the military and civilian 
programs which would ultimately lead to the end of the rebellion were instituted in 1953, the 
rebellion itself would last until 1956.     
 The Mau Mau Rebellion: Implications  
At the start of the Kenya Emergency, state capacity was much greater than rebel capacity. 
This, in part, appears to support this project’s hypothesis that terrorist campaigns are more likely 
when state capacity is high. The onset of the Mau Mau rebellion marks something that in 
hindsight appears obvious; the growing Kikuyu dissatisfaction with the status quo in post-World 
War II Kenya combined with a land scarcity that threatened not only the economic but also the 
societal security of a large number of Kikuyu. The coercive actions of the state predate the 
eruption of rebellion, in line with this project’s hypotheses which posits that grievances are far 
more important than capacity at onset. 
Because the state had such capacity, it was able to implement broad-scale coercive 
actions that affected vast swaths of Kikuyu. The massive evictions and resettlement programs, 
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alongside widescale detention, imprisonment, and torture, all provided grievances that served to 
encourage aggrieved Kikuyu to radicalize. However, state capacity also served to eventually 
destroy the rebellion. The colonial administration’s intelligence on the Mau Mau, initially 
miniscule, was grown into a potent force. Effective, though not necessarily humane or legitimate, 
bureaucracy enabled the implementation of resettlement villages, work camps, and prisons. In 
this light, state capacity, both bureaucratic and military, does appear to have a dampening effect 
on the later stages of the Mau Mau rebellion.  
Yet, even the broad-scale imprisonment and military defeat of the Mau Mau was not 
enough to ultimately stop the movement towards greater indigenous rights. By 1954, the 
sprawling incarceration system had over 52,000 Kikuyu detainees (Elkins 2010, 131). As 
General Erskine noted, these efforts were not enough to end indigenous rebellion in Kenya, they 
rather served only to suppress it: “Mau Mau is not like a town riot which can be brought under 
control by a show of force… Unless we deal with the fundamental causes which allowed Mau 
Mau to grow up and prosper we shall get further trouble in a different form” (Erskine 1953).   
Thus, this case study begs the question: can coercive action alone ever truly end a 
rebellion? Even given the huge capacity overmatch the colonial administration enjoyed over the 
Mau Mau, this does not appear to be the case in Kenya. For those in the colonial administration 
who understood that the grievances which had sparked the rebellion were still unanswered, the 
end of the Mau Mau did not mean the end of nationalist violence; the administration had 
achieved suppression but not resolution.  
Rebel capacity, on the other hand, was initially not that high—though there was enough 
capacity that the group could stage attacks—and the Mau Mau struggled to keep supply and 
information lines open during the course of the conflict. In the opening years of the conflict, 
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rebel intelligence was far superior to that of the colonial administration, but this overmatch was 
gradually reduced due to the bureaucratic effectiveness of the state. Rebel bureaucratic 
effectiveness was never high, and the rebels formed into gangs that were only loosely associated 
with one another. Attempts by rebel leaders to consolidate power led to intra-group friction and 
were mostly unsuccessful. The resulting Mau Mau organization structure meant that several 
rebel leaders had to be separately defeated, but also that there was no effective centralized 
control which might have been better able to counter colonial moves or drive overall strategy. 
The forested safe havens offered an advantage at the start of the rebellion, but an effective 
cordon around the safe havens, as well as the villigasation of the reserves, resulted in increasing 
isolation of the Mau Mau fighters. Lacking external supporters, the Mau Mau had no alternative 
sources of support, so when the population either chose or was forced to support the colonial 
administration, the Mau Mau lost significant capacity. In this case study, the hypotheses that 
rebel capacity is likely lower when rebels choose terrorist campaigns, moderate when rebels 
choose insurgent campaigns, and higher when rebels choose civil war campaigns appears to be 
mostly supported. However, it is worth noting that as the rebellion ended, rebel capacity dropped 
precipitously. Such a capacity drop, however, was the predecessor to the end of the rebel group 
as an organization.  
The Kenyan Emergency lasted about five years, from 1952-1956. Yet repercussions from 
the Emergency, most notably the political organization of indigenous Kenyans and the political 
concessions in agricultural and legislative affairs they gained as a result of the Emergency, 
would have lasting effects past the violence. Seven years after the end of the Emergency, under 
the Independence Act of 1963, Kenya became an independent country. Even though the land-
rights concessions generated by the Swynnerton Plan during the Emergency were focused on 
216 
rewarding loyalist indigenous peoples, this limited enfranchisement would eventually lead to 
calls for a more generalized enfranchisement of indigenous Kenyans. The Mau Mau lost in the 
short term, but their objectives were realized less than a decade after their defeat. As Percox 
(2003, 122) notes, the decolonization “policy reversal came a good two years after the apparent 
defeat of the Mau Mau forest fighters” yet, had the Mau Mau not undertaken their rebellion, 
Kenya would have probably remained a colony until 1975. 
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Chapter 8 - Case Study: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
As with Chapter 7, Chapter 8 follows the research methodology of the structured, focused 
case study outlined by George and Bennet (2005). Chapter 8 examines the case of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conflict in Sri Lanka, and asks the following questions:  
 How did the coercive action of the state—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel 
campaign onset and evolution? 
 How did state administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—
affect rebel campaign onset and evolution? 
 How did rebel administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—
affect rebel campaign onset and evolution?   
An analysis of these questions shows that, even in a very different historical context from that 
examined in the last chapter, coercion and capacity affect the strategic calculations of the actors 
in similar ways.  
As with Chapter 7, Chapter 8 is organized into four sections, which provide an overview 
of how the conflict arose, a more in-depth look at how coercion, state capacity, and rebel 
capacity influenced conflict onset and campaign evolution, and a summation of the significance 
of the case study to the hypotheses proposed by this project.     
 Overview: The LTTE Rebellion in Sri Lanka  
When the British arrived in the 18th century, the island of Ceylon already had a long 
history of conquest, kingdoms, and colonialism. Situated off the southern tip of India, the island 
had numerous South Asian ethnolinguistic groups dating to various invasions and kingdoms. 
Previously partially colonized under the Portuguese, and then the Netherlands, the British 
occupied the Dutch colony in 1796, officially took ownership of the colony in 1802, and then 
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took over the non-colonized parts of the island, known as the Kingdom of Kandy, via military 
force in 1815. By the time of British colonization, the Tamils and Sinhalese had already both 
been on the island of Sri Lanka for thousands of years. These two ethnic groups tended, though 
not exclusively, to follow different religions; the Tamils were mostly Hindu, and the Sinhalese, 
mostly Buddhist (de Silva 1981; Marks 2007, 485-486).   
The Sinhalese were the majority on the island, comprising approximately 80 percent of 
the total population. The Tamils were a minority at 17 percent, but retained cultural and 
economic ties to the millions of their co-ethnics in southern India (Marks 2007, 485-486). The 
Tamils could be further divided into two groups. The indigenous Tamils were located mostly in 
the northern and eastern sections of Sri Lanka, as well as the capital city of Colombo. The Indian 
Tamils, more recent immigrants to the island, had been brought over to labor on the colonial tea 
and rubber plantations in the central Hill Country (de Silva 1981).  During the British colonial 
period, from 1815-1948, English-language education via state and missionary schools was the 
best path to secure civil service and white-collar employment. Yet the English-language primary 
and secondary schools were heavily concentrated in Tamil areas of the island, and Tamils were 
also disproportionately represented at universities. These educational attainments meant that 
Tamils were more likely to have professional success, so much so that, “by the time Ceylon 
gained independence, all major civil services and military were dominated by Tamils” (Hashim 
2013, 59). The majority Sinhalese were correspondingly underrepresented in education and the 
government. While Tamils were definitely overrepresented, a small elite, comprised of both 
Sinhalese and Tamil leading families, were active in the colony’s governance, while the majority 
of the indigenous population was completely disenfranchised (de Silva 1981).  
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When Ceylon was granted independence in 1948, the political order was changed 
drastically. The British-advised Soulbury Constitution, implemented upon Sri Lankan 
independence from British rule, provided for a universal suffrage, a move that would make 
politics in Sri Lanka dictated by majoritarian rule (de Silva 1981). The Constitution contained 
only one safeguard for minority rights, Section 29. Section 29(2)(b) and (c) stated that 
Parliament could not restrict or privilege “persons of any community or religion” (de Silva 1981, 
511-512). Unfortunately, Section 29 would prove no match for the exigencies of xenophobic 
political parties.  
While the Sinhalese and Tamil elite continued, at first, to govern peacefully, the desire 
for increased political power, in combination with the new enfranchisement of Ceylon’s 
population, eventually led to the involvement and manipulation, of the population in an effort to 
further the political power of Sinhalese-based parties. This occurred, at least in part, because due 
to demographics on the island the promotion of universal suffrage strongly favored the Sinhalese 
majority (Hashim 2013, 64). In order to encourage Sinhalese voter support, some Sri Lankan 
politicians attacked the long-standing overrepresentation of Tamils in sectors of Sri Lankan 
society, and embarked on a policy of discriminatory practices towards Tamil speakers. While 
these policies were supposedly created in order to rectify the imbalance in Tamil-Sinhalese 
opportunities instituted by the British, they quickly devolved into retributive practices which 
systematically disenfranchised Tamils (Marks 2007, 485-486).  
Further complicating the situation were the geopolitical mindsets of each group. The 
Tamils saw themselves as a minority on the island of Sri Lanka, persecuted by the Sinhalese 
majority. The Sinhalese, however, were quite aware of the millions of co-ethnic Tamils living 
just across the Palk Straits in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Sinhalese also saw 
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themselves as the minority, with hostile Tamils both on the island and poised for attack in nearby 
India. This led to a situation one historian described as “the unusual situation of the majority in 
the country subscribing to a deeply ingrained minority complex and acting as if the whole 
country were its sole preserve” (Hashim 2013, 17).  
Sinhalese domination of Ceylon’s political sphere continued apace, year after year. In 
1956, the Official Language Act No. 33 instituted Sinhalese as the only official language in 
Ceylon. This, unsurprisingly, provoked Tamil protests and riots. The year 1957 saw an 
agreement, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, on regional autonomy for the Tamil northern 
and eastern provinces. However, the failure to implement the Pact in 1958 led to further Tamil 
riots, and, in 1959, a Sinhalese Buddhist monk assassinated Bandaranaike. In 1965, the Dudley 
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, which was to increase Tamil language rights, remained 
unimplemented due to Sinhalese political pressure. In 1971, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP), a radical communist and ethnocentric Sinhalese movement that was strongly anti-Tamil, 
staged an armed revolt against the government that failed, but led to approximately 6,000 deaths. 
In 1972, the new Republican Constitution was instituted, changing the name of Ceylon to ‘Sri 
Lanka,’ which referenced an ancient Sinhalese name for the island. The Constitution reinforced 
several discriminatory policies against Tamils, including that of university admissions (O’Duffy 
2007; Hoffman 2006).   
In May 1978, the LTTE and other Tamil resistance organizations were proscribed by 
Perhaps the most important piece of legislation in the conflict, passed in July 1979, was the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. Initially a temporary measure, the Act was made permanent in 
1982 and is still in effect at the time of the writing of this case study. This Act provided the 
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police the ability to arrest suspects without a warrant and to detain them for up to 18 months 
(Marks 2007, 488; Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1979).  
The economic situation in Sri Lanka reached a crisis stage in the 1970s, as the 
government was unable to meet the obligations of consistently expanding socialist policies. The 
historian Ahmed Hashim sums up the bleak situation facing Sri Lanka, noting, “[t]he nation was 
bankrupt, and by the end of the 1970s around 25 percent of the population, irrespective of ethnic 
or religious origin was unemployed. The Sinhalese blamed the Tamils and vice versa” (Hashim 
2013, 77-78). 
While educational opportunities for Sri Lankans had been expanded post-independence, 
this expansion did not keep pace with the population growth. Ironically, the increased 
opportunities in education led more Sinhalese and Tamil students to compete for, and feel 
entitled to, postsecondary education. This increased expectation of education far outpaced the 
increase in available seats at educational institutions (Kearney 1975). 
Expectation surpassed supply following graduation, as well; even those youths who did 
get into a university were not guaranteed employment, as the increase in the number of 
university graduates was far greater than the number of available employment opportunities. 
This led to a growing number of educated, under- or unemployed youths who faced a 
challenging post-university environment (Kearney 1975). In the face of such heightened 
competition both for education and employment, the disenfranchisement of Tamils was 
particularly pointed. While in the past Tamils had received preferential treatment, the pro-
Sinhalese policies reversed that trend, and started what amounted to an affirmative action policy 
whereby the number of Sinhalese receiving spots was related to their percentage as a population, 
not their test scores.   
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A number of Tamil student groups formed in the 1970s to protest what they viewed as 
discriminatory practices. Most members of these groups had participated at some point in either 
the Tamil Youth Movement, the youth wing of the Federal Party, or the Tamil Student Union, 
the student wing of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Both the Federal Party and the 
TULF were legitimate, legally-recognized pro-Tamil political parties, but the radicalization of 
the younger members of these parties was common; it was from these organizations that an 
“entire strand of Tamil guerilla activity was nurtured and fostered” (Samaranayaka 2008, 216).   
In the early 1970s, one radical group, the Tamil Student Movement, became particularly 
well known for political acts that included arson and vandalism. The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) 
broke away the Tamil Student Movement in 1974. Following the split, the TNT quickly became 
known as one of the more extremist student groups. The TNT was established “for the purpose 
of silencing pro-government Tamils, eliminating Tamil police informants and their Sinhalese 
police handlers, and staging armed demonstrations against the Sinhalese government” (Hoffman 
2006, 139). Most notably, the TNT assassinated the mayor of Jaffna, a major Tamil city, in 1975. 
When the original leader of the TNT was arrested in 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the second-
in-command, assumed leadership of the organization and renamed it the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Samaranayaka 2008; Hoffman 2006). As the 1970s drew to a close, the 
LTTE under the leadership of Prabhakaran had become “the preeminent political and military 
force within the Tamil community (Hoffman 2006, 139).”     
 The Onset of the LTTE Rebellion  
While the LTTE did undertake a few violent attacks in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
start of the LTTE rebellion is generally dated to July 1983, when they killed 13 Sri Lankan Army 
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personnel in an ambush. The attack sparked widespread rioting and the onset of greater 
hostilities.     
 Coercion  
The increasing discrimination of the Tamil ethnic group from the end of colonization up 
into the 1980s produced a great deal of resentment in the Tamil population. While some 
rebalancing was perhaps necessary, given the preferential treatment Tamils received under 
British rule, the Ceylon government was unable to assure the Tamils that their rights as a 
minority group would be protected. The massive population growth post-independence led to a 
greater scarcity of educational and employment opportunities overall, and the combination of 
greater competition and discriminatory treatment led to powerful Tamil grievances against the 
state. The old guard political elite, comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese, attempted to develop 
different pacts that would have reaffirmed minority rights on the island, but these attempts were 
unsuccessful due to political pressure from the newly enfranchised Sinhalese majority. The 
Sinhalese-only language policy further served to remove Tamils from civil and military service. 
Thus, the Tamils increasingly faced a situation where their political, economic, and societal 
rights were threatened.  
The Vaddukkoaddai Resolution, the TULF response to the implementation of the 1972 
Constitution, lays out in no uncertain terms how the Tamils felt:  
The Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the 
new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped 
to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language, citizenship, economic life, 
opportunities of employment and education, thereby destroying all the attributes of 
nationhood of the Tamil people. (Tamil United Liberation Front 1976)    
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 State Capacity  
Upon independence from British rule in 1948, Ceylon appeared to be set up for success; 
it “was by far the most prosperous country in South Asia, and much more prosperous than most 
other Asian countries. Per capita income was a fifth higher than the south Asian average” (Sally 
2006, 3). The indigenous component of the civil service was well developed under colonization, 
but the policy goals of post-independence Ceylon were unsustainable. Welfare state politics, 
while wildly popular with the voting public, required increasing amounts of state funding, and 
eventually led to the bankruptcy of the government. In the scarcity environment, politicians and 
the public bought into a blaming of the ‘other’—the Tamils blamed the Sinhalese, and the 
Sinhalese blamed the Tamils (Hashim 2013, 76). This led to an increasingly factionalized state, 
where compromise was unacceptable. This factionalization drastically limited the ability of the 
government to implement policies that would have decreased tensions between the ethnic 
groups.  
Militarily, the Sri Lankan security forces were ill-prepared; “[t]he armed forces of Sri 
Lanka were small, ill-equipped and ill-conditioned for a counter-insurgency role” (O’Ballance 
1989, 28). In 1971, for a population of 12.5 million, there were 10,605 police, 6,578 army, 1,718 
navy, and 1,397 air force personnel (Marks 2007, 486-487). Both the military and the police 
were further hamstrung in their efforts to control Tamil areas by the fact that, due to the 1956 
Official Language Act, the vast majority of security personnel, including those in the intelligence 
branches, spoke Sinhalese and not Tamil (O’Ballance 1989, 29). By the time of the LTTE’s 
attack in July 1983, less than 5 percent of the military was Tamil (Tambiah 1986, 15).     
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 Rebel Capacity  
Widespread Tamil discrimination, the impotence of moderate Tamil politicians to affect 
the political behavior of the state, and a large number of underemployed, radicalized youths 
meant that mobilization for Tamil rebel groups was widespread. One scholar estimates that there 
were over thirty different Tamil extremist groups in the late 1970s (Gunaratna 1987, 27). Initially 
a group of radicalized students, the LTTE distinguished itself from other rebel groups by a 
commitment to professionalism, discipline, and ruthlessness. The LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran, 
also insisted on a tightly controlled, hierarchical command structure; the result was a well-
organized, highly committed group (Hoffman 2006, O’Duffy 2007).   
While the numbers of the LTTE are not well established at this point, more general 
estimates of Tamil ‘terrorists’ by the Sri Lankan police placed that number at 200 in 1983, with a 
growth to somewhere between 5,000 to 10,000 by 1984 (Marks 2007, 483). Though Sri Lankan 
police figures are a problematic source due to the probable anti-Tamil bias, they at least illustrate 
the establishment concern with the rapid growth of the potentially radical Tamil nationalist 
cause. As Marks (2007, 482) points out, “The significance of the number, whether five thousand 
or ten thousand, lay in the fact that until Sri Lanka could mobilize its manpower pool, the 
combined insurgents matched, if not exceeded, the strength of the army.”  
The presence of a mobilized support base in the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka meant that 
financing and other support for the LTTE could easily be accessed. Furthermore, the Tamil-
dominated eastern and northern provinces provided, if not a complete safe haven, at least large 
areas of relative safety in which to plan and train. The Indian state of Tamil Nadu also provided 
safe haven for militant Tamils. Located just across the Palk Straits, the sympathetic co-ethnic 
population offered money and support (Furtado 2007, 74).    
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 Campaign Choices During the LTTE Rebellion  
Lasting for over twenty-five years, the LTTE rebellion is commonly organized into a 
number of ‘wars.’ Summarized below, these periods of higher and lesser conflict tended to be 
punctuated by attempts at negotiation, none of which were successful. The ebbs and flows of 
violence in this long-running conflict have direct relationships to the coercion and capacity of the 
actors, as described below.    
 Eelam War I, 1983-1989  
Eelam War I, from 1983 to 1989, marks the first shift to higher levels of violence, though 
by this point, as described above, the LTTE had been undertaking sporadic terrorist attacks for a 
number of years. The LTTE burst onto the national stage with a quite literal bang in 1983, by 
attacking a Sri Lankan Army patrol and killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers. Underscoring the deep 
grievances and distrust already present in Sri Lankan society, this attack let to organized, and 
probably state-supported, anti-Tamil riots across Sri Lanka which, in the course of two weeks, 
killed somewhere between 400-2,000 Tamils and destroyed many more Tamil homes and 
businesses (Hashim 2013, 88; Hoffman 2006, 139-140). Off and running following the 1983 
ambush, the LTTE’s insurgent campaign increased in intensity in 1984, where an August 
offensive saw the LTTE “began operating in larger groups and making sustained attacks” 
(O’Ballance 1989, 41). Thus, by the start of the officially recognized Eelam War I, I argue, the 
LTTE already had obtained enough recruits and capacity to stage attacks (notably ambushes) on 
government forces, as opposed to only targeting civilians. They also had what at the moment was 
a sympathetic area in the Tamil regions in Sri Lanka, which would later grow into a safe haven, 
and eventually their own Tamil proto-state. 
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The LTTE committed their first massacres of civilian Sinhalese in November 1984 and 
again in May 1985. An attempt at peace talks in Bhutan in 1985 proved unsuccessful, and 
fighting continued (Alexander 2006, 155). Tamil support for resistance remained strong. By 
1986, one scholar estimates that, in the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna, 70% of Tamil youth belonged 
to one of the Tamil rebel organizations (O’Ballance 1989, 60).   
In 1987, India, exerting a high level of diplomatic pressure, arranged a ceasefire; an 
agreement, the Peace Accord, on devolution of power in the north and east of Sri Lanka; and the 
reintroduction of Tamil as a national language. In addition to these measures, India attempted to 
guarantee the peace by sending in the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to replace the 
predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan Army forces stationed in Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan 
government, while it accepted the plan, was not overly enthused, rather, “[a] main factor in 
persuading [President of Sri Lanka] Jayawardene to accept the Peace Accord so tamely was that 
his armed forces were too weak to beat Tamil insurgents into surrender” (O’Ballance 1989, 92).  
Unfortunately, the introduction of the IPKF to Sri Lanka provided a common enemy that 
generated what must have been an uncomfortable arrangement between the LTTE, the Sri 
Lankan government, and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Sinhalese-nationalist 
extremist group. The LTTE, suspicious of India’s interference, soon began to attack the IPKF. 
The Sri Lankan government hoped to use the IPKF presence in the north as a means by which it 
could reallocate its own forces south to face the JVP rebels. However, the JVP was able to 
withstand the increase in Sri Lankan focus, and soon this ultra-nationalist group was threatening 
the government itself. While the xenophobic JVP hated both the Tamils and the Indians, it 
decided that the Indians were the primary threat, and focused its efforts on pressuring—to the 
point of threatening a takeover of—the government of Sri Lanka in order to force the removal of 
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Indian troops. In order to calm the Sinhalese majority that supported the JVP, the Sri Lankan 
government began covertly arming the LTTE, in the hopes that the LTTE could attrit the IPKF 
forces to the point that political considerations would force India to recall them (Hashim 2013, 
88-98).   
Further complicating issues, the LTTE had for the past few years been undertaking 
training in Tamil Nadu sponsored by India’s intelligence agency. India had provided the support 
in order to attempt to have some control over the actions of the LTTE, and to politically appease 
ethnic Tamil Indians (Furtado 2007, 73-74). By 1987, approximately 20,000 Tamil rebels had 
participated in Indian training (Hashim 2013, 89). This meant that the LTTE was well trained in 
Indian military doctrine, and thus “the LTTE knew the standard psychology, combat strategies, 
and weaponry of the Indian soldier, while the IPKF had no notion of the LTTE’s strategies” 
(Alexander 2006, 159).  
What the IPKF intervention did was to destabilize Sri Lanka rather than bring peace. 
…Deployment of the IPKF in Sri Lanka proved to be a total failure of Indian foreign 
policy. Renowned Indian defense analyst Ravi Rikhye estimates that the IPRK at its peak 
numbered as many as 150,000, including paramilitary forces. However, it failed to disarm 
the LTTE and destroy its fighting capabilities while the LTTE continued to use 
safehouses in Tamil Nadu during the entire IPKF assignment in Sri Lanka. (Alexander 
2006, 159-160)  
 
Elections in 1989 in brought about new leadership in both India and Sri Lanka; the new 
leaders both supported the withdrawal of the IPKF, which had done little to the help the 
situation. The IPKF started withdrawing in 1989, and its departure marked the end of Eelam War 
I (Hashim 2013, 97-98).   
High levels of state coercion throughout Eelam War I continued to add fuel to the flame 
of the Tamil rebellion. The state was widely assumed to be complicit in what was essentially an 
anti-Tamil pogrom in the riots of 1983, and the performance of the Sri Lankan army left much to 
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be desired. In 1984, TULF complained that ‘Tamil-speaking people are being harassed, 
humiliated, and murdered by the armed forces” (O’Ballance 1989, 40). The addition of Indian 
forces, instead of initiating peace, only served to intensify conflict.  
The bureaucratic capacity of the Sri Lankan government was definitely challenged, as it 
sought to deal with a number of simultaneous threats to the state. The xenophobic JVP Sinhalese 
radicals grew so strong that, in order to accede to their demands for the removal of the IPKF, the 
Sri Lankan state started covertly supporting the LTTE’s efforts to fight the IPKF. At the same 
time, Sri Lanka felt that it had to cooperate on some level with India; India’s military might 
vastly overweighed that of Sri Lanka, and India, very concerned about the effect a successful 
Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka would have on Indian Tamils, cared a great deal about 
the ongoing conflict in its southern neighbor. India, too, was playing both sides, as it 
simultaneously trained Tamils in India while attempting to demobilize them in Sri Lanka.  
The LTTE, then, was ultimately supported in Eelam War I by both the Indian and Sri 
Lankan governments. Indeed, it would have been hard to lose a conflict in which both of the 
nominative enemies facing the rebel group were actually supporting it. Due to this, LTTE 
capacity remained high, even in the face of ongoing conflict. Support for the LTTE among the 
Tamil population was also strong, as the ascendance of the JVP in southern Sri Lanka ensured 
that Tamils continued to feel threatened by extremist Sinhalese nationalism, while the poor 
behavior of the IPKF troops, including raping and looting of Tamil civilians, ensured that the 
LTTE was still seen as the best guarantor of security for the Tamil peoples (Hashim 2013, 98). 
By the end of Eelam War I, the LTTE had at least partial control over Tamil-speaking areas, 
delineated by the IPKF. They also had the military capacity, given to them by both India and Sri 
Lanka, of combating the IPKF forces. Though I argue that Eelam War I was, at the start, more of 
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an insurgent campaign, the introduction of the IPKF and the resulting increased conflict 
escalated the conflict; by about 1986-87, given the amount of violence, the number of forces on 
both sides, and the common occurrence of battles between these forces, the LTTE’s campaign 
had probably escalated into a civil war.  
The peace negotiations in 1985 brought a hiatus to all LTTE campaigning temporarily, 
but the LTTE also took advantage of the Bhutan peace talks in order to build their capacity, for, 
as “talks proceeded, LTTE cadres laid land mines and erected barriers on roads leading from the 
encampments, severely limiting the army’s mobility. When the truce and talks ended 
unproductively, LTTE hit squads were in a much stronger position to attack” (Richardson 2005, 
530). However, the presence of these talks raises an interesting question not covered by the 
hypotheses I proposed in Chapter 4. Breaks, or pauses in conflict for negotiations seem to 
register as non-violent activity while simultaneously offering and advantage to those groups who 
would use peace to prepare for war. 
 Eelam War II, 1990-1994  
While the IPKF started withdrawing in 1989, the last Indian troops left in 1990. This 
withdrawal marked the start of Eelam War II, from 1990-1994. With the protective buffer 
between LTTE-dominated areas and the rest of the Sri Lankan state removed, violence spiked. 
The LTTE simply took over the bases left by the departing Indian Army and proceeded to attack 
Sri Lankan targets, in part with weapons recently received from the government. The violence 
started in June 1990 with the LTTE execution of approximately 600 surrendered Sri Lankan 
police personnel. LTTE operations also included multiple instances of ethnic cleansing, 
including the expulsion of 30,000 Muslims (regardless of ethnicity) from the LTTE-controlled 
city of Jaffna in October 1990 (Hashim 2013). The removal of the IPKF did little on the overall 
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type of LTTE campaign; given the prior capacity building by both India and Sri Lanka, the 
LTTE was well positioned continue its civil war campaign.  
On the Sri Lankan side, state capacity, which had been strained by the JVP insurrection, 
could start to recover, but the LTTE did their best to at least interrupt the smooth functioning of 
the state. The year 1991 saw an increase in LTTE political assassinations, as well as the start of 
large-scale military operations. LTTE assassinations included the Sri Lankan defense minister in 
March of 1991, Rajiv Ghandi, the former Indian prime minister responsible for the IPKF 
deployment in September 1991, and the current Sri Lankan president in May 1993. In 1991, the 
5,000 LTTE troops staged a conventional attack on the large Elephant Pass army base in an 
operation lasting 53 days. Though the assault was unsuccessful, the size of the operation meant 
that the LTTE’s forces, by this point, were probably close to comparable with that of the Sri 
Lankan Army. Though the Sri Lankan won the battle of Elephant Pass, it lost a naval base to the 
LTTE in November 1993 (Hashim 2013).   
After three years of conflict, Sri Lankan presidential elections in 1994 brought forth a 
new president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, who campaigned on promises of peace. Kumaratunga 
seemed to understand that political concessions to the Tamils were necessary for lasting peace 
when she stated that “[t]he first task is, therefore, a new approach predicated on unqualified 
acceptance of the fact that the Tamil people have genuine grievances for which solutions must be 
found” (Little 1999, 52). While peace negotiations did occur in 1994, the promises of peace 
lasted only briefly, for when talks faltered, LTTE naval units sabotaged and sank two Sri Lankan 
gunboats in the spring of 1995. President Kumaratunga then reversed her message, and 
announced a new premise for dealing with the LTTE, that of ‘war for peace’ (Hashim 2013, 
102).  
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This serious attempt by the Sri Lankan government to actually address the grievances that 
led to Tamil rebellion met with failure, not on the part of the government, but via action by the 
LTTE. The Kumaratunga government, by attempting to address some of the grievances of the 
Tamil population, threatened the popular support for the LTTE, which was dependent upon 
aggrieved Tamils for a support base. As with the Indian Peace Accords, the LTTE chose to 
sabotage agreements that might have ended the fighting. Some researchers lay the cause of the 
continued LTTE fighting despite overtures from the Sri Lankan government on the character of 
Prabhakaran, who could accept nothing less than a completely independent Tamil state (Pratap 
2001, 94-97; Schaffer 1999, 139).   
However, I argue for a somewhat different interpretation; that the LTTE had the capacity 
that, it thought, could garner itself further concessions from the Sri Lankan state. Prabhakaran 
could not have fought alone; others—many others—in the LTTE must have also supported the 
continuation of the civil war campaign. Another issue with the government offer is potentially a 
lack of trust in the government. Given the pograms of 1983, such a distrust seems reasonable. 
Accepting the offer, and giving up the capacity to carry out violence, may have seemed the 
bigger risk than simply fighting on. Such a possibility is outside of the scope of this project’s 
hypotheses, but it does add nuance to why some rebel groups would continue to choose to fight 
as long as they had the capacity. 
The Sri Lankan state capacity was further strained during Eelam War II, but the 
economy, at least in non-conflict, areas, actually grew. This overall growth, however, may have 
underreported the Tamil-held areas, for:  
Sri Lanka averaged a growth rate of 5 per cent during the 1984-2001 period. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the key growth-generating areas… were minimally affected by 
the war. Moreover, the bulk of these activities were concentrated in the Western Province 
that accounted for 50 per cent of the country’s GDP. Some have challenged this 
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viewpoint, arguing that since 1990 there has been an non-inclusion of the North-East 
Provinces… which would have most probably incurred negative growth rates during the 
post-1990 period. (Kelegama 2008, 133). 
 
Though the state economic situation was adequate, the heavy military operations took 
their toll not only on the ability of the army, but also on the will of the population. The elections 
that brought Kumaratunga into power in 1994 represented the desire of the Sri Lankan 
population for peace, but that peace, as described above, was sabotaged by the efforts of the 
LTTE.   
The LTTE took advantage of the ceasefire provided by the Bhutan peace talks to build its 
capacity to undertake action in Eelam War II. Militarily, the LTTE found itself able to undertake, 
and even win, large-scale operations against the Sri Lankan army. Support from Tamil Nadu in 
India also provided safe haven at the beginning of Eelam War II, but the LTTE’s decision to 
assassinate Rajiv Ghandi, the ex-prime minister of India who, when in power, had chosen to send 
in the IPKF to Sri Lanka, was perhaps the biggest long-term blow to the LTTE’s capacity. Killed 
in 1991, “Rajiv’s assassination turned Indians hostile to the Tigers. They were seen as dangerous 
and untrustworthy. A decade later, sitting in his London suburban house, A.S. Balasingham, 
chief ideologue of the Tamil Tigers, admitted to me that in assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE 
had committed ‘a historical blunder’” (Pratap 2001, 126). Though co-ethnic Tamils in southern 
India would still support the LTTE, state support from India was drastically decreased.     
I argue that the majority of Eelam War II can be considered a civil war campaign; the 
force on force battles, and control of territory seem to make this the logical distinction. However, 
the peace negotiations of 1994 did lead to at least some level of decreased violence, and that year 
could perhaps be considered an insurgent campaign, as the violence certainly did not stop, but 
did continue at levels below that of the previous year (Hashim 2013). The assassination of Rajiv 
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Ghandi by the LTTE appears to be the first serious blow to LTTE capacity; though it did not 
affect them so badly that they could not wage civil war, the lack of a friendly, and regionally 
powerful, neighbor no doubt decreased their capacity, though perhaps more in the long term than 
in the short term. The Sri Lankan state appeared still capable to continue battling the LTTE; their 
task was probably made easier given India’s coldness following the 1991 assassination of Rajiv 
Ghandi. 
 Eelam War III, 1995-2000  
A surprise sabotage attack by the LTTE that destroyed two Sri Lankan Navy gunboats 
signaled the end of negotiations and the start of Eelam War III, which lasted from 1995 to 2000. 
The fighting featured a series of major operations in Tamil areas, as the Sri Lankan army 
attempted to retake control of territory administered by the LTTE. The LTTE kept itself busy not 
only with these major conventional operations, but also a series of terrorist attacks in non-Tamil 
areas. One problem that the Sri Lankan army faced was the “manifest inability to undertake more 
than one offensive at any one time—due to lack of personnel and the complexity of commanding 
and coordinating large numbers of units at once—[which] allowed the LTTE almost always to 
guess correctly where and when an offensive was coming” (Hashim 2013, 103).  
Eelam War III demonstrates the danger in classifying terrorist tactics as indicative of a 
terrorist group. The LTTE was definitely undertaking terrorist activities, but this is not all they 
were doing; force on force battles with the Sri Lankan army, including battles over territory, as 
described below, make all of Eelam War III arguably a civil war campaign. 
The Sri Lankan government was able to retake the LTTE ‘capital’ of Jaffna in northern 
Sri Lanka in the latter half of 1995. The LTTE response to the loss of Jaffna was, in early 1996, 
to bomb the Central Bank in Sri Lanka’s capital city, Colombo, a terrorist-style attack that killed 
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80 and wounded more than 1,000. The LTTE was also able to bounce back by handing the Sri 
Lankan army a serious defeat when it took control over the Mullaitivu army base in 1996. The 
town of Kilinochci was taken by government forces in 1996, and retaken by the LTTE in 1998. 
Battles for control of different areas of the jungle of Wanni, a LTTE safe haven, lasted from May 
1997 through November of 1999. The LTTE staged a terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan Trade 
Center in 1997, and on a major Sinhalese shrine in 1998 (Hisham 2013).  
The fighting came to a head with the battle for control of Elephant Pass, a major Sri 
Lankan army base which blocked LTTE routes from the city of Jaffna to the jungles of Wanni. 
Starting in December 1999, the LTTE eventually took control of the base in April 2000, where 
15,000 Sri Lankan army troops were defeated by 5,000 LTTE fighters. The intense fighting that 
characterized Eelam War III eventually ground to a pause in 2000, as both sides, having taken 
massive casualties and losses of war material, needed a breather (Saez 2001; Hisham 2013). As 
one scholar put it, “Eelam War III showed signs of being a stalemate from the beginning, but it 
took six years of bloody fighting for both sides to exhaust themselves before a ceasefire was 
possible. The LTTE lacked the numbers to hold the towns they captured, and the government 
forces were too small and undisciplined to occupy the countryside” (Peebles 2006, 168). 
The magnitude of state coercion did not change significantly throughout Eelam War III, 
though both sides continued to perpetrate war crimes against civilians. In 2000, Kumaratunga 
introduced a Constitutional Reforms Bill into the Sri Lankan Parliament. “The bill  aimed  to  
replace  the  existing   Constitution  by  providing   an   increase   in   regional   power   sharing   
and   administrative   decentralization.  The controversy   over   the   bill   arose   because   of   
the   tenuous   balance   between   increased decentralization and autonomy” (Saez 2001, 118). 
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These Reforms failed to be passed, and yet another attempt at resolving the political grievances 
of the Tamils failed.   
In terms of state capacity, the Kumaratunga government, reversing from a peace policy 
into a renewal of conflict, retained power, but elections in 2001 would weaken that government’s 
efforts. Despite the turmoil caused by the civil war, Sri Lanka continued both to hold elections 
and provide a functioning government, demonstrating a continued level bureaucratic and 
administrative capability, but the problems and limitations caused by the presence of xenophobic 
Sinhalese parties ensured that efforts to address Tamil grievances continued to stall.   
The Sri Lankan government was still overseeing a functioning economy; “a review of the 
economic data show that Sri Lanka’s economy continued to grow at rates which are surprising in 
the context of a civil war—an average rate of real growth of just over 5 percent in the six years 
1995-2000 (Shastri 2004, 73). Yet indebtedness continued to grow; “by 1995 interest payments 
to service government debt were themselves 29.9 percent of current expenditures, with a figure 
close to 48 percent if amortization and interest payments were considered as a combined figure 
of true debt cost” (Marks 2007, 510). In addition, military spending by the Sri Lankan state 
continued to increase. In 1985, spending was 1.61 percent of GDP, by 1996 it was 6.02 percent 
(Winslow and Woost 200, 8).   
Rotberg (1999:2) described the Sri Lankan army as lacking both intelligence and the 
necessary infrastructure to develop that intelligence, concluding that “the Sri Lankan army fights 
a committed, even fanatic, cadre of guerillas with overwhelming numbers but with insufficient 
training, knowledge, and motivation.” Indeed, an estimate of LTTE forces in 1995 places them at 
about 16,000 total, while for a single major operation, the Sri Lankan army was able to assemble 
40,000 troops (Peebles 2006, 168; Hashim 2013, 103). Yet numbers did not seem to hold the key 
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to military victory over the LTTE. In 1999, “despite numerical superiority, the 143,000 person 
government army had still not managed to gain battlefield superiority over the LTTE, whose 
troops number fewer than 10,000” (Rotberg 1999, 1).  
As with the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE had significant capacity in Eelam War III, 
enough so that the two sides were forced to a draw. The end of Eelam War III saw the LTTE try 
to focus rebuilding capacity with an eye toward the future fight. Eelam War III proved to both 
sides that currently, neither could win – they were too evenly matched. The bloody stalemate, 
then, was a chance for both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state to attempt to out-capacitate the 
other before hostilities began again. Interestingly, this project’s hypotheses proposes that civil 
wars are more likely when state capacity is low, yet in the LTTE conflict, the Sri Lankan state 
appears to have maintained adequate capacity throughout the conflict. What is interesting, 
however, is that the Sri Lankan capacity, at least in economic terms, was focused on non-conflict 
regions. This suggests that a more micro-level understanding of state capacity is called for; when 
the conflict started, the state’s ability to provide desired educational resources to Tamil youth 
was limited. Perhaps state capacity, therefore, is something that should be examined in terms of 
geographical location within a state. 
 Caesura, 2001-2005  
From 2001 to 2005, the antagonists engaged in negotiations that accomplished little, but 
gave both sides a chance to prepare for further conflict. An initial ceasefire, called by the LTTE 
in December 2000, was canceled in April 2001, and military activity and terrorist attacks were 
briefly resumed. However, the 11 September 11 2001 attack on the United States cast a 
worldwide pall on the tolerance of terrorist-style activities, and in December of 2001 a somewhat 
less precarious ceasefire was called by both sides. By February 2002, Norway had been selected 
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as the primary mediator and monitor of the peace negotiations (Hassan 2009, 8). Peace talks 
started in September 2002 and broke down in 2003, yet violence did not yet return. In part, this 
was due to the expressed desire of the government to continue with peace negotiations, and was 
also due in part to the desire of the LTTE to gain more time in which to rebuild capacity to 
continue to wage war. As one LTTE participant in those talks recounted, “What we were told by 
him [Prabhakaran] was to drag these talks out for about five years, somehow let the time pass by, 
meanwhile I will purchase arms and we’ll be ready for the next stage of fighting” (Buerk 2007).  
In 2004, two separate incidents combined to weaken the LTTE. That spring, the LTTE 
was rocked by internal strife when Colonel Karuna defected from the organization. The LTTE 
were headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, while Colonel Karuna had been tasked with command 
over eastern Sri Lanka. Backed by eastern Tamils, who felt that they had suffered more for the 
cause, yet lacked the political sway of the northern Tamils, Karuna posed a serious threat to 
Prabhakaran and the northern LTTE. The LTTE was able to militarily defeat Karuna’s forces, 
but a large number Karuna’s followers escaped into the jungle. Following his defeat, Karuna, 
backed by the Sri Lankan government, pursued a low-level guerilla war against the LTTE in the 
east (Hashim 2013, 119-131). Then, in December 2004, a major tsunami hit Sri Lanka, killing 
30,000 people, including 3,000 LTTE military personnel. Between Karuna’s defection and the 
tsunami, the numbers military personnel of the LTTE suffered a severe decline. Further, the 
tsunami destroyed massive amounts of infrastructure in LTTE-controlled regions.   
Though the LTTE was weakened by the events of 2004, as 2005 began the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan government both started breaking the terms of the ceasefire with regularity. The 
Norwegian-led monitoring commission counted 3,000 infractions by the LTTE and 300 by the 
Sri Lankan army. By the fall of 2005, direct clashes between LTTE and army personnel were 
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occurring. It was clear that another round of conflict was about to break out (Sengupta 2006). 
The LTTE surprised the Sri Lankan state with a peace proposal in 2003, the Interim Self-
Governing Authority (ISGA). However, this proposal backfired by going too far; the ISGA 
basically called for the creation of a separate Tamil state, and it doing so, it provoked outrage 
among Sinhalese hardliners, and ultimately to an increase in coercion by the state, as 
Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and took direct control of the ministries of Media, 
Interior, and Defense (Hashim 2013, 117-118).   
In Sri Lankan elections in 2002, the United National Front won an overwhelming 
majority of seats. However, their pledge of unconditional negotiations with the LTTE was seen 
as going too far by President Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency, 
dissolved Parliament, and held new elections in 2004. Another series of elections in 2005 kept 
Kumaratunga in power but brought in a new prime minister. Though Kumaratunga was able to 
stay in power, the “frequent elections and shifting political alliances undermined the 
government’s ability to implement policies” (Peebles 2006, 167).  
Economically speaking, the ceasefire was necessary in order to help the economic 
situation. By 2001, both internal and external financial support to the state was struggling, as 
“the IMF package started falling apart and macroeconomic management had gone haywire. 
Budge deficit was 10.8 per cent of the GDP and the rate of inflation was 14.2 per cent, with the 
economy receding to negative growth (-1.5 per cent) for the first time since Independence. …A 
peace package was worked out with the LTTE with the hope of providing an economic dividend 
through aid mobilisation and revival of the economy” (Kelegama 2006, 25). In 2005, 
international relief funds to help rebuild after the devastation of the tsunami arrived, providing a 
much-needed inflow of cash (Kelegama 2006, 31).   
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The LTTE took advantage of the ceasefire period in the early 2000s to strengthen its own 
position. As members of the Sri Lankan government pointed out, “The LTTE was using 
negotiations as a form of warfare to march closer to its true goal of creating an independent state. 
…The LTTE continued to levy taxes, smuggle in arms and ammunition, recruit child soldiers, 
and kill members of rival Tamil groups and government personnel” (Hashim 2013, 116). In 
effect, the LTTE solidified its position as a proto-state. It also solidified the impression 
externally that the only solution to the LTTE would be defeat, since the idea of Tamil region in 
which the Sri Lankan government had no authority was not politically feasible. All was not well 
militarily with the LTTE. The defection by Colonel Karuna meant that the LTTE’s control over 
the eastern province was weakened. Karuna later claimed, to a reporter, that his defection meant 
that the LTTE lost 70 percent of its fighting force (Buerk 2007). Given the source, this 
percentage may be suspect, but the defection certainly did decrease the LTTE’s fighting 
capacity, especially in the eastern regions. Combined with the losses from the tsunami, the 
LTTE’s military might was less than it had been during Eelam War III.  
Perhaps the greatest change to rebel capacity came from the September 2001 attacks by al 
Qaeda on the United States. Though completely unrelated to the Sri Lankan crisis, these attacks 
led to an increasing international lack of tolerance towards violent rebels. The terrorist attacks of 
the LTTE would no longer be excusable in the eyes of the world community, and increasing 
international restrictions on money flows meant that the LTTE’s smuggling, trafficking, and 
diaspora funding were all under increased scrutiny (Hashim 2013; United States Department of 
the Treasury 2009).  
 As with earlier LTTE peace negotiations and ceasefires, both sides used the time away 
from conflict to engage in capacity building, which would appear to support the general 
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argument I outline in this project about the importance of capacity on rebellion. Such a buildup 
of capacity is what then enabled the last outbreak of violence, Eelam War IV. 
 Eelam War IV, 2006-2009  
Following a steady escalation of small attacks, Eelam War IV unofficially commenced in 
April 2006, when the LTTE closed the gates of a dam in the eastern province in order to threaten 
the security of 15,000 families in a government-controlled area (BBC News 2006). The gates 
were eventually reopened, though whether via state coercion or LTTE choice is unclear. What is 
clear is that a military battle for control of the dam eventually spread throughout the eastern 
province. In a reversal from previous Wars, the Sri Lankan army was able to gained several 
victories in key towns, and by July 2007, all of the eastern province was under government 
control (Hashim 2013, 133-143).   
Once the eastern province was secured, the Sri Lankan army focused its efforts in the 
northern province, which was the heart of Tamil resistance and the headquarters of the LTTE. 
The LTTE controlled area at this time was bounded by Sri Lankan government areas of control 
to the north and south, and by the island’s coastline on the east and west. The Sri Lankan army 
attacked along three simultaneous fronts, seeking to squeeze and eventually trap the LTTE. 
Starting in September 2007, the mass of Sri Lankan forces along the three fronts forced the 
LTTE was to commit troops to fighting on multiple fronts. The LTTE simply did not have the 
personnel to carry out the fight, and was forced to withdraw repeatedly through 2007 to 2009 
(Hashim 2013, 143-163).  
The Sri Lankan navy, which had been trying to counter the Sea Tigers since the start of 
hostilities, changed tactics during Eelam War IV. Instead of seeking out the multiple small fast 
craft the Sea Tigers possessed, the navy instead focused on building intelligence about the larger 
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ships used as floating storage for LTTE war material. In order to attack these larger ships, the Sri 
Lankan navy had to outfit itself with ‘blue-water’ capable ships, which it did, starting in 2000. 
This proved invaluable in Eelam War IV, when in “a 13-month period in 2006-7, SLN [Sri 
Lankan navy] forces tracked down and destroyed all eight Sea Tiger logistical freighters” 
(Hashim 2013, 176). As the effectiveness of the Sri Lankan navy increased, the LTTE were 
faced not only with the loss of collected supplies, but also the inability to replenish their land 
forces.   
After three years of heavy fighting, Eelam War IV ended on May 19, 2009, with the final 
defeat of the remaining LTTE cadres and the death of their leader, Prabhakaran. Though the 
death of Prabhakaran did not end all support for Tamil autonomy, it did mark then end of 
organized military resistance to the Sri Lankan state. Neither side came out of the final battle 
with clean hands. The LTTE had used unwilling human shields in an effort to stop army attacks, 
and the army apparently announced civilian safe zones that were then the target of army fire 
(Human Rights Watch 2008, 2009, 2010).    
While in previous iterations of the Eelam Wars the Sri Lankan army had lacked the 
personnel to stage multiple simultaneous offensives against the LTTE, or to police, hold, and 
stabilize territories it did recover, Eelam War IV saw a huge increase in the numbers of troops; 
“Between 2005 and 2009 the [Sri Lankan] armed forces increased from 125,000 men and women 
to around 450,000” (Hashim 2013, 188). This allowed the army to constantly harass the LTTE, 
and the LTTE, with fewer troops, could not successfully defend against the number and 
simultaneity of attacks.  
Conversely, at the restart of hostilities in 2006, the LTTE was struggling to find the 
military personnel necessary for ongoing operations. Recruitment changed into forced 
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conscription of adults and children; such conscription did not help popular support for the LTTE 
(Human Rights Watch 2008). The increasingly war-weary Tamil population had fewer resources 
to give to the LTTE, and the effects of the Global War on Terror meant that overseas resources 
were also more difficult to come by. The LTTE also had poorer intelligence on the Sri Lankan 
military. Hashim (2013, 192) argues that this situation came about because, at the start of 
hostilities in 2005, the LTTE had to split its attention between a focus the situation in the eastern 
province following Colonel Karuna’s rebellion and a focus on how the Global War on Terror had 
affected overseas resupply of war material.    
 As with previous Eelam Wars, the height violence, force on force battles, and control of 
territory by both sides means that this War should also be considered to be a civil war campaign. 
The end of hostilities was brought about, in part by the destruction of the LTTE’s capacity; it 
was simply unable to fight any more. The changes in international support for the LTTE, most 
notably since 2001, further decreased the ability of the LTTE to reconstitute itself. Decades of 
war had reduced available conscripts due to attrition, and made war-weary the Tamil population, 
leading to a lack of new recruits for the LTTE. On the governmental side, military capacity had 
increased, and combined with the LTTE’s decrease in external support, the Sri Lankan state was 
able to end the conflict. 
 The LTTE Rebellion: Implications  
Both the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE were organizationally resilient; unfortunately, 
this meant that the conflict between the two combatants would drag out for over a quarter-
century. The case study of the LTTE offers multiple insights into how the factors of coercion, 
state capacity, and rebel capacity all influence choices of rebel campaign type. While the LTTE 
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undertook multiple years of civil war campaigns, not every year of every conflict reached that 
level of violence.   
As described above, I argue that at the start of the conflict, Eelam War I had insurgent 
levels of violence from 1984-1986, with the first upswing to civil war in 1987 with the 
introduction of the IPKF forces, and then a decrease in violence back to insurgent campaigns in 
1988 and 1989. Eelam War II started out at a higher level of violence; the first three years, from 
1990 to 1993, were characterized as civil war. In 1994, the LTTE switched to an insurgent 
campaign with the propagation of the peace talks. All years of Eelam War III, from 1995 to 
2000, were civil war. The caesura between Wars III and IV shows significant variation; 2001 
was a civil war, while the implementation of the ceasefire in 2002 led to quite a decrease, with 
the LTTE not participating in an active campaign of civil war, terrorism, or insurgency, perhaps 
due to the new international situation following the September 2001 attacks. 2003 saw an 
insurgent campaign, but 2004, with the defection of Karuna and the tsunami, appear to have been 
enough of a distraction that, while the LTTE might have wanted to start again with conflict, all it 
was capable of was a terrorist campaign. The violence and infractions of the ceasefire ticked 
back up in 2005, as the LTTE started a new insurgent campaign. In the final Eelam War IV, all 
years from 2006 to 2009 were civil war campaigns.  
Looking at these campaigns, the breaks in violence appear to have been deliberate 
choices, made in response to the capacity of the LTTE to carry out a campaign. Recall that 
scholarly analysis of the end of Eelam War III was that both sides had simply beaten each other 
to a bloody pulp and did not have the capacity to keep fighting. This is reflected in the only 
actual complete stop of LTTE campaigning, in 2002.   
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Again, coercive actions taken by the state which aggrieved the Tamil population appear 
to have provided the initial incitation to violence. Chosen state policies of Tamil discrimination, 
however, were exacerbated by a deepening economic crisis that encouraged radicalization by 
both Tamil and Sinhalese youth. Even the differences in religion between Sinhalese Buddhist 
and Tamil Hindus were present in this conflict.  
The non-violent pro-Tamil political parties attempted to resolve grievances through 
political negotiations such as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and Dudley Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pacts, but these pacts were never implemented. The impotence of attempts at 
political resolution, in combination with employment and educational discrimination, succeeding 
in radicalizing large numbers of Tamil youths. Coercion increased as the conflict went on. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1979 (originally temporary, made permanent by the Sri Lankan 
legislature in 1982) granted the state wide latitude in detaining, arresting, and trying Tamils 
(Marks 2007; Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1979). Once full-
scale civil war broke out, both the Sri Lankan and Tamil forces routinely participated in acts of 
torture and civilian killings (Human Rights Watch 2008).   
What could have arrested the process, of course, was addressing the grievances of the 
insurgent mass base early on. Although insurgent leaders and followers were spurred by 
the same injustice, they responded in dissimilar fashion. Leaders sought structural 
change, revolution, as the route to liberation; followers looked for redress of immediate 
issues. Had the state early on driven a wedge between the two, what became a profound 
threat to the security of the state would likely have remained a law-and-order problem. 
(Marks 2007:515) 
 
The Sri Lankan state started the conflict with moderately low capacity in both the 
bureaucratic and military fields. While historically the political elites in Ceylon had been 
comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese who were able to cooperate, the opening the political 
establishment to majority rule meant that both Tamil and Sinhalese politicians pandered to their 
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ethnic bases in order to gain political power. By the time the LTTE came to power, the 
government was deeply factionalized. Any attempts to broker negotiated solutions to the conflict 
were invariably overthrown as the majoritarian politics of the state were dictated by Sinhalese 
nationalists. Overall, the Sri Lankan government was able to maintain capacity throughout the 
conflict, but the capacity of the LTTE was enough that, at least in the Tamil regions, the two 
sides were fairly evenly matched. 
Though initially the actions of the radical Tamil youth movements were more along the 
lines of hooliganism, the inability of the central government to control a volatile situation, and 
even of encouraging anti-Tamil riots and pogroms following Tamil attacks led to rising popular 
support for Tamil rebels. The LTTE emerged from a crowded field of contenders to become the 
primary violence-oriented Tamil resistance organization with a high capacity for both violence 
and the creation of a proto-state. Growing from a small group of disaffected students, at its 
height the organization exercised at least partial control over significant parts of the northern and 
eastern territories of Sri Lanka and had a military branch that was large enough to challenge the 
Sri Lankan army in multiple conventional, force-on-force battles. Again, this case study provides 
evidence that the onset of sub-state violence tends to be predicated primarily by state coercion. 
International support figured strongly in the LTTE’s rebellion, as the group was able to 
finance its operations through a number of different tactics. “Its transnational network was huge 
and capable of raising as much as $300 million a year from a web of fake charities and 
international arms and drug smuggling, among other means” (Hashim 2013, 190). Yet the effects 
of an international crackdown on rebel group financing hurt this network, as did the increasing 
effectiveness of the Sri Lankan navy. The LTTE also received support from co-ethnics in 
southern India, as well as training. This support was long-lasting, “From the July/August riots of 
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1983 until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the LTTE’s main external refuge and 
support base had been in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu” (O’Duffy 2007, 272). However, their 
choice to assassinate a Indian ex-prime minister led to a decline in this area of international 
support as well.   
In terms of military capacity, “[w]ith a troop strength estimated at twenty thousand, the 
Tamil insurgency was arguably one of the best organized nonstate military forces ever 
assembled, with the capacity to fight on land, at sea, and in the air” (Mampilly 2011, 94). Yet the 
activities of the LTTE, including forcible child conscription, harsh taxes and penalties imposed 
on Tamil populations under its control, and Prabhakaran’s insistence on his role as the 
dictatorial, highly autocratic leader of all Tamils (and corresponding intolerance of any other 
resistance movement or rapprochement effort, despite the wishes of the population) all combined 
to undermine support for the LTTE, and the movement fell apart following his death.  
As one scholar sums up the end of the LTTE, “By the time a quarter century of unceasing 
bloodletting passed, more than 90,000 people lay dead, many thousands were injured and 
maimed, the Tamils were in ruins, and there was no trace of Tamil Eelam” (Swamy 2010, 175). 
Yet, even though Tamil Eelam was never achieved, this does not mean that Tamil resistance is 
yet dead. Whether rebellion starts again may be more linked to the coercion—or lack thereof—
practiced on Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, as well as the relative capability of Tamils 
and the state; “the violent exit strategy [the creation of a Tamil state] collapsed with the defeat of 
the LTTE. This does not mean aspiration for an independent state is not still there… it means 
that capability is no longer there. It is the government’s task to ensure that both aspiration and 
capability to exit the state do not rear their heads again” (Hashim 2013, 47-48). 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
This research project sought to answer two questions. First, how do changes in state 
coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity affect the choices rebels make when choosing the 
type of campaign they will undertake? Second, how do the structural conditions that encourage 
the start of a rebel campaign differ from the conditions that affect rebel campaign choice in 
ongoing campaigns? In order to answer these questions, this project utilized theories on policy 
substitution and the linkage between ends, ways, and means in order to understand how the 
structural conditions facing a rebel group would serve to constrain their actions. This project also 
looked at how the relationship between these structural conditions could vary between the onset 
of rebel campaigns, and campaign choices made while conflict was already underway.  
 Ends, Ways, Means, and Campaigns  
This research project argued that current conceptions of rebel activity which varied in 
length from multi-year civil wars to single-day terrorist events were in need of a theoretical 
underpinning that could generate unit commensurability and enable the comparison between the 
campaign choices that rebel groups made. In order to place acts of political violence into their 
larger context, I used policy substitution theory and the ends, ways, means framework provided 
by military science theory. These theories explain why actors are constrained by the means they 
have available to them to act, and develop ways to use those means in order to achieve their 
desired endstate. Applying those theories to rebel groups, therefore, would mean that 
explanations of rebel group action would first look at the constraints groups face on 
accomplishing action of any sort. Once those constraints are understood, the group then looks at 
the different options it has to affect the political behavior of the state in order to reach the 
249 
group’s goals, or endstate. Within this framework, the rebel campaign is understood as the 
‘ways,’ the different paths of activity it can take.  
The advantage to understanding rebel choices as campaigns is that, as a standardized unit 
of analysis, organizing violence into campaigns permits comparisons between different types of 
rebel activity. Since, unfortunately, a large deal of conflict literature has to this point focused 
only on a specific type of conflict (and this may be in part due to the above-noted issue of how to 
compare multi-year wars to single day attacks), the development of the campaign unit of analysis 
provides a novel way for conflict researchers to understand how rebel groups make choices 
between several options, rather than only analyzing choices between one type of rebel violence 
and no violence at all.  
The campaign concept is then applied to three types of sub-state violent activities: 
terrorism, insurgency, and civil war. Terrorist campaigns tend to be primarily focused on attacks 
which have little military significance but have a great deal of propaganda or shock value, and 
which target civilians rather than the security forces of the state. Insurgent campaigns tend to 
target security forces, and may utilize both terrorist and more war-like battle tactics. Civil war 
campaigns tend toward larger-scale battles and direct confrontation with the security forces of 
the state.86 The advantage of using a campaign concept of rebel violence is that it provides 
insight into the overarching trend of the rebel way, rather than not seeing the civil war forest due 
to the terrorist attack trees.   
                                                 
86 As discussed in previous chapters, however, the delineation between types of violence is not necessarily all that 
clear; as Findley and Young (2012) note, there can be terrorist acts of violence in the midst of a civil war.  
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 Coercion and Capacity  
Following the conceptualization of rebel campaigns, this project noted that there are basic 
structural conditions that can serve as predictor variables for the types of rebel campaign to 
come. In explaining how state coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity all contribute to rebel 
group campaign choice, this project offers a parsimonious categorization scheme into which 
much of the current theoretical literature on the causes of rebel activity can be placed.   
Coercion refers actions taken by the state that lead to grievances against the state by 
members of its population. Capacity refers to the ability of an actor to enact and implement 
activities via administrative and/or coercive means across its sphere of control, and is sub-
divided into state capacity and rebel capacity. While coercion, or grievances caused by coercion, 
are typically understood as one of the primary causes of sub-state political violence, the role of 
capacity is less well understood. Drawing from extant literature, the concept of capacity was 
disaggregated into administrative and military subcomponents, as both states and rebel groups 
may have capacity that varies by each subcomponent.    
These five structural conditions, once identified, were then examined in terms of how 
they might affect rebel campaign choices. I hypothesize that the relationship between these 
variables and rebel campaigns is as follows. When coercion is at low or high levels, terrorist 
campaigns are more likely to occur; when coercion is at intermediate levels, insurgent campaigns 
are more likely to occur, and when coercion is high, civil war campaigns are more likely to 
occur. When state administrative capacity is at higher levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely 
to occur, and when state administrative capacity is at lower levels, insurgent campaigns and civil 
war campaigns are more likely to occur. When state military capacity is at higher levels, terrorist 
campaigns are more likely to occur, when state military capacity is at intermediate levels, 
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insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur, and when state military capacity is at lower levels, 
civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When rebel administrative capacity is at lower 
levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, when rebel administrative capacity is at 
higher levels, and insurgent campaigns and civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When 
rebel military capacity is at lower levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, when rebel 
military capacity is at intermediate levels, insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur, and 
when rebel military capacity is at high levels, civil war campaigns are more likely to occur.  
Finally, this project looked at potential differences in the means between rebel campaign 
onset and occurrence. I hypothesized that, given the high costs of rebelling, which potentially 
include death or imprisonment for the rebel, the onset year of any given rebel campaign type will 
have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that 
same type of rebel campaign. In other words, the cost to start violent rebellion may be higher 
than the cost to continue in rebel action, once undertaken.  
 Latent Variable Development 
This project developed a new, unique dataset that combined multiple data sources on both 
states and rebels. In order to better measure the variables of coercion, state administrative 
capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, this 
project utilized latent variable techniques. Extant research on capacity and coercion typically is 
operationalized by simply selecting one or a few proxy variables, but this risks only capturing 
part of the larger underlying concept. By using latent variable techniques, which are still quite 
new to the field of conflict studies, this project was able to include several competing measures 
for each specific phenomenon, and better capture the full spectrum of that phenomenon. For each 
of the five constructs, latent variables were generated and tested. Confirmatory factor analysis 
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suggests that the latent variables, as created, are indeed capturing the underlying concept, and 
that these coercion and capacity variables do each appear to be a cohesive concept, with 
statistically significant shared variance. With the generation of these latent variables, the 
hypotheses proposed on the relationship between rebel campaign choice and these structural 
factors could then be examined. 
 Research Findings 
 Empirical Models 
The hypotheses were quantitatively tested using multinomial probit models.87 The results 
of this quantitative testing were mixed. The relationships found in the models provided only 
limited support for the hypotheses. Some of the results were quite surprising, in terms of their 
lack of support for relationships that previous research has found regarding rebel group choice 
and measures of capacity and coercion. Overall, it appears that including disaggregated measures 
of both rebel and state capacity in a model of sub-state conflict may offer new insights or paths 
for research on the relationship between these structural variables and the occurrence of different 
types of rebel campaigns. In particular, rebel administrative and military capacity, which, due to 
less-available data, has been less incorporated into quantitative research in this field, appears to 
have a large effect on rebel campaign choice. However, given the limited nature of rebel group 
data, more research, perhaps as more or better data becomes available, seems to be called for, in 
order to better understand the relationship examined in this project. What results this research did 
find are summarized below. 
                                                 
87 Additional models were also generated; these models are presented in the Appendix A. 
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Terrorist campaigns were hypothesized to be more likely to occur when coercion is at 
how or high levels; when state administrative capacity is at higher levels; when state military 
capacity is at lower levels; when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels; and when rebel 
military capacity is at lower levels. The expected U-shaped relationship with coercion was 
present and significant in Model 2, but not Model 1. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant 
positive linear relationship between coercion and terrorist campaigns for both Models 1 and 2. 
For state administrative capacity, the hypothesized positive linear relationship was not present in 
either Model 1 or 2. For state military capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was 
not present in either model. In Model 1, there was significant positive linear relationship, and in 
Model 2, there was a significant negative quadratic relationship. The hypothesized negative 
linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and terrorist campaigns was significant 
in Model 2, as was an unexpected positive quadratic relationship. The hypothesized negative 
linear relationship between rebel military capacity and terrorist campaigns was present and 
significant across both Model 1 and 2. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant positive 
quadratic relationship in Model 1.  
Insurgent campaigns were hypothesized be more likely to occur when coercion is at 
intermediate levels; when state administrative capacity is at lower levels; when state military 
capacity is at intermediate levels; when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels; and 
when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels. The hypothesized negative quadratic 
relationship with coercion was not present in either Model 1 or 2. For state administrative 
capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model, but there 
was an unexpected significant positive linear relationship for both models. For state military 
capacity, the hypothesized negative quadratic relationship was not present in either model. The 
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hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and insurgent 
campaigns was significant in both models, as was an unexpected positive quadratic relationship. 
The hypothesized negative quadratic relationship between rebel military capacity and insurgent 
campaigns was not present in either model. Unexpectedly, there was a significant negative linear 
relationship and a significant positive quadratic relationship in both models.   
Civil war campaigns were hypothesized to be more likely to occur when coercion is high; 
when state administrative capacity is at low levels; when state military capacity is at low levels; 
when rebel administrative capacity is at high levels; and when rebel military capacity is at high 
levels. The hypothesized positive linear relationship with coercion was not present in either 
Model 1 or 2. In Model 1, there were two unexpected significant relationships: a negative linear 
relationship, and a negative quadratic relationship. For state administrative capacity, the 
hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model, but there was an 
unexpected significant positive quadratic relationship for both models. For state military 
capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model. The 
hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and civil war 
campaigns was not present in either model. However, Model 2 had both an unexpected 
significant negative linear relationship and an unexpected significant positive quadratic 
relationship. The hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel military capacity and 
civil war campaigns was not present in either model. 
Finally, the onset year of any rebel campaign was hypothesized to have a stronger 
positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel 
campaign. However, this claim was not supported by Model 3. This is a very counterintuitive 
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finding, and is not supported by majority of the extant literature, or by the qualitative case studies 
researched for this project.  
 Case Studies 
Given the limited support for the hypotheses in the empirical analysis, this project turned 
to case studies to further examine the relationships between rebel choice and coercion and 
capacity. Thus, hypotheses were also examined via structured, focused case studies on the Mau 
Mau and LTTE rebel groups. Interestingly, when examining rebel group choices on a more 
detailed level, the relationships proposed by the hypotheses do appear to be present at times in 
both the Mau Mau and LTTE conflicts. The case studies also suggest some possible new 
approaches to future empirical research. 
Within the case studies, some general trends stand out. In line with theories by Tilly 
(1978) and Gurr (1970), grievances arising from coercive actions by the state appear to have 
been the driving force behind the choice to rebel in both cases. Though quantitative analysis was 
unable to support this project’s hypothesis that higher levels of coercion are required for the 
onset (rather than occurrence) of a rebel campaign, the case studies show how states’ inability to 
appease aggrieved sub-populations appeared to be one of, if not the primary factor leading to the 
outbreak of violence, while state and rebel capacities influenced the specific expression of that 
violence.     
State capacity, however, may have also contributed to the onset of rebel activity in the 
case of the LTTE, as it was a perceived discrimination in the provision of a limited government 
service, higher education, which led to grievances. Had the Sri Lankan state had more capacity 
with which to increase the availability of higher education, perhaps grievances would not have 
reached the point of rebellion. However, it is difficult to determine precisely how good Sri 
256 
Lanka’s state capacity was prior to the onset of the LTTE rebellion. Despite its inability to 
provide higher education to all who wanted it, by other measures, such as per capita income, and 
overall governance structures, it was better off than neighboring countries (Sally 2006; Hashim 
2013). The Kenyan state is similarly difficult to determine; Kenya was a prosperous colony prior 
to the rebellion, but had to build up a huge administrative and security apparatus during the 
rebellion in order to defeat the Mau Mau.   
Both Kenya and Sri Lanka both had lower levels of state military capacity at the start of 
their rebellions, but both countries also managed to build local forces, and, in the case of Kenya, 
receive external forces as well. Alongside state military capacity, state administrative capacity 
appears, on the whole, to have increased in Kenya and been maintained at a moderate level in Sri 
Lanka during the course of their respective rebellions. This would appear to not support the 
hypothesis regarding civil war, which expects state capacity to be lower when insurgent or civil 
war campaigns are chosen. Instead, the case studies suggest that state capacity can be at 
moderate to high levels and rebels may still choose a civil war campaign.  
Coercive actions were also involved in the continued occurrence of violence; higher 
levels of coercive state activity appeared to continue to inflame grievances throughout the course 
of the conflict, leading to increased popular support and rebel recruits. However, these effects of 
coercion were somewhat mitigated by other efforts of the state. For example, during the Mau 
Mau rebellion, the huge Pipeline imprisonment system was highly coercive, but the Swynnerton 
Plan, implemented about the same time, offered at least a little relief to the pressing problem of 
indigenous land rights.   
Rebel capacity appeared to have a great effect on the choice of campaign once violence 
had started. Neither the Mau Mau nor LTTE were at particularly high capacity prior to onset, 
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though both groups had practiced smaller-scale violence. Once their respective rebellions had 
started, however, both groups were able to build capacity on the fly, thanks in part to 
sympathetic co-ethnic populations that provided support. In both cases, rebel capacity in terms of 
both bureaucratic and combatant forces grew, though not always steadily, throughout the 
conflict, but fell precipitously right before the rebellion ended. My hypotheses on the 
relationship between rebel capacity and campaign type appear to be generally supported by the 
case studies, for as rebel capacity grew in both cases, the scope of the violence generally 
progressed from terrorist to insurgent to civil war campaigns.  
In both case studies, external actors were heavily involved in the conflict. For the LTTE, 
both the government and the rebels received external support. The Mau Mau in Kenya did not 
have international allies, but the Kenyan colonial government received substantial support from 
Great Britian, which funded and supported the colonial Kenyan administration in their massive 
counter-rebellion operation.  The main effect of external support appeared to be an increase the 
capacity of whatever side was receiving that support. The last battles against the Mau Mau were 
fought with British troops and airforce. The LTTE, once a receiver of largess from India, made a 
political misstep with the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, after 
which it lost most of its Indian support. The LTTE was able to continue its rebellious activity 
following this loss of support, but eventually the Sri Lankan government was able to attrite the 
LTTE’s capacity to fight.   
 Research Limitations  
Though this project does offer a novel approach that provides conflict researchers with a 
new way of organizing rebel violence, there were limitations to the research presented above. 
First, the quantitative hypotheses testing was limited in terms of the data available. In particular, 
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information on the capacity of specific rebel groups was minimal. Unfortunately, data on rebel 
groups is difficult to come by; far better data exist on states than on non-state actors. Yet the 
available data on rebel groups, despite its weaknesses, do provide valuable comparability across 
multiple types of campaigns and countries. Hopefully, as better data on rebel groups becomes 
available, rebel administrative and military capacity can be measured more accurately.  
The findings provided via qualitative analysis of the LTTE and Mau Mau are also 
somewhat limited. Geopolitically, both rebellions took place in countries that had experienced 
British colonial rule. Temporally, both rebellions took place in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Due to these parallels, it is possible that certain of the conflict processes traced in these 
rebellion case studies shared similarities that other rebellions would not. For example, in both Sri 
Lanka and Kenya, the initial grievances towards the state arose in part, either directly or 
indirectly, from British colonial policies. Further case studies, perhaps more distant in time, and 
unrelated to the British Empire or colonialism more generally, might provide different nuances to 
our understanding of how coercion and capacity influence rebel activity.   
 Further Research  
The results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis offer several suggestions for future 
research. First, coercion may not be as simple as looking to what coercive actions the state took 
in the year prior in order to understand what rebels will choose to do in the current year. Rather, 
the case studies suggest that coercion may be a longer-term process. The memory of coercive 
actions from many years past, as well as expectations about future coercion, may both affect the 
perceived level of current coercion. Thus, cumulative effects and future expectations may need 
to be incorporated into empirical models of the relationship between coercion and rebel group 
campaign choice. Also, the case studies suggest that rebels are acutely aware of their own 
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capacity, but may be somewhat less well informed about state capacity. Therefore, as well as 
actual capacity, the level of information states and rebel groups have vis-à-vis each other may 
need to be included when analyzing rebel group choices. Finally, geographic dispersion of 
capacity within a state may also matter; rebel capacity may match the capacity of the state, in a 
limited, given area, even if overall levels of state and rebel capacity are not equal. Though this 
sort of sub-state level disaggregated data is difficult to come by, both for state and rebel data, it 
might be possible to look at a small number of cases where this sort of data is available.  
Additionally, analyzing rebel activity by utilizing an ends, ways, and means framework 
offers several promising avenues of future research. Within the framework, the concept of a 
campaign can be extended to include other forms of rebel activity. Further, the rebel ends, held 
constant in this project, could bear more scrutiny and perhaps further disaggregation.  
This project examined only three types of violent rebel campaigns. Non-violent political 
protest campaigns were not differentiated from instances of peace. Yet non-violent forms of 
political protest by organized groups, such as marches, strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts, can 
both precede and exist concurrently with violent political protest. Further, there are other violent 
rebel actions that may reflect different campaign types, such as coup d'états, which seek to 
overthrow the government without prolonged violence.88  Thus, one area of further research 
would be the expansion of the categorization of sub-state political protest activities into a larger 
spectrum of activity. Once this typology was generated (and if available cross-national data were 
sufficiently detailed), the effect of coercion, rebel capacity, and state capacity on all of these 
types of political protest could then be examined.   
                                                 
88 Coup attempts which are not quickly successful, though, can evolve into more prolonged and mass-mobilized 
forms of violence. 
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In this project, the ends were held constant in order to focus on the relationship between 
the campaigns and means available for rebellion. The ends of rebellion were assumed to be 
focused on, in some way, changing the political behavior of the state. However, the ends could 
be further disaggregated. Some rebel groups may simply wish to change current discriminatory 
policies of the state, as the Mau Mau did; separatist rebel groups may wish to carve out a new 
state from territory taken away from the current state, as the LTTE as some points did; and some 
may wish to take over control of the state as a whole. While all of these ends do require a change 
in the political behavior of the state, the specific desired end sought could affect rebel campaign 
choices. On problem with such a disaggregation, however, is that the rebel group’s desired 
endstate could conceivably change over time,  
 Conclusion  
If we seek to understand rebellion, then we must, as preeminent military theorist Carl von 
Clausewitz suggested, also seek to understand why, and it what situations, rebellion arises. 
Rebellions, whether they are forces for positive or negative change, are likely be a recurrent form 
of conflict on the world stage for the foreseeable future, and rebel leaders who are able to 
maintain that role for any length of time will develop strategies in order to help them achieve 
their goals. Those strategies, translated into campaign plans of action, are ultimately expressed 
via violent acts. This project represents an attempt at better understanding how those acts are 
linked together into coherent campaigns, and how coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity 
inform the campaign choices that rebel leaders make. 
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Appendix A - Additional Empirical Models 
As a robustness check, the results of two alternate versions of the quantitative models 
presented in Chapter 6 are provided below. The first set of results utilizes a slightly different 
methodology for multinomial probit, following a method outlined in Williams (2012). The 
second set of results utilizes multinomial logit modeling, following a method outlined in Herron 
(Kropko 2008). Results from these alternate specification models can be compared to that of the 
models presented in Chapter 6; results do not vary significantly.  
 Alternate Specification: Multinomial Probit Models 
Following Williams (2012), the alternate specification multinomial probit models 
presented below provide results based on a slightly different way of calculating the squared 
variables. In the following models, the values of the squared terms of the independent 
variables—coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative 
capacity, and rebel military capacity—are not calculated prior to running the multinomial model. 
Rather, the squared terms are calculated during the actual model run itself, via cross-notational 
methods. This is a minor adjustment to the model, and overall estimates for the independent 
variables are the same as with the multinomial probit model provided in Chapter 6. These 
estimates can be seen in Table A.1. However, the estimates and confidence intervals calculated 
for each independent variable do vary slightly, as can been seen in Tables A.3 through A.6. 
While squaring the variable within the model may provide a slightly more accurate 
measure of the effect of the independent variables across percentiles, the downside, as Williams 
(2012) notes, is that percentile estimates cannot be generated for the squared terms, only for the 
unaltered independent variables. Therefore, Figures A.1 through A.6 only provide percentile 
estimates and confidence intervals for coercion, state administrative capacity, state military 
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capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, but not the squared terms for 
each of these variables.  
 
Table A.1 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models  
 Variables Model 5: 
All years, 
base 
Model 6: 
All years, 
full 
Model 7: 
Onset only, base 
Model 8: 
Onset only,  
full 
T
er
ro
ri
st
 
Coercion 0.4558888 
(0.038)** 
0.6999954 
(0.037)** 
-2.164233 
(0.053)* 
Model did not converge. 
Coercion2 0.1209088 
(0.163) 
0.2823611 
(0.025)** 
-1.317285 
(0.009)*** 
 
State Administrative Capacity 0.0320118 
(0.632) 
-0.0788487 
(0.479) 
0.3069065 
(0.008)*** 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 0.0054241 
(0.698) 
-0.0064269 
(0.75) 
0.0812818 
(0.004)*** 
 
State Military Capacity 0.4609196 
(0.018)** 
0.4855203 
(0.149) 
1.153706 
(0.199) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -0.1424742 
(0.147) 
-0.27746 
(0.037)** 
-0.0259824 
(0.920) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity -2.093313 
(0.147) 
-4.510391 
(0.085)* 
-10.55759 
(0.447) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 13.55092 
(0.292) 
31.96654 
(0.026)** 
-46.35024 
(0.632) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -5.014672 
(0.015)** 
-32.02971 
(0.02)** 
1.06828 
(0.613) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 3.633653 
(0.004)*** 
-72.62454 
(0.21) 
-0.2569697 
(0.919) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.9100504 
(0.514) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  0.0318643 
(0.973) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  1.187872 
(0.117) 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.002975 
(0.014)** 
  
Polyarchy  0.0401364 
(0.113) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -0.1975969 
(0.389) 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0068698 
(0.415) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0148711 
(0.149) 
  
Constant -3.035661 
(0.000)*** -6.541821 
(0.005)*** 
-6.445964 
(0.000)*** 
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Table A.1 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models  
 Variables Model 5: 
All years, 
base 
Model 6: 
All years, 
full 
Model 7: 
Onset only, base 
Model 8: 
Onset only,  
full 
In
su
rg
en
t 
Coercion -0.1499687 
(0.175) 
-0.0617201 
(0.639) 
-0.145642 
(0.468) 
 
Coercion2 -0.0216043 
(0.63) 
-0.0104499 
(0.855) 
-0.0709283 
(0.39) 
 
State Administrative Capacity 0.1169716 
(0.003)*** 
0.1383648 
(0.015)** 
0.0095177 
(0.896) 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 -0.0049638 
(0.561) 
0.0091033 
(0.432) 
0.000768 
(0.956) 
 
State Military Capacity 0.0601594 
(0.493) 
0.1299702 
(0.245) 
-0.0181498 
(0.873) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -0.0014085 
(0.969) 
-0.0317161 
(0.484) 
0.0637101 
(0.211) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity 2.790924 
(0.000)*** 
2.965471 
(0.004)*** 
2.63807 
(0.001)*** 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 9.18415 
(0.054)** 
14.60889 
(0.017)** 
0.0256893 
(0.997) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -3.372204 
(0.000)*** 
-2.933861 
(0.000)*** 
1.413227 
(0.022)** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 2.368605 
(0.000)*** 
2.326829 
(0.000)*** 
-3.700304 
(0.003)*** 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.2380755 
(0.621) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  1.809232 
(0.000)*** 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.03221 
(0.001)*** 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.000362 
(0.652) 
  
Polyarchy  -0.0145657 
(0.177) 
  
GDP per Capita†  0.1624125 
(0.088)* 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0070855 
(0.022)** 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0018939 
(0.666) 
  
Constant -0.5629137 
(0.000)*** -2.286863 
(0.005)*** 
-2.103746 
(0.000)*** 
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Table A.1 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models 
 Variables Model 5: 
All years, 
base 
Model 6: 
All years, 
full 
Model 7: 
Onset only, base 
Model 8: 
Onset only,  
full 
C
iv
il
 W
a
r
 
Coercion -0.5798075 
(0.004)*** 
-0.3332844 
(0.209) 
-0.3664196 
(0.561) 
 
Coercion2 -0.1333125 
(0.086)* 
-0.0700651 
(0.516) 
-0.3931579 
(0.152) 
 
State Administrative Capacity 0.0564765 
(0.257) 
0.125977 
(0.114) 
-5.942488 
(0.000) 
 
State Administrative Capacity2 0.0250599 
(0.027)** 
0.0339347 
(0.06)* 
-0.8875362 
(0.000) 
 
State Military Capacity -0.0880095 
(0.455) 
0.2121922 
(0.265) 
-0.0066828 
(0.991) 
 
State Military Capacity2 0.0151252 
(0.755) 
-0.0914182 
(0.218) 
-0.4029145 
(0.059) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity -0.6960079 
(0.342) 
-5.267944 
(0.000)*** 
-1.317589 
(0.468) 
 
Rebel Administrative Capacity2 -0.4971674 
(0.943) 
21.11043 
(0.013)** 
40.3167 
(0.036) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -0.609051 
(0.256) 
0.1477596 
(0.804) 
2.09427 
(0.000) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 0.1570627 
(0.812) 
-0.1426276 
(0.866) 
-1.876002 
(0.073) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.184874 
(0.128) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  0.2911674 
(0.610) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.010525 
(0.015)** 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.0024684 
(0.020)** 
  
Polyarchy  -0.0122942 
(0.411) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -0.3844237 
(0.006)*** 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.005237 
(0.220) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.019847 
(0.000)*** 
  
Constant -1.958928 
(0.000)*** 
 
-0.7370183 
(0.509) 
-12.72692 
(0.000)*** 
 
 
      
 N 1309 1108 1309  
Wald chi2 
(df) 
241.584 
(30) 
316.422 
(54) 
213.768 
(30) 
 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.000  
R2 Count 0.616 0.596 0.936  
R2 Count (adjusted) 0.189 0.181 0.000  
AIC 2299.139 1948.493 699.192  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
†Logged variable 
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Table A.1 provides the overall results of the factor-variable notation version of the 
multinomial probit models. As with Model 4 presented in Chapter 6, Model 8, the full model for 
onset years, did not converge. The results presented in Table A.1, above, and Table A.2, below 
are identical to those of Table 6.5. This is as expected; the small differences caused by the 
introduction of cross-notational operators, however, can be seen below in Tables A.3, through 
A.5.  
 
Table A.2 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall 
Campaign Choice 
Probability of 
Choosing: 
Margin Delta-method Std. 
Err. 
z P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Model 5: All years, base 
No Active Campaign 0.5258175 0.0129285 40.67 0.000 0.5004781 0.5511568 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0191093 0.0036941 5.17 0.000 0.0118689 0.0263497 
Insurgent Campaign 0.3933814 0.0125272 31.4 0.000 0.3688286 0.4179343 
Civil War Campaign 0.0616918 0.0065165 9.47 0.000 0.0489197 0.074464 
Model 6: All years, full 
No Active Campaign 0.5068654 0.0139152 36.43 0.000 0.479592 0.5341387 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0212145 0.0040787 5.2 0.000 0.0132203 0.0292087 
Insurgent Campaign 0.4117965 0.0135927 30.3 0.000 0.3851554 0.4384376 
Civil War Campaign 0.0601236 0.0068219 8.81 0.000 0.0467529 0.0734944 
Model 7: Onset years, base 
No Active Campaign 0.9358039 0.0067088 139.49 0.000 0.922655 0.9489529 
Terrorist Campaign 0.0030025 0.0014957 2.01 0.045 0.0000709 0.005934 
Insurgent Campaign 0.0581272 0.006418 9.06 0.000 0.0455482 0.0707062 
Civil War Campaign 0.0030664 0.0014287 2.15 0.032 0.0002662 0.0058666 
Model 8: Onset years, full 
No Active Campaign Model failed to converge. 
Terrorist Campaign 
Insurgent Campaign 
Civil War Campaign 
 
The differences between the alternate specification and original multinomial probit 
models become evident when looking at the average marginal effects of each independent 
variable in the three models. This can be seen in Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5, which provide the 
overall average marginal effects for each independent variable. As discussed above, due to the 
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limitations of using the cross-notational operators, only average marginal effects for the original 
(not squared) variables were calculated and are presented below. 
 
Table A.3 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 5 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0304533 0.0145845 2.09 0.037 0.0018682 0.0590385 
S. Admin Cap -0.023782 0.0066393 -3.58 0 -0.0367947 -0.0107693 
S. Mil Cap -0.0097479 0.0150283 -0.65 0.517 -0.0392028 0.0197071 
R. Admin Cap -0.5073993 0.1265135 -4.01 0 -0.7553612 -0.2594375 
R. Mil Cap 0.858392 0.1041942 8.24 0 0.6541752 1.062609 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0100574 0.0056144 1.79 0.073 -0.0009466 0.0210615 
S. Admin Cap -0.0010588 0.0016123 -0.66 0.511 -0.0042188 0.0021012 
S. Mil Cap 0.0013043 0.0050149 0.26 0.795 -0.0085248 0.0111335 
R. Admin Cap -0.1485751 0.0515737 -2.88 0.004 -0.2496577 -0.0474924 
R. Mil Cap -0.1361287 0.079571 -1.71 0.087 -0.292085 0.0198276 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0225382 0.0142947 -1.58 0.115 -0.0505552 0.0054788 
S. Admin Cap 0.0355357 0.0061922 5.74 0 0.0233992 0.0476721 
S. Mil Cap 0.015651 0.0144757 1.08 0.28 -0.0127208 0.0440228 
R. Admin Cap 0.7893635 0.1222061 6.46 0 0.5498439 1.028883 
R. Mil Cap -0.8190294 0.1053034 -7.78 0 -1.02542 -0.6126386 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0179728 0.0064029 -2.81 0.005 -0.0305222 -0.0054234 
S. Admin Cap -0.0106949 0.0042329 -2.53 0.012 -0.0189912 -0.0023986 
S. Mil Cap -0.0072076 0.0072645 -0.99 0.321 -0.0214457 0.0070305 
R. Admin Cap -0.1333853 0.0563039 -2.37 0.018 -0.2437389 -0.0230316 
R. Mil Cap 0.0967735 0.0442642 2.19 0.029 0.0100172 0.1835298 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
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Table A.4 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 6 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0134768 0.0200724 0.67 0.502 -0.0258644 0.0528179 
S. Admin Cap -0.0201986 0.0111712 -1.81 0.071 -0.0420938 0.0016967 
S. Mil Cap -0.0084248 0.0184973 -0.46 0.649 -0.0446789 0.0278293 
R. Admin Cap -0.2097889 0.2550041 -0.82 0.411 -0.7095878 0.29001 
R. Mil Cap 0.7127066 0.1562008 4.56 0 0.4065587 1.018854 
Ethnic F. -0.0174559 0.1177179 -0.15 0.882 -0.2481789 0.213267 
Linguistic F. -0.3873567 0.0845421 -4.58 0 -0.5530562 -0.2216571 
Religious F. 0.243931 0.0763021 3.2 0.001 0.0943817 0.3934803 
Pop. Density -0.0002278 0.0001854 -1.23 0.219 -0.0005911 0.0001355 
Polyarchy 0.0030424 0.0025895 1.17 0.24 -0.0020328 0.0081177 
GDP** -0.0132124 0.0234634 -0.56 0.573 -0.0591998 0.032775 
Mountain T. -0.0017949 0.0007444 -2.41 0.016 -0.003254 -0.0003358 
Forest T. -0.0015018 0.0010514 -1.43 0.153 -0.0035626 0.000559 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0053252 0.0077874 0.68 0.494 -0.0099378 0.0205882 
S. Admin Cap -0.0036126 0.0025621 -1.41 0.159 -0.0086343 0.001409 
S. Mil Cap -0.0088685 0.0041411 -2.14 0.032 -0.0169848 -0.0007522 
R. Admin Cap -0.2578324 0.0973072 -2.65 0.008 -0.448551 -0.0671138 
R. Mil Cap -0.1026762 0.2589742 -0.4 0.692 -0.6102563 0.4049038 
Ethnic F. 0.0280214 0.0423647 0.66 0.508 -0.0550118 0.1110546 
Linguistic F. -0.0262756 0.0287305 -0.91 0.36 -0.0825864 0.0300352 
Religious F. 0.0544122 0.0241821 2.25 0.024 0.0070161 0.1018082 
Pop. Density 0.000079 0.0000402 1.96 0.05 9.28E-08 0.0001578 
Polyarchy 0.0014795 0.0007973 1.86 0.064 -0.0000832 0.0030422 
GDP** -0.0073382 0.0068822 -1.07 0.286 -0.020827 0.0061507 
Mountain T. 0.0000924 0.0002549 0.36 0.717 -0.0004071 0.0005919 
Forest T. 0.000372 0.0003153 1.18 0.238 -0.000246 0.00099 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0085978 0.0197839 -0.43 0.664 -0.0473736 0.030178 
S. Admin Cap 0.0294978 0.0109354 2.7 0.007 0.0080649 0.0509308 
S. Mil Cap 0.0181861 0.0185791 0.98 0.328 -0.0182283 0.0546005 
R. Admin Cap 1.03456 0.2473771 4.18 0 0.5497101 1.519411 
R. Mil Cap -0.7350903 0.1709733 -4.3 0 -1.070192 -0.3999887 
Ethnic F. -0.1124525 0.117088 -0.96 0.337 -0.3419407 0.1170357 
Linguistic F. 0.4491257 0.0840059 5.35 0 0.2844772 0.6137743 
Religious F. -0.2462365 0.0779422 -3.16 0.002 -0.3990004 -0.0934726 
Pop. Density -0.0000323 0.0001987 -0.16 0.871 -0.0004218 0.0003572 
Polyarchy -0.0038803 0.0026028 -1.49 0.136 -0.0089817 0.001221 
GDP** 0.0566711 0.0224278 2.53 0.012 0.0127134 0.1006288 
Mountain T. 0.0015264 0.0007476 2.04 0.041 0.0000612 0.0029917 
Forest T. -0.0003856 0.0010497 -0.37 0.713 -0.0024431 0.0016718 
296 
Table A.4 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, 
Model 6 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0102041 0.0103448 -0.99 0.324 -0.0304796 0.0100715 
S. Admin Cap -0.0056866 0.0057083 -1 0.319 -0.0168747 0.0055014 
S. Mil Cap -0.0008927 0.0083549 -0.11 0.915 -0.0172681 0.0154826 
R. Admin Cap -0.5669375 0.1387632 -4.09 0 -0.8389083 -0.2949666 
R. Mil Cap 0.1250599 0.0464487 2.69 0.007 0.0340221 0.2160977 
Ethnic F. 0.1018866 0.0602121 1.69 0.091 -0.0161269 0.2199002 
Linguistic F. -0.0354935 0.0438125 -0.81 0.418 -0.1213644 0.0503774 
Religious F. -0.0521063 0.0323124 -1.61 0.107 -0.1154375 0.0112249 
Pop. Density 0.0001811 0.0000834 2.17 0.03 0.0000177 0.0003446 
Polyarchy -0.0006416 0.0011563 -0.55 0.579 -0.0029079 0.0016247 
GDP** -0.0361204 0.0109076 -3.31 0.001 -0.0574988 -0.014742 
Mountain T. 0.0001761 0.0003313 0.53 0.595 -0.0004732 0.0008254 
Forest T. 0.0015153 0.0004554 3.33 0.001 0.0006228 0.0024079 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
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Table A.5 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 7 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0001534 0.0069089 0.02 0.982 -0.0133878 0.0136946 
S. Admin Cap -0.0004865 0.0039628 -0.12 0.902 -0.0082535 0.0072804 
S. Mil Cap -0.0139626 0.0084544 -1.65 0.099 -0.0305329 0.0026077 
R. Admin Cap -0.2051229 0.0686744 -2.99 0.003 -0.3397222 -0.0705235 
R. Mil Cap -0.1462935 0.0544604 -2.69 0.007 -0.2530339 -0.0395531 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion -0.0007989 0.00111 -0.72 0.472 -0.0029746 0.0013767 
S. Admin Cap 0.0018734 0.0015612 1.2 0.23 -0.0011864 0.0049333 
S. Mil Cap 0.0054653 0.0031156 1.75 0.079 -0.0006412 0.0115717 
R. Admin Cap -0.0154028 0.0162781 -0.95 0.344 -0.0473072 0.0165016 
R. Mil Cap 0.0044283 0.0119042 0.37 0.71 -0.0189035 0.0277601 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0004407 0.0067583 -0.07 0.948 -0.0136867 0.0128053 
S. Admin Cap 0.0005686 0.0035275 0.16 0.872 -0.0063451 0.0074824 
S. Mil Cap 0.0098466 0.0078541 1.25 0.21 -0.0055471 0.0252403 
R. Admin Cap 0.2111032 0.064872 3.25 0.001 0.0839563 0.33825 
R. Mil Cap 0.1358456 0.0537625 2.53 0.012 0.0304731 0.2412182 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion 0.0010815 0.0011663 0.93 0.354 -0.0012045 0.0033674 
S. Admin Cap -0.0019541 0.0010208 -1.91 0.056 -0.0039548 0.0000467 
S. Mil Cap -0.0013617 0.0013602 -1 0.317 -0.0040277 0.0013043 
R. Admin Cap 0.0094304 0.0182195 0.52 0.605 -0.0262791 0.04514 
R. Mil Cap 0.0059788 0.0031976 1.87 0.062 -0.0002885 0.012246 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
 Alternate Specification: Multinomial Logit Models 
As discussed in Chapter 6, multinomial probit models were chosen as the main model to 
be presented over multinomial logit models due to the lack of a requirement for the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This project limits its scope to 
providing hypotheses about three types of violent rebel campaigns—terrorist, insurgent, and civil 
war—and one other category, the absence of a violent campaign. Since this absence of violence 
is not further parsed into types of civil protest campaigns, or the lack thereof, there is a 
possibility that civil campaigns not captured in this project’s theoretical model could affect 
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preferences for violent campaign choice. Thus, multinomial probit, which does not require the 
IIA, was used as the primary modeling choice for this chapter.  
However, Kropko (2008) argues that, even when the assumption of IIA is violated, 
multinomial logit models may still provide estimation as, or even better, than multinomial probit 
models. Therefore, as a robustness check, the models—as described in Chapter 6, with no 
changes other than switching the estimation from multinomial probit to multinomial logit—were 
run, and these estimates can be seen in Table A.6. While the estimates from the multinomial logit 
models are slightly different (as would be expected by a different estimation methodology), the 
sign and significance of the variables is similar to that of the multinomial probit models 
presented in Chapter 6. The estimates and confidence intervals calculated for each independent 
variable also vary slightly, but also remain roughly in line with the Chapter 6 models. These 
estimates can be seen in Tables A.7 through A.10. 
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Table A.6 Multinomial Logit Models  
 Variables Model 9: 
All years, 
base 
Model 10: 
All years, 
full 
Model 11: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 12: 
Onset only,  
full 
T
er
ro
ri
st
 
Coercion 0.9573912 
(0.013)** 
1.290855 
(0.037)** 
-4.124041 
(0.139) 
Model did not 
converge. 
Coercion2 0.2597726 
(0.089)* 
0.5039265 
(0.029) 
-2.473622 
(0.038)** 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity 
-0.0017479 
(0.988) 
-0.1806413 
(0.326) 
0.594157 
(0.010)** 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity2 
0.0018876 
(0.939) 
-0.0119711 
(0.743) 
0.1486094 
(0.014)** 
 
State Military Capacity 0.6959919 
(0.103) 
0.7394223 
(0.386) 
2.110118 
(0.362) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -0.2654476 
(0.225) 
-0.452844 
(0.131) 
-0.0575401 
(0.933) 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity 
-5.189742 
(0.123) 
-7.72334 
(0.215) 
-18.83561 
(0.463) 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity2 
19.84958 
(0.517) 
51.53015 
(0.079)* 
-81.806 
(0.675) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -10.67934 
(0.038)** 
-58.77888 
(0.027)** 
1.608751 
(0.715) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 7.417685 
(0.013)** 
-140.7398 
(0.201) 
0.0286368 
(0.996) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.671614 
(0.607) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  -0.2189392 
(0.910) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  1.825242 
(0.225) 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.0042958 
(0.035)** 
  
Polyarchy  0.0719755 
(0.119) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -0.3376232 
(0.429) 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0059045 
(0.751) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0218979 
(0.285) 
  
Constant -5.120962 
(0.000)*** -10.54288 
(0.020)** 
-10.68168 
(0.000)*** 
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Table A.6 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Models  
 Variables Model 9: 
All years, 
base 
Model 10: 
All years, 
full 
Model 11: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 12: 
Onset only,  
full 
In
su
rg
en
t 
Coercion -0.1557139 
(0.239) 
-0.080995 
(0.612) 
-0.2104546 
(0.513) 
 
Coercion2 -0.0224845 
(0.674) 
-0.0229005 
(0.745) 
-0.1060557 
(0.424) 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity 
0.1357461 
(0.004)*** 
0.1675655 
(0.016)** 
0.0045921 
(0.971) 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity2 
-0.0070091 
(0.490) 
0.0103437 
(0.458) 
-0.0000682 
(0.998) 
 
State Military Capacity 0.082771 
(0.449) 
0.1627951 
(0.249) 
-0.0535837 
(0.749) 
 
State Military Capacity2 -0.0068324 
(0.882) 
-0.0422291 
(0.463) 
0.1038049 
(0.170) 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity 
3.233585 
(0.000)*** 
3.334763 
(0.008)*** 
4.005962 
(0.002)*** 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity2 
11.25988 
(0.050)** 
16.67508 
(0.027)** 
-2.134785 
(0.860) 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -4.172116 
(0.000)*** 
-3.527031 
(0.000)*** 
2.037299 
(0.024)** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 2.896129 
(0.000)*** 
2.823427 
(0.003)*** 
-5.707332 
(0.006)*** 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.2813544 
(0.632) 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  2.15019 
(0.000)*** 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.212426 
(0.002)*** 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.000311 
(0.761) 
  
Polyarchy  -0.0164172 
(0.251) 
  
GDP per Capita†  0.1840222 
(0.116) 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0090335 
(0.017)** 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0022159 
(0.682) 
  
Constant -0.6802238 
(0.000)*** -2.65243 
(0.008)*** 
-2.60564 
(0.000)*** 
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Table A.6 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Models  
 Variables Model 9: 
All years, 
base 
Model 10: 
All years, 
full 
Model 11: 
Onset only, 
base 
Model 12: 
Onset only,  
full 
C
iv
il
 W
a
r
 
Coercion -0.9538861 
(0.004)*** 
-0.5852344 
(0.155) 
-0.7617366 
(0.610) 
 
Coercion2 -0.2235323 
(0.074)* 
-0.1225565 
(0.466) 
-0.7788121 
(0.248) 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity 
0.0605669 
(0.436) 
0.1936433 
(0.149) 
-11.2568 
(0.000)*** 
 
State Administrative 
Capacity2 
0.0385814 
(0.024)** 
0.0452305 
(0.117) 
-1.659933 
(0.000)*** 
 
State Military Capacity -0.1657487 
(0.354) 
0.2643258 
(0.426) 
-0.0097024 
(0.994) 
 
State Military Capacity2 0.0390471 
(0.596) 
-0.0942361 
(0.448) 
-0.7395961 
(0.075)* 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity 
-1.596605 
(0.187) 
-8.460622 
(0.001)*** 
-2.793023 
(0.356) 
 
Rebel Administrative 
Capacity2 
-1.805408 
(0.880) 
34.59906 
(0.007)*** 
71.57672 
(0.008)*** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity -0.3522915 
(0.705) 
0.8775174 
(0.409) 
3.641582 
(0.011)** 
 
Rebel Military Capacity2 -0.149756 
(0.892) 
-1.095381 
(0.496) 
-2.989295 
(0.025)** 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  2.380135 
(0.059)* 
  
Linguistic Fractionalization  -0.1782673 
(0.850) 
  
Religious Fractionalization  -1.148923 
(0.085)* 
  
Population 
Density  
 0.0041253 
(0.012)** 
  
Polyarchy  -0.0180442 
(0.456) 
  
GDP per Capita†  -0.6571758 
(0.009)*** 
  
Mountainous Terrain  0.0047552 
(0.479) 
  
Forested Terrain  0.0293302 
(0.001)*** 
  
Constant -2.871533 
(0.000)*** -0.5734196 
(0.763) 
-23.01554 
(0.001)** 
 
 
      
 N 1309 1108 1309  
Wald chi2 
(df) 
229.623 313.261 449.458  
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.000 0.000  
McFadden R2 0.1055 0.139 0.080  
R2 Count 0.618 0.601 0.937  
R2 Count (adjusted) 0.194 0.192 0.012  
AIC 2296.996 1950.396 698.675  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
†Logged variable 
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Table A.7 Multinomial Logit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall Campaign Choice 
Probability 
of Choosing: 
Margin Delta-method 
Std. Err. 
z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Model 9: All years, base 
No Active 
Campaign 0.526356 0.0129424 40.67 0 0.5009894 0.5517226 
Terrorist 
Campaign 0.0190985 0.003669 5.21 0 0.0119074 0.0262897 
Insurgent 
Campaign 0.3926662 0.0125755 31.22 0 0.3680187 0.4173136 
Civil War 
Campaign 0.0618793 0.0065471 9.45 0 0.0490472 0.0747114 
Model 10: All years, full 
No Active 
Campaign 0.5063177 0.0139689 36.25 0 0.4789392 0.5336962 
Terrorist 
Campaign 0.0216607 0.0041449 5.23 0 0.0135368 0.0297845 
Insurgent 
Campaign 0.4115523 0.0137174 30 0 0.3846667 0.4384379 
Civil War 
Campaign 0.0604693 0.0068889 8.78 0 0.0469674 0.0739713 
Model 11: Onset years, base 
No Active 
Campaign 0.9358289 0.0066869 139.95 0 0.9227228 0.948935 
Terrorist 
Campaign 0.0030558 0.001515 2.02 0.044 0.0000865 0.006025 
Insurgent 
Campaign 0.0580596 0.0064102 9.06 0 0.0454958 0.0706234 
Civil War 
Campaign 0.0030558 0.0013784 2.22 0.027 0.0003542 0.0057573 
Model 12: Onset years, full 
No Active 
Campaign 
Model failed to converge. 
Terrorist 
Campaign 
Insurgent 
Campaign 
Civil War 
Campaign 
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Table A.8 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 9 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0524635 0.0277922 1.89 0.059 -0.0020082 0.1069352 
Coercion2 0.009519 0.0112658 0.84 0.398 -0.0125616 0.0315997 
S. Admin Cap -0.0261324 0.0095954 -2.72 0.006 -0.044939 -0.0073259 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0000976 0.002048 -0.05 0.962 -0.0041115 0.0039164 
S. Mil Cap -0.0147242 0.0215178 -0.68 0.494 -0.0568983 0.0274498 
S. Mil Cap2 0.00206 0.0091708 0.22 0.822 -0.0159144 0.0200344 
R. Admin Cap -0.4756772 0.1298488 -3.66 0 -0.7301761 -0.2211783 
R. Admin Cap2 -2.098056 1.217105 -1.72 0.085 -4.483538 0.2874253 
R. Mil Cap 0.8398766 0.100761 8.34 0 0.6423887 1.037365 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.5695096 0.1241768 -4.59 0 -0.8128916 -0.3261276 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0195269 0.0073385 2.66 0.008 0.0051437 0.0339101 
Coercion2 0.0050902 0.002776 1.83 0.067 -0.0003507 0.010531 
S. Admin Cap -0.0012474 0.0019697 -0.63 0.527 -0.005108 0.0026131 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0000476 0.0004352 0.11 0.913 -0.0008053 0.0009005 
S. Mil Cap 0.0119234 0.0080893 1.47 0.14 -0.0039314 0.0277783 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0047279 0.0039842 -1.19 0.235 -0.0125367 0.0030809 
R. Admin Cap -0.1180741 0.0618431 -1.91 0.056 -0.2392844 0.0031362 
R. Admin Cap2 0.2615516 0.5445523 0.48 0.631 -0.8057514 1.328855 
R. Mil Cap -0.155076 0.0919144 -1.69 0.092 -0.3352249 0.0250728 
R. Mil Cap2 0.1081904 0.0535753 2.02 0.043 0.0031848 0.2131961 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.020339 0.0269721 -0.75 0.451 -0.0732034 0.0325254 
Coercion2 -0.0021715 0.0108397 -0.2 0.841 -0.0234168 0.0190739 
S. Admin Cap 0.0267963 0.0090732 2.95 0.003 0.0090131 0.0445795 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0022693 0.0020253 -1.12 0.263 -0.0062388 0.0017002 
S. Mil Cap 0.0146886 0.0224479 0.65 0.513 -0.0293085 0.0586856 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0000128 0.009439 0 0.999 -0.0184873 0.0185129 
R. Admin Cap 0.7451776 0.1214102 6.14 0 0.5072179 0.9831372 
R. Admin Cap2 2.196557 1.163923 1.89 0.059 -0.0846891 4.477804 
R. Mil Cap -0.7645276 0.1035354 -7.38 0 -0.9674532 -0.5616019 
R. Mil Cap2 0.5388987 0.1152859 4.67 0 0.3129426 0.7648549 
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Table A.8 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 9 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0516525 0.0188984 -2.73 0.006 -0.0886927 -0.0146122 
Coercion2 -0.012438 0.0070488 -1.76 0.078 -0.0262534 0.0013774 
S. Admin Cap 0.0005836 0.004158 0.14 0.888 -0.007566 0.0087331 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0023193 0.0009562 2.43 0.015 0.0004451 0.0041934 
S. Mil Cap -0.0118885 0.0101345 -1.17 0.241 -0.0317518 0.0079748 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0026553 0.0041282 0.64 0.52 -0.0054358 0.0107464 
R. Admin Cap -0.1514207 0.0662405 -2.29 0.022 -0.2812498 -0.0215916 
R. Admin Cap2 -0.3600738 0.6628683 -0.54 0.587 -1.659272 0.9391242 
R. Mil Cap 0.0797384 0.0505617 1.58 0.115 -0.0193608 0.1788375 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.0775874 0.059248 -1.31 0.19 -0.1937113 0.0385364 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
Table A.9 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 10 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0220249 0.0326844 0.67 0.5 -0.0420353 0.0860851 
Coercion2 0.0037558 0.0141315 0.27 0.79 -0.0239414 0.0314531 
S. Admin Cap -0.0342661 0.0139862 -2.45 0.014 -0.0616786 -0.0068536 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0031442 0.0028619 -1.1 0.272 -0.0087534 0.002465 
S. Mil Cap -0.0431417 0.0288458 -1.5 0.135 -0.0996784 0.0133951 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0141239 0.0115067 1.23 0.22 -0.0084288 0.0366766 
R. Admin Cap -0.2649313 0.2597383 -1.02 0.308 -0.7740091 0.2441464 
R. Admin Cap2 -4.455257 1.501967 -2.97 0.003 -7.399057 -1.511456 
R. Mil Cap 1.078702 0.2467173 4.37 0 0.5951453 1.56226 
R. Mil Cap2 0.683954 0.9545063 0.72 0.474 -1.186844 2.554752 
Ethnic F. -0.0378466 0.1198375 -0.32 0.752 -0.2727239 0.1970306 
Linguistic F. -0.3739781 0.0851957 -4.39 0 -0.5409585 -0.2069977 
Religious F. 0.2358484 0.0772548 3.05 0.002 0.0844318 0.3872651 
Pop. Density -0.0002187 0.0001884 -1.16 0.246 -0.0005879 0.0001505 
Polyarchy 0.0028846 0.0026289 1.1 0.273 -0.0022679 0.0080371 
GDP** -0.0094213 0.0243539 -0.39 0.699 -0.0571541 0.0383115 
Mountain T. -0.0017983 0.0007541 -2.38 0.017 -0.0032762 -0.0003203 
Forest T. -0.0014848 0.0010755 -1.38 0.167 -0.0035928 0.0006231 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion 0.0257982 0.0119602 2.16 0.031 0.0023566 0.0492399 
Coercion2 0.0098534 0.0044836 2.2 0.028 0.0010656 0.0186411 
S. Admin Cap -0.0052153 0.0035409 -1.47 0.141 -0.0121553 0.0017248 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0003802 0.0006857 -0.55 0.579 -0.0017242 0.0009638 
S. Mil Cap 0.0120496 0.0163015 0.74 0.46 -0.0199006 0.0439999 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0080041 0.0058291 -1.37 0.17 -0.019429 0.0034207 
R. Admin Cap -0.1656245 0.1174896 -1.41 0.159 -0.3958998 0.0646509 
R. Admin Cap2 0.76907 0.5526478 1.39 0.164 -0.3140998 1.85224 
R. Mil Cap -1.074078 0.5261909 -2.04 0.041 -2.105393 -0.0427628 
R. Mil Cap2 -2.673055 2.111529 -1.27 0.206 -6.811575 1.465465 
Ethnic F. 0.0310216 0.0610677 0.51 0.611 -0.088669 0.1507122 
Linguistic F. -0.0240021 0.0360673 -0.67 0.506 -0.0946927 0.0466884 
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Table A.9 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 10 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Religious F. 0.047161 0.0293302 1.61 0.108 -0.0103252 0.1046472 
Pop. Density 0.0000726 0.0000417 1.74 0.081 -9.06E-06 0.0001543 
Polyarchy 0.001531 0.0008982 1.7 0.088 -0.0002294 0.0032914 
GDP** -0.0072283 0.0079157 -0.91 0.361 -0.0227427 0.0082861 
Mountain T. 0.0000205 0.0003458 0.06 0.953 -0.0006572 0.0006981 
Forest T. 0.0003536 0.0003855 0.92 0.359 -0.000402 0.0011091 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0171957 0.0332536 -0.52 0.605 -0.0823716 0.0479802 
Coercion2 -0.0070126 0.0146192 -0.48 0.631 -0.0356658 0.0216405 
S. Admin Cap 0.032456 0.0138538 2.34 0.019 0.005303 0.0596089 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0013512 0.0027747 0.49 0.626 -0.0040871 0.0067896 
S. Mil Cap 0.0214631 0.0300818 0.71 0.476 -0.0374961 0.0804223 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0026168 0.0121894 -0.21 0.83 -0.0265076 0.021274 
R. Admin Cap 0.928741 0.2539406 3.66 0 0.4310265 1.426456 
R. Admin Cap2 2.275687 1.506942 1.51 0.131 -0.6778661 5.22924 
R. Mil Cap -0.1960283 0.2893947 -0.68 0.498 -0.7632316 0.3711749 
R. Mil Cap2 1.921261 1.072858 1.79 0.073 -0.1815019 4.024023 
Ethnic F. -0.1209439 0.122265 -0.99 0.323 -0.3605789 0.118691 
Linguistic F. 0.4496523 0.0871329 5.16 0 0.278875 0.6204296 
Religious F. -0.2446848 0.0795838 -3.07 0.002 -0.4006661 -0.0887034 
Pop. Density -0.0000578 0.0002165 -0.27 0.79 -0.000482 0.0003665 
Polyarchy -0.003706 0.0027003 -1.37 0.17 -0.0089984 0.0015865 
GDP** 0.054196 0.0230722 2.35 0.019 0.0089753 0.0994167 
Mountain T. 0.0017161 0.0007761 2.21 0.027 0.000195 0.0032372 
Forest T. -0.0003288 0.0010928 -0.3 0.763 -0.0024707 0.0018131 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0306272 0.0215234 -1.42 0.155 -0.0728122 0.0115578 
Coercion2 -0.0065965 0.0087588 -0.75 0.451 -0.0237635 0.0105704 
S. Admin Cap 0.0070254 0.0067157 1.05 0.296 -0.0061371 0.0201878 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0021731 0.0014652 1.48 0.138 -0.0006987 0.005045 
S. Mil Cap 0.0096288 0.0174885 0.55 0.582 -0.0246481 0.0439057 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0035029 0.0065258 -0.54 0.591 -0.0162932 0.0092874 
R. Admin Cap -0.4981824 0.1356015 -3.67 0 -0.7639565 -0.2324084 
R. Admin Cap2 1.410489 0.6404568 2.2 0.028 0.1552164 2.665761 
R. Mil Cap 0.1914035 0.0603672 3.17 0.002 0.0730859 0.3097211 
R. Mil Cap2 0.0678403 0.1742579 0.39 0.697 -0.2736989 0.4093794 
Ethnic F. 0.1277682 0.0647498 1.97 0.048 0.0008609 0.2546755 
Linguistic F. -0.051672 0.047923 -1.08 0.281 -0.1455993 0.0422553 
Religious F. -0.0383243 0.0341954 -1.12 0.262 -0.1053461 0.0286974 
Pop. Density 0.0002038 0.0000877 2.32 0.02 0.0000319 0.0003757 
Polyarchy -0.0007097 0.0012401 -0.57 0.567 -0.0031401 0.0017208 
GDP** -0.0375461 0.0127027 -2.96 0.003 -0.062443 -0.0126493 
Mountain T. 0.0000617 0.0003449 0.18 0.858 -0.0006142 0.0007376 
Forest T. 0.0014601 0.00048 3.04 0.002 0.0005193 0.0024009 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
**Logged variable 
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Table A.10 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 11 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: No Active Campaign 
Coercion 0.0248617 0.0200451 1.24 0.215 -0.0144261 0.0641494 
Coercion2 0.0146667 0.0087168 1.68 0.092 -0.002418 0.0317514 
S. Admin Cap 0.027242 0.0171826 1.59 0.113 -0.0064353 0.0609193 
S. Admin Cap2 0.003885 0.0025568 1.52 0.129 -0.0011262 0.0088962 
S. Mil Cap -0.0030578 0.0119811 -0.26 0.799 -0.0265404 0.0204247 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0034755 0.0047741 -0.73 0.467 -0.0128326 0.0058816 
R. Admin Cap -0.1539832 0.1041163 -1.48 0.139 -0.3580474 0.050081 
R. Admin Cap2 0.1594478 0.8601643 0.19 0.853 -1.526443 1.845339 
R. Mil Cap -0.122971 0.0511541 -2.4 0.016 -0.2232312 -0.0227109 
R. Mil Cap2 0.3130203 0.1161375 2.7 0.007 0.085395 0.5406456 
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign 
Coercion -0.0121793 0.0101202 -1.2 0.229 -0.0320146 0.0076559 
Coercion2 -0.0073077 0.004993 -1.46 0.143 -0.0170938 0.0024784 
S. Admin Cap 0.0017797 0.0010803 1.65 0.099 -0.0003376 0.0038971 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0004432 0.0002765 1.6 0.109 -0.0000987 0.0009851 
S. Mil Cap 0.006257 0.0076067 0.82 0.411 -0.0086518 0.0211657 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0001848 0.0020439 -0.09 0.928 -0.0041907 0.0038211 
R. Admin Cap -0.0563826 0.0803385 -0.7 0.483 -0.2138432 0.101078 
R. Admin Cap2 -0.2420651 0.5862734 -0.41 0.68 -1.39114 0.9070097 
R. Mil Cap 0.0044477 0.0132995 0.33 0.738 -0.0216188 0.0305141 
R. Mil Cap2 0.0009578 0.016054 0.06 0.952 -0.0305076 0.0324232 
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign 
Coercion -0.0105813 0.017237 -0.61 0.539 -0.0443651 0.0232026 
Coercion2 -0.0052145 0.0070904 -0.74 0.462 -0.0191113 0.0086824 
S. Admin Cap 0.0017924 0.0067793 0.26 0.791 -0.0114948 0.0150796 
S. Admin Cap2 0.0002149 0.0012094 0.18 0.859 -0.0021554 0.0025852 
S. Mil Cap -0.0032038 0.0090046 -0.36 0.722 -0.0208526 0.0144449 
S. Mil Cap2 0.0057009 0.0040842 1.4 0.163 -0.002304 0.0137058 
R. Admin Cap 0.2188014 0.0707066 3.09 0.002 0.0802191 0.3573837 
R. Admin Cap2 -0.1127506 0.6506677 -0.17 0.862 -1.388036 1.162535 
R. Mil Cap 0.1088295 0.0494858 2.2 0.028 0.0118391 0.20582 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.3066188 0.1156356 -2.65 0.008 -0.5332604 -0.0799771 
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Table A.9 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 11 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err.* z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Outcome: Civil War Campaign 
Coercion -0.0020374 0.0041232 -0.49 0.621 -0.0101186 0.0060439 
Coercion2 -0.0021023 0.0020535 -1.02 0.306 -0.0061272 0.0019226 
S. Admin Cap -0.0306811 0.0165974 -1.85 0.065 -0.0632113 0.0018492 
S. Admin Cap2 -0.0045243 0.0023699 -1.91 0.056 -0.0091692 0.0001206 
S. Mil Cap -0.0000229 0.0035036 -0.01 0.995 -0.0068898 0.0068439 
S. Mil Cap2 -0.0020306 0.0015627 -1.3 0.194 -0.0050934 0.0010322 
R. Admin Cap -0.0081532 0.0079564 -1.02 0.305 -0.0237474 0.0074411 
R. Admin Cap2 0.1955474 0.0916468 2.13 0.033 0.015923 0.3751719 
R. Mil Cap 0.0096271 0.0059907 1.61 0.108 -0.0021143 0.0213686 
R. Mil Cap2 -0.0073223 0.0048126 -1.52 0.128 -0.0167548 0.0021101 
*Standard error calculated using Delta method. 
 
